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Summary
This thesis deals with the human factor in aviation security screening. In the last
decades the threat level of terroristic attacks has increased dramatically. This also
aﬀects aviation. By and by diﬀerent security measures were introduced and in the
1970s airports began implementing the screening of passengers and their baggage.
Thereby it should be prevented that any object can be brought aboard an aircraft
that could be used to do harm. This task is being executed by aviation security
screening oﬃcers.
In the course of the development in recent years it has been realized more and
more that the position of the screening oﬃcers has to be strengthened. They are -
as human factor - one of the weakest links in the whole screening procedure. Still
they have to take the ﬁnal decision whether a passenger and his bag are clear and
thus allowed to board the aircraft. Technologies are advanced constantly, but also
screening oﬃcers should receive attention. The aim is to turn the human factor into
the strongest link in the screening procedure. Therefore, investments have to be
made into careful selection and speciﬁc training of the screening oﬃcers in order
to lay the foundations for reaching and maintaining high standards and quality.
One essential aspect to even make this possible is the assessment of the screening
oﬃcers’ competencies. In this thesis the focus lies on the X-ray screening task within
the screening procedure. Diﬀerent aspects of aviation security X-ray screening are
attended to.
The ﬁrst part of this thesis deals with competency assessment and training. Chapter
1 presents a detailed introduction into assessment and certiﬁcation of X-ray image
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interpretation competency of aviation security screening oﬃcers. Certiﬁcation is a
very important means in the attempt to introduce and maintain high standards. It
is disclosed what is important for serious and professional competency assessment
and certiﬁcation. The study in Chapter 2 investigated the eﬀect of computer-based
training for X-ray image interpretation competency. Large eﬀects were found in that
the X-ray image interpretation competency, assessed with an appropriate test, could
be increased signiﬁcantly when screening oﬃcers received training. It could also be
shown a transfer of knowledge due to training. This is an essential ﬁnding and one
headstone in the intention to strengthen the human factor in the process of aviation
security screening. Chapter 3 takes a diﬀerent approach on the investigation of train-
ing eﬀects. Here, the time used to interpret an X-ray image of a bag and searching
it for a threat object is analyzed. By applying a special formula, portions of this
reaction time can be allocated to diﬀerent processes involved in the interpretation of
an image. It was assumed that on the one hand the image is searched visually, that
is, scanned. The portion of time needed for this process is called search time. On
the other hand, time is needed to take a decision. Objects ﬁrst have to be detected
in the image and then they have to be identiﬁed and a decision has to be taken
if it is a threat object or a harmless object. This is the decision time. Chapter 3
investigated the eﬀect of training on these two interpretation processes by analyzing
the search time and the decision time separately. The eﬀect of training cropped up
in both processes, in decision time even more than in search time. This means that
not only the scanning process can be improved by training, but the speciﬁc learning
of threat objects decreases the decision time. That is, threat objects are detected
faster and the interpretation and recognition becomes faster as well.
In the second part of this thesis potential decision aids for the X-ray image inter-
pretation task of aviation security screening oﬃcers are investigated. The study in
Chapter 4 explored the image enhancement feature which is integrated in most of
the X-ray machines. Image enhancements are algorithms for the diﬀerent display
of an X-ray image. Modern X-ray machines color-code the diﬀerent materials being
scanned. For example, this artiﬁcial coloring displays metallic material in blue and
organic material in orange. Of course there are many diﬀerent shadings and more
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colors. Image enhancements are supposed to facilitate the interpretation of an X-ray
image in that they provide the possibility to suppress certain image information and
bring out other. For example, the Metallic Only ﬁlter displays only the blue-colored
metallic material, the Organic Only ﬁlter only displays organic material and sup-
presses all other material, etc. These image enhancements are provided by the X-ray
machine manufacturers without having been investigated regarding their eﬀective-
ness. This was the aim of the study in Chapter 4. The present study shows that
X-ray image interpretation could not be improved with these image enhancement
ﬁlters. Chapter 5 applies a concept on X-ray image interpretation that originated
in marketing. Marketing, dealing with consumers and their behavior among others,
devides the products on a market into diﬀerent sets. Of all products that are avail-
able on the market, the consideration set includes those products a consumers takes
into account when choosing the product to be bought. For our study, the concept of
the consideration set is adapted to X-ray image interpretation. As a decision aid for
aviation security screening oﬃcers, when interpreting an X-ray image of a passenger
bag, consideration information was provided. Consideration information were X-ray
image patches that were presented simultaneously to the bag. The results of this
study indicate that there is no beneﬁt of consideration information on detection
performance of threat objects in X-ray images of passenger bags.
The third part of the thesis is more of statistical and test theoretical nature. Chapter
6 deals with the analysis of tests which are used for certiﬁcation of aviation security
screening oﬃcers. Diﬀerent ways of analysis were applied and their eﬀect on test
diﬃculty and reliability were investigated. There could actually be found a rather
large impact of analysis method which conﬁrms the need to take a closer look at
the scoring method that is used for assessing competencies of employees. The re-
sults provide a good basis for the decision which analysis method is appropriate to
use for certiﬁcation purposes in aviation security screening. In Chapter 7 the Angoﬀ
method is applied to X-ray image tests. The Angoﬀ method is a widely used method
to establish a pass mark for a test with a criterion-referenced approach instead of a
normative approach. The ﬁrst aim was to investigate if the Angoﬀ method is appro-
priate to use for image tests since in the literature it is mainly applied to theoretical
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exams, mostly multiple-choice exams. Reliability analyses conﬁrmed the applicabil-
ity of the Angoﬀ method for establishing a pass mark for image tests. A passmark
was established for an X-ray image test which is used for certiﬁcation of aviation
security screening oﬃcers. This criterion-referenced pass mark is compared to the
normative passmark which has been applied until now. The results are comparable.
The main contribution of this thesis are the new approaches that were applied
to aviation security X-ray image interpretation competency assessment - besides
the formulation of important basic prerequisites for fundamental headstones in the
ambitious intention to turn the human operator into the strongest link within the
aviation security screening process.
Part I
Competency Assessment and Training

1Assessment and Certiﬁcation of X-Ray Image
Interpretation Competency of Aviation Security
Screeners
1.1 Competency Assessment in Aviation Security Screening
1.1.1 Introduction
In response to the increased risk of terrorist attacks, large investments have been
made in recent years in aviation security technology. However, the best equipment
is of limited value if the people who operate it are not selected and trained ap-
propriately to perform their tasks eﬀectively and accurately. Latterly, the relevance
of human factors has increasingly been recognized. One important aspect of hu-
man factors is the competency of the personnel who conducts security screening at
airports (aviation security screeners) and assessment of their competency. Compe-
tency assessment is important in maintaining the workforce certiﬁcation process.
The main aim of certiﬁcation procedures is to ensure that adequate standards in
aviation security are consistently and reliably achieved. Certiﬁcation of aviation se-
curity screeners can be considered as providing quality control over the screening
process. Using certiﬁcation tests, important information on strengths and weaknesses
in aviation security procedures in general as well as on each individual screener can
be obtained. As a consequence, certiﬁcation can also be a valuable basis for qualify-
ing personnel, measuring training eﬀectiveness, improving training procedures and
increasing motivation. In short, certiﬁcation and competency assessment can be
important instruments in improving aviation security. The implementation of com-
petency assessment procedures has several challenges. First, what should be assessed
has to be identiﬁed. Then, it should be considered how procedures for certiﬁcation
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of diﬀerent competencies can be implemented. Another important challenge is inter-
national standardization, since several countries, organizations and even companies
are independently developing their own certiﬁcation or quality control systems. The
following international documents refer to certiﬁcation and competency assessment
of aviation security staﬀ:
EU Regulation 2320/2002
ICAO Annex 17, 3.4.31
ICAO-Manual on Human Factors in Civil Aviation Security Operations (Doc
9808)2
ICAO Human Factors Training Manual (Doc 9683), Part 1, Chapter 4, and Ap-
pendix 6, Appendix 323
ICAO Security Manual for Safeguarding Civil Aviation Against Acts of Unlawful
Interference, Doc 8973, Chapter 4, I-4-454
ECAC Doc 30, Chapter 12, and Annex IV-12A5
ECAC Doc 30 by the European Civil Aviation Conference speciﬁes three elements
for initial certiﬁcation of aviation security screeners:
an X-ray image interpretation exam
a theoretical exam
a practical exam
Periodic certiﬁcation should contain a theoretical exam and an X-ray image in-
terpretation exam. Practical exams can be conducted if considered necessary. This
chapter covers the ﬁrst element, that is, how to examine competency in X-ray image
1 ICAO Annex 17, 3.4.3 (Each Contracting State shall ensure that the persons carrying out screening
operations are certiﬁed according to the requirements of the national civil aviation security programme)
2 ICAO Manual on Human Factors in Civil Aviation Security Operations (Doc 9808)
3 ICAO Human Factors Training Manual (Doc 9683), Part 1, Chapter 4, and in Appendix 6 - Guidance on
recruitment, selection, training, and certiﬁcation of aviation security staﬀ and Appendix 32 - Guidance
on the use of threat image projection
4 ICAO Security Manual for Safeguarding Civil Aviation Against Acts of Unlawful Interference, Doc 8973,
Chapter 4, I-4-45 (Recruitment, selection, training and certiﬁcation of security staﬀ)
5 ECAC Doc 30 Annex IV-12A Certiﬁcation criteria for screeners and ECAC Doc 30, Chapter 12, 12.2.3
Certiﬁcation of security staﬀ 1.1.10.3
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interpretation. First, human factors best practice guidance for assessing the X-ray
image interpretation competency of aviation security screeners is provided. Three
diﬀerent possibilities are discussed, which can serve to measure competency in X-ray
image interpretation: covert testing, threat image projection (TIP), and computer-
based image tests. Second, on-the-job assessment of screener competency using TIP
is discussed. Third, an example of a reliable, valid, and standardized computer-based
test is presented which is now used at more than 100 airports worldwide to mea-
sure competency in X-ray image interpretation and also for certiﬁcation purposes,
the X-Ray Competency Assessment Test (X-Ray CAT). Fourth, the application of
this test in an EU-funded project (the VIA Project) at several European airports is
presented.
1.1.2 Requirements for assessing competency
One of the most important tasks of an aviation security screener is the interpretation
of X-ray images of passenger bags and the identiﬁcation of prohibited items within
these bags. Hit rates, false alarm rates, and the time used to visually inspect an
X-ray image of a passenger bag are important measures that can be used to assess
the eﬀectiveness of screeners at this task. A hit refers to detecting prohibited items
in an X-ray image of a passenger bag. The hit rate refers to the percentage of all
X-ray images of bags containing a prohibited item that are correctly judged as being
NOT OK. If a prohibited item is reported in an X-ray image of a bag that does not
contain such an item, this counts as a false alarm. The false alarm rate refers to
the percentage of all harmless bags (i.e., bags not containing any prohibited items)
that are judged as containing a prohibited item by a screener. The time taken to
process each bag is also important as it helps in determining throughput rates and
can indicate response conﬁdence. The results of an X-ray image interpretation test
provide very important information for civil aviation authorities, aviation security
institutions, and companies. Moreover, failing a test can have serious consequences,
depending on the regulations of the appropriate authority. Therefore, it is essential
that a test is fair, reliable, valid, and standardized. In the last 50 years, scientiﬁc
criteria have been developed that are widely used in psychological testing and psy-
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chometrics. These criteria are essential for the development of tests for measuring
human performance. A summary of the three most important concepts, namely
reliability, validity, and standardization, is now presented. A more detailed intro-
duction to psychological testing and psychometrics can be found in handbooks such
as Fishman and Galguera (2003), Kline (2000), or Murphy and Davidshofer (2001).
Reliability
We mean reliability to refer to the ”consistency” or ”repeatability” of measurements.
It is the extent to which the measurements of a test remain consistent over repeated
tests of the same participant under identical conditions. If a test yields consistent
results of the same measure, it is reliable. If repeated measurements produce diﬀerent
results, the test is not reliable. If, for example, an IQ test yields a score of 90 for an
individual today and 125 a week later, it is not reliable. The concept of reliability
is illustrated in Figure 1.1. Each point represents an individual person. The x-axis
represents the test results in the ﬁrst measurement and the y-axis represents the
scores in the same test of the second measurement. Figures 1.1a-c represent tests of
diﬀerent reliability. The test in Figure 1.1a is not reliable. The score a participant
achieved in the ﬁrst measurement does not correspond at all with the test score of the
second measurement. The reliability coeﬃcient can be calculated by the correlation
between the two measurements. In Figure 1.1a the correlation is near zero, that is,
r = 0.05 (the theoretical maximum is 1). The test in Figure 1.1b is somewhat more
reliable. The correlation between the two measurements is 0.50. Figure 1.1c shows
a highly reliable test with a correlation of 0.95.
The reliability of a test may be estimated by a variety of methods. When the same
test is repeated (usually after a time interval during which job performance is as-
sumed not to have changed), the correlation between the scores achieved on the two
measurement dates can be calculated. This measure is called test-retest reliability.
A more common method is to calculate the split-half reliability. With this method,
the test is divided into two halves. The whole test is administered to a sample of
participants and the total score for each half of the test is calculated. The split-
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Fig. 1.1. Illustration of diﬀerent correlation coeﬃcients. a: r = 0.05, b: r = 0.50, c: r = 0.95.
half reliability is the correlation between the test scores obtained in each half. In
the alternate forms method, two tests are created that are equivalent in terms of
content, response processes, and statistical characteristics. Using this method, par-
ticipants take both tests and the correlation between the two scores is calculated
(alternate forms reliability). Reliability can also be a measure of a test’s internal
consistency. Using this method, the reliability of the test is judged by estimating
how well the items that reﬂect the same construct or ability yield similar results.
The most common index for estimating the internal reliability is Cronbach’s alpha.
Cronbach’s alpha is often interpreted as the mean of all possible split-half esti-
mates. Another internal consistency measure is KR 20 (for details see standard text
books on psychometrics such as for example Fishman & Galguera, 2003; Kline, 2000;
Murphy & Davidshofer, 2001). Acceptable tests usually have reliability coeﬃcients
between 0.7 and 1.0. Correlations exceeding 0.9 are not often achieved. For individ-
ual performance to be measured reliably, correlation coeﬃcients of at least 0.75 and
Cronbach’s alpha of at least 0.85 are recommended. These numbers represent the
minimum values. In the scientiﬁc literature, the suggested values are often higher.
Validity
Validity indicates whether a test is able to measure what it is intended to measure.
For example, the hit rate alone is not a valid measure of detection performance in
terms of discriminability (or sensitivity), because a high hit rate can also be achieved
by judging most bags as containing prohibited items. In order to measure detection
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performance in terms of discriminability (or sensitivity), the false alarm rate must be
considered, too (for diﬀerent detection measures see Macmillan & Creelman, 1991,
and Hofer & Schwaninger, 2004). As with reliability, there are also diﬀerent types
of validity. The term face validity refers to whether a test appears to measure what
it claims to measure. A test should reﬂect the relevant operational conditions. For
example, if a test for measuring competency in X-ray image interpretation contains a
representative sample of X-ray images of bags and screeners have to decide whether
the depicted bags contain a prohibited item, it is face valid. Concurrent validity
refers to whether a test can distinguish between groups that it should be able to
distinguish between (e.g., between trained and untrained screeners). In order to
establish convergent validity, it has to be shown that measures that should be related
are indeed related. If, for example, threat image projection (TIP, i.e., the insertion
of ﬁctional threat items into X-ray images of passenger bags) measures the same
competencies as a computer-based oﬄine test, one would expect a high correlation
between TIP performance data and the computer-based test scores. Another validity
measure is called predictive validity. In predictive validity, the test’s ability to predict
something it should be able to predict is assessed. For example, a good test for
pre-employment assessment would be able to predict on-the-job X-ray screening
detection performance. Content validity refers to whether the content of a test is
representative of the content of the relevant task. For example, a test for assessing
whether screeners have acquired the competency to detect diﬀerent threat items in
X-ray images of passenger bags should contain X-ray images of bags with diﬀerent
categories of prohibited items, according to an internationally accepted prohibited
items list.
Standardization and development of population norms
The third important aspect for judging the quality of a test is standardization.
This involves administering the test to a representative group of people in order
to establish norms (a normative group). When an individual takes the test, it can
then be determined how far above or below the average her or his score is, relative
to the normative group. It is important to know how the normative group was
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selected, though. For instance, for the standardization of a test used to evaluate
the detection performance of screeners, a meaningful normative group of a large
and representative sample of screeners (at least 200 males and 200 females) should
be tested. In summary, competency assessment of X-ray image interpretation needs
to be based on tests that are reliable, valid, and standardized. However, it is also
important to consider test diﬃculty, particularly if results from diﬀerent tests are
compared with each other. Although two tests can have similar properties in terms
of reliability, an easy test may not adequately assess the level of competency needed
for the X-ray screening job.
1.1.3 Assessment of X-ray image interpretation competency
Currently, there are several methods used to assess X-ray image interpretation com-
petency: covert testing (inﬁltration testing), threat image projection (TIP), and
computer-based image tests.
Covert testing
Covert testing, as the exclusive basis for individual assessment of X-ray image inter-
pretation competency, is only acceptable if the requirements of reliability, validity,
and standardization are fulﬁlled. For covert testing to achieve these requirements,
a signiﬁcant number of tests of the same screener is necessary in order to assess
competency reliably. More research is needed to address this issue and it should be
noted that this chapter does not apply to principles and requirements for covert
testing used to verify compliance with regulatory requirements.
Threat image projection (TIP)
Screener competency can also be assessed using TIP data if certain requirements
are met. In cabin baggage screening, TIP is the projection of ﬁctional threat items
into X-ray images of passenger bags during the routine baggage screening operation.
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This way, the detection performance of a screener can be measured under opera-
tional conditions. Using raw TIP data alone does not provide a reliable measure of
individual screener detection performance. Data needs to be aggregated over time in
order to have a large enough sample upon which to perform meaningful analyses.
In order to achieve reliable, valid, and standardized measurements, several other
aspects need to be taken into account as well when analyzing TIP data. One re-
quirement is to use an appropriate TIP library. This should contain a large number
of threat items, which represent the prohibited items that need to be detected and
which feature a reasonable diﬃculty level. See the section on reliable measurement of
performance using TIP for more information on how to use TIP data for measuring
X-ray detection performance of screeners.
Computer-based X-ray image interpretation tests
Computer-based X-ray image interpretation tests constitute a valuable tool for
standardized measurements of X-ray image interpretation competency. These tests
should consist of X-ray images of passenger bags containing diﬀerent prohibited
objects. The categories of items should reﬂect the prohibited items list and require-
ments of the appropriate authority, and it should be ensured that the test content
remains up-to-date. The test should also contain harmless bag images, that is, X-ray
images of bags that do not contain a prohibited object. For each image, the screen-
ers should indicate whether or not a prohibited object is present. Additionally, the
screeners can be requested to identify the prohibited item(s). The image display
duration should be comparable to operational conditions. Test conditions should be
standardized and comparable for all participants. For example, the brightness and
contrast on the monitor should be calibrated and similar for all participants. This
applies equally to other monitor settings that could inﬂuence detection performance
(e.g., the refresh rate). In order to achieve a valid measure of detection performance,
not only hit rates but also false alarm rates should be taken into account. An addi-
tional or alternative measure would be to count the number of correctly identiﬁed
prohibited items (in this case, candidates have to indicate where exactly in the bag
the threat is located). The test should be reliable, valid, and standardized. Reliabil-
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ity should be documented by scientiﬁcally accepted reliability estimates (see above,
section 1.1.2). If possible, validity measures should also be provided (see above, sec-
tion 1.1.2). Individual scores should be compared to a norm that is based on a large
and representative sample of screeners (see above, section 1.1.2). The probability of
detecting a prohibited item depends on the knowledge of a screener as well as on the
general diﬃculty of the item. Image-based factors such as the orientation in which
a threat item is depicted in the bag (view diﬃculty), the degree by which a threat
object is superimposed by other objects (superposition), and the number and type
of other objects within the bag (bag complexity) inﬂuence detection performance
substantially (Schwaninger, Hardmeier, & Hofer, 2004; Schwaninger, 2003b). Tests
should take these eﬀects into account.
1.1.4 Certiﬁcation of X-ray image interpretation competency
As indicated above and as speciﬁed in ICAO Annex 17, 3.4.3, individuals carrying
out screening operations should be certiﬁed initially and periodically thereafter. Cer-
tiﬁcation can not only be considered as providing quality control over the screening
process, but also as a valuable basis for awarding personnel a qualiﬁcation, measur-
ing training eﬀectiveness, improving training procedures, and increasing motivation.
Certiﬁcation data provides important information on strengths and weaknesses in
aviation security procedures in general as well as on individual screeners. Further-
more, standardized certiﬁcation can help in achieving international standardization
in aviation security. However, this is very challenging, since many countries, organi-
zations, and companies develop their own certiﬁcation and quality control systems.
The present section gives a brief overview of how a certiﬁcation can be implemented.
As mentioned above, certiﬁcation of screeners should contain a theoretical exam and
an X-ray image interpretation exam. For periodic certiﬁcation, practical exams can
be conducted if considered necessary, unlike the initial certiﬁcation, where practical
exams are required. The exams should meet the requirements of high reliability and
validity and standardization (see above).
12 1 Assessment and Certiﬁcation of X-Ray Image Interpretation Competency
The X-ray image interpretation exam should be adapted to the location in which
a screener is employed, that is, cabin baggage screening, hold baggage screening,
or cargo screening. Since not every threat object always constitutes a threat during
the ﬂight, depending on where aboard the aircraft it is transported, screeners should
be certiﬁed according to their location. The certiﬁcation of cabin baggage screeners
should be based on cabin baggage X-ray images that contain all kinds of objects
that are prohibited from being carried on in cabin baggage (guns, knives, impro-
vised explosive devices, and other prohibited items). Objects that are prohibited
from being transported in the cabin of an aircraft do not necessarily pose a threat
when transported in the hold or in cargo. Furthermore, diﬀerent types of bags are
transported in the cabin, the hold, and cargo. Usually, small suitcases or bags serve
as hand baggage, whereas big suitcases and traveling bags are transported in the
hold of the aircraft. The certiﬁcation of hold baggage screeners should be carried
out using X-ray images of hold baggage. Similarly, cargo screeners should be tested
using X-ray images of cargo items. Screeners should be kept up-to-date regarding
new and emerging threats. In order to verify whether this is consistently achieved,
it is recommended that a recurrent certiﬁcation should be conducted on a periodical
basis, typically every 1-2 years. The minimum threshold that should be achieved in
the tests in order to pass certiﬁcation should be deﬁned by the national appropriate
authority and should be based on a large and representative sample of screeners (see
also the section on standardization for more information on this topic).
1.2 Measurement of Performance on the Job Using Threat
Image Projection (TIP)
Threat image projection (TIP) is a function of state-of-the-art X-ray machines that
allows the exposure aviation security screeners to artiﬁcial but realistic X-ray im-
ages during the process of the routine X-ray screening operation at the security
checkpoint. For cabin baggage screening (CBS), ﬁctional threat items (FTIs) are
digitally projected in random positions into X-ray images of real passenger bags. In
hold baggage screening (HBS), combined threat images (CTIs) are displayed on the
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monitor. In this case, not only the threat item is projected but an image of a whole
bag which may or may not contain a threat item. This is possible if the screeners
visually inspecting the hold baggage are physically separated from the passengers
and their baggage. If a screener responds correctly by pressing a designated key on
the keyboard (the ”TIP key”) it counts as a hit, which is indicated by a feedback
message. If a screener fails to respond to a projected threat within a speciﬁed amount
of time, a feedback message appears indicating that a projected image was missed.
This would count as a miss. Feedback messages also appear if a screener reports a
threat although there was no projection of a threat or a CTI. In this case, it could
be a real threat. Projecting whole bags in HBS provides not only the opportunity to
project threat images (i.e., bags containing a threat item) but also non-threat images
(i.e., bags not containing any threat item). This also allows the recording of false
true alarms (namely, if a non-threat image was judged as containing a threat) and
correct rejections (namely, if a non-threat image was judged as being harmless). TIP
data are an interesting source for various purposes like quality control, risk analysis,
and assessment of individual screener performance. Unlike the situation in a test
setting, individual screener performance can be assessed on the job when using TIP
data. However, if used for the measurement of individual screener X-ray detection
performance, international standards of testing have to be met, that is, the method
needs to be reliable, valid, and standardized (see above). In a study on CBS and
HBS TIP, Hofer and Schwaninger (2005) found very low reliability values for CBS
TIP data when a small TIP image library of a few hundred FTIs was used. Good
reliabilities were found for HBS TIP data when a large TIP image library was avail-
able. The authors suggest that a large image library (at least 1000 FTIs) containing
a representative sample of items of varying diﬃculty should be used when TIP is
used for individual performance assessment. Also viewpoint diﬃculty, superposition,
and bag complexity may need to be considered. Finally, as mentioned above, data
needs to be aggregated over time in order to have a large enough sample upon which
to perform meaningful analyses. TIP data should only be used for certiﬁcation of
screeners if the reliability of the data has been proven, for example by showing that
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the correlation between TIP scores based on odd days and even days aggregated
over several months is higher than .75.
1.3 X-Ray Competency Assessment Test (X-Ray CAT)
1.3.1 Introduction
This section introduces the X-Ray Competency Assessment Test (X-Ray CAT) as
an example of a computer-based test that can be used for assessing X-ray image
interpretation competency. The CAT has been developed on the basis of scientiﬁc
ﬁndings regarding threat detection in X-ray images of passenger bags (Schwaninger
et al., 2004; Schwaninger, 2003b). How well screeners can detect prohibited objects in
passenger bags is inﬂuenced in two diﬀerent ways. First, it depends on the screener’s
knowledge of what objects are prohibited and what they look like in X-ray images.
This knowledge is an attribute of the individual screener and can be enhanced by
speciﬁc training. Second, the probability of detecting a prohibited item in an X-
ray image of a passenger bag also depends on image-based factors. These are the
orientation of the prohibited item within the bag (view diﬃculty), the degree by
which an object is superimposed by other objects in the bag (superposition), and
the number and type of other objects within the bag (bag complexity). Systematic
variation or control of the image-based factors is a fundamental property of the test
and has to be incorporated in the test development. In the X-Ray CAT, the eﬀects of
viewpoint are controlled by using two standardized rotation angles in an ’easy’ and
a ’diﬃcult’ view for each forbidden object. Superposition is controlled in the sense
that it is held constant over the two views and as far as possible over all objects.
With regard to bag complexity, the bags are chosen in such a way that they are
visually comparable in terms of the form and number of objects with which they
are packed. The X-Ray CAT contains two sets of objects in which object pairs are
similar in shape. This construction not only allows the measurement of any eﬀect
of training, that is, if detection performance can be increased by training, but also
possible transfer eﬀects. The threat objects of one set can be included in the training.
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By measuring detection performance after training using both sets of the test, it can
be ascertained whether training also helped in improving the detection of the objects
that did not appear during training. Should this be the case, it indicates a transfer
of the knowledge gained about the visual appearance of objects used in the training
to similar looking objects.
1.3.2 Materials for the test
Stimuli were created from color X-ray images of prohibited items and passenger bags
(Figure 1.2 displays an example of the stimuli).
Fig. 1.2. Example images from the X-Ray CAT. Left: harmless bag (non-threat image), right: same bag
with a prohibited item at the top right corner (threat image). The prohibited item (gun) is also shown
separately at the bottom right.
On the basis of the categorization of current threat image projection systems
(Doc 30 of the European Civil Aviation Conference, ECAC), four categories of
prohibited items were chosen to be included in the test: guns, improvised ex-
plosive devices (IEDs), knives, and other prohibited items (e.g., gas, chemicals,
grenades, etc.). The prohibited items were selected and prepared in collabora-
tion with airport security experts to be representative and realistic. Sixteen ex-
emplars are used of each category (eight pairs). Each pair consists of two pro-
hibited items of the same kind that are similar in shape. The pairs were divided
into two sets, set A and set B. Furthermore, each object within both sets is
used in two standardized viewpoints (see Figure 1.3). The easy viewpoint shows
the object in canonical (easily recognizable) perspective (Palmer, Rosch, & Chase,
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1981); the diﬃcult viewpoint shows it with an 85 degree horizontal rotation or
an 85 degree vertical rotation. In each threat category, half of the prohibited
items of the diﬃcult viewpoint are rotated vertically and the other half horizon-
tally. The corresponding object of the other set is rotated around the same axis.
Fig. 1.3. Example of two X-ray images of simi-
lar looking threat objects used in the test. Left: a
gun of set A. Right: Corresponding gun of set B.
Both objects are depicted also in 85 degree hori-
zontal rotation (top) and 85 degree vertical rota-
tion (bottom).
In order to compare how well a prohib-
ited object can be detected relative to its
counterpart in the other image set, the two
conditions should be comparable in regard
to the rotation of the objects, superposi-
tion by other objects, and the bag complex-
ity. Furthermore, the superposition should
also be the same for both viewpoints of an
object. This was achieved using an image-
processing tool to combine the threat ob-
jects with passenger bags of comparable
image complexity, and at the same time, controlling for superposition. This tool
calculates the diﬀerence in brightness between the pixels of the two superimposed
images (threat object and bag) using the following formula for superposition:
SP =
√∑
[ISN(x, y)− IN(x, y)]2
ObjectSize
SP = Superposition; ISN = Grayscale intensity of the SN (Signal plus Noise) image
(contains a prohibited item); IN = Grayscale intensity of the N (Noise) image (contains
no prohibited item); ObjectSize: Number of pixels of the prohibited item where R, G, and
B are < 253
This equation, developed especially for the preparation of these test images) calcu-
lates the superposition value of an object independent of its size. This value can be
held constant for the two views of an object and the two objects of a pair, inde-
pendently of the bag complexity, when combining the bag image and the prohibited
item. To ensure that the bag images do not contain any other prohibited items, they
were visually inspected by at least two highly experienced aviation security instruc-
tors. Clean bag images were assigned to the four categories and the two viewpoints of
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the prohibited items such that their image diﬃculty was balanced across all groups.
This was achieved using the false alarm rate as the diﬃculty indicator for each bag
image based on a pilot study with 192 screeners. In the test, each bag appears twice,
once containing a prohibited item (threat image) and once not containing a prohib-
ited item (non-threat image). Combined with all prohibited items this adds up to
a total of 256 test trials: 4 threat categories (guns, IEDs, knives, other) * 8 (exem-
plars) * 2 (sets) * 2 (views) * 2 (threat images vs. non-threat images). The task
is to inspect visually the test images and to judge whether they are OK (contain
no prohibited item) or NOT OK (contain a prohibited item). Usually the images
disappear after 15 seconds. In addition to the OK / NOT OK response, screeners
have to indicate the perceived diﬃculty of each image in a 100-point scale (diﬃculty
rating; 1 = easy, 100 = diﬃcult). All responses can be made by clicking buttons on
the screen. The X-Ray CAT takes about 30-40 minutes to complete.
1.3.3 Assessing detection performance in a computer-based test
Detection performance of screeners in a computer-based test can be assessed by their
judgments of X-ray images. As explained above, not only is the hit rate (i.e., the
proportion of correctly detected prohibited items in the threat images) an important
value but so is the false alarm rate (i.e., the proportion of non-threat images that
were judged as being NOT OK, that is, as containing a prohibited item). This
incorporates the deﬁnition of detection performance as the ability not only to detect
prohibited items but also to discriminate between prohibited items and harmless
objects (that is, to recognize harmless objects as harmless). Therefore, in order to
evaluate the detection performance of a screener, his or her hit rate in the test
has to be considered as well as his or her false alarm rate (Green & Swets, 1966;
Hofer & Schwaninger, 2004, 2005; Macmillan & Creelman, 1991). There are diﬀerent
measures of detection performance that set the hit rate against the false alarm rate,
for example, d’ or A’. These measures are explained in more detail below.
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1.3.4 Reliability of the X-Ray CAT
As elaborated earlier in this chapter the reliability of a test stands for its repeata-
bility or consistency. The reliability of the X-Ray CAT was measured by computing
Cronbach’s alpha and Guttman’s split-half coeﬃcients. The calculations are based
on the results of a study at several airports throughout Europe (see below for the
details and further results of the study) including the data of 2265 screeners who
completed the X-Ray CAT on behalf of the EU funded VIA project in 2007. The
reliability measures were calculated based on correct answers, that is, hits for threat
images and correct rejections (CR) for non-threat images (#correct rejections =
#non-threat items - #false alarms). The analyses were made separately for threat
images and for non-threat images. Table 1.1 shows the reliability coeﬃcients.
Table 1.1. Reliabilities
RELIABILITY ANALYSES
Reliability
Hit CR
Coeﬃcients
X-Ray CAT
Alpha .98 .99
Split-half .97 .99
As stated above, an acceptable test should reach split-half correlations of at least
.75 and Cronbach alpha values of at least .85. Bearing this in mind, the reliability
values listed in Table 1.1 show that the X-Ray CAT is very reliable and therefore a
useful tool for measuring detection performance of aviation security screeners.
1.3.5 Validity of the X-Ray CAT
Regarding the diﬀerent types of validity as described above, the face validity and
the content validity can be conﬁrmed instantly. In terms of face validity, the X-Ray
CAT is valid as it appears to measure what it claims to measure and it reﬂects the
relevant operational conditions. In terms of content validity, the X-Ray CAT is valid
as its content is representative of the content of the relevant task. The test includes
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prohibited items from diﬀerent categories, on the basis of the deﬁnition in Doc 30
of the European Civil Aviation Conference (ECAC) that have to be detected by the
aviation security screeners. Regarding the convergent validity of the CAT, it can be
compared to another test that measures the same abilities. An example of such a test
that is also widely used at diﬀerent airports is the Prohibited Items Test (PIT, see
Hardmeier, Hofer, & Schwaninger, 2006a, for details). To assess convergent validity,
the correlation between the scores on the X-Ray CAT and the scores on the PIT of a
sample that conducted both tests is calculated. This precise procedure was applied
to a sample of 473 airport security screeners. The result can be seen in Figure 1.4
(r = .791).
Fig. 1.4. Convergent validity shown as
the reliability between the scores of the
X-Ray CAT and the PIT. The dots rep-
resent individual screeners.
Since correlation coeﬃcients range from 0 (no correlation) to 1 (perfect correla-
tion) (see also above), the convergent validity can be classiﬁed as quite high. This
means that the X-Ray CAT and the PIT measure the same X-ray image interpre-
tation competency. Other studies have also conﬁrmed the concurrent validity, that
is, the ability of a test to discriminate, for example, between trained and untrained
screeners (cf. Koller, Hardmeier, Michel, & Schwaninger, 2008). Figure 1.5 shows
the results of the study. It can be seen that the detection performance increases for
the trained screeners but not for the untrained screeners. This means that the test
is able to discriminate between screeners who received training with the computer-
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based training system X-Ray Tutor and those who did not receive training with
X-Ray Tutor (for details on X-Ray Tutor please refer to Schwaninger, 2004, 2005b).
Therefore, the concurrent validity of the X-Ray CAT can be conﬁrmed.
Fig. 1.5. Detection performance d’ for
trained (XRT Training Group) com-
pared to untrained (Control Group)
screeners. The concurrent validity ap-
pears in the diﬀerence of the detection
performance between the two groups af-
ter one group has trained. Thin bars
are standard deviations. Note: No per-
formance measures are indicated for se-
curity reasons.
1.3.6 Standardization
The X-Ray CAT was standardized in regard to its development. The revisions of
the test were based on data from representative samples (N > 94) of airport security
screeners (more details on the revisions can be found in the following subsection).
In the study described in section 1.4, involving a large and representative sample
of airport security screeners (N = 2265), a mean detection performance A’ of 0.8
(SD = 0.08) was achieved. There are diﬀerent approaches to the deﬁnition of pass
marks. The normative approach deﬁnes a pass mark as the threshold where a certain
proportion of screeners fails the test (e.g., not more than 10 percent), based on a
test measurement. That is, a screener is rated in relation to all other screeners. The
criterion-referenced approach sets the pass mark according to a deﬁned criterion.
For instance, the results could be compared to the test results obtained in other
countries when the test was conducted the ﬁrst time or by having a group of experts
(e.g., using the Angoﬀ method, Angoﬀ, 1971) rate the diﬃculty of the test items
(in this case of the images) and the minimum standard of performance. These ap-
proaches can of course be combined. Furthermore, the standard might be adjusted
by taking into account the reliability of the test, the conﬁdence intervals, and stan-
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dard error of measurement. According to the Measurement Research Associates, the
level of performance required for passing a credentialing test should depend on the
knowledge and skills necessary for acceptable performance in the occupation and
should not be adjusted to regulate the number or proportion of persons passing
the test (Criterion referenced performance standard setting , 2004). The pass point
should be determined by careful analysis and judgment of acceptable performance.
The Angoﬀ method is probably the most basic form of the criterion-based standard
setting, due to the relatively simple process of determining the pass points (Khalid
& Saeed, 2007). In this method, judges are expected to review each test item and
a passing score is computed from an estimate of the probability of a minimally
acceptable candidate answering each item correctly. As a ﬁrst step, the judges dis-
cuss and deﬁne the characteristics of a minimally acceptable candidate. Then, each
judge makes an independent assessment of the probability for each item that this
previously deﬁned minimally acceptable candidate will answer the item correctly.
To determine the probability of a correct response for each item, that is, the passing
score, the judges’ assessments of the items are averaged. Then, these probabilities
for all items of the test are averaged to obtain the pass point for the test (Criterion
referenced performance standard setting , 2004). The Angoﬀ method features several
advantages: it is easy to implement, understand, and compute (Berk, 1986). How-
ever, the Angoﬀ method also has disadvantages. First, it assumes that the judges
have a good understanding of the statistical concepts. Second, the panelists may
lose sight of the candidates’ overall performance on the assessment due to the focus
on individual items, as this method uses an item-based procedure (Khalid & Saeed,
2007). Moreover, the continuum of item probabilities tends to result in considerable
variability among the judges. Many judges have diﬃculties deﬁning candidates who
are minimally competent (Berk, 1986). In the case of aviation security screeners,
judges would have to focus on a person who would be just suﬃciently capable of
doing this job.
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1.3.7 Revision of the test
The development of a scientiﬁcally approved test is a complex procedure. Here, the
development of the X-Ray CAT is explained in order to provide an example. The ﬁrst
step in a test’s development is the deﬁnition of what should be measured and how. It
was planned that a test should be developed for the purpose of measuring the X-ray
image interpretation competency of airport security screeners when they search X-
ray images of passenger bags for prohibited objects. In order for the test to be face
valid (see above), the nature of the items was obvious. They should be X-ray images
of passenger bags where some of these images contain a prohibited item and some do
not. Careful thought should be invested into the design of the test. In this case, since
it is known that several factors can inﬂuence the detection performance of an aviation
security screener, the items should be constructed considering these factors. That is,
the items should be constructed while controlling for the image-based factors view
diﬃculty, superposition, and bag complexity. Furthermore, the eﬀects that should
or could be measured with the test should be considered. Depending on the initial
point and the aims, the items can be developed quite diﬀerently. The X-Ray CAT is
composed of two similar sets and contains prohibited items of diﬀerent categories,
each one in two diﬀerent viewpoints. The set construction serves the purpose of
measuring the transfer eﬀects. Transfer eﬀect means the transfer of knowledge about
threat objects that is gained during training to threat objects that were not included
in training but are similar to objects that were included. The X-Ray CAT can
measure several eﬀects: the eﬀect of viewpoint, threat category, training, and transfer
(see above for a more detailed description). After the ﬁrst version of the test has
been constructed, it was administered to a large and representative sample in a
pilot study (N = 354 airport security screeners). On the basis of the results of
this pilot study, the ﬁrst revision took place. First of all, a reliability analysis gave
information on the quality of the test and each item (item diﬃculty and item-to-total
correlation). Those items with a diﬃculty below the range of acceptable diﬃculty
had to be revised. The range of acceptable item diﬃculty depends on the answer
type. In this case, an item can be correct or incorrect, that is having a 50 percent
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chance probability. The range of acceptable diﬃculty was deﬁned between 0.6 and
0.9. Furthermore, the items should possess as high an item-to-total correlation as
possible. In this case, all items with a negative or very small item-to-total correlation
were corrected. In order to measure any eﬀect of threat category on the detection
performance, the detection performance of a threat object should only depend on
the threat object itself and not on the diﬃculty of the bag it is placed in. To this
end, the diﬃculty of the bags should be balanced across all categories, across both
viewpoints of the test, and also across the two sets. As a measure of diﬃculty for
the bag images, the false alarm rate was consulted (i.e., how many times a bag was
judged as containing a threat item although there was none). Then, the bags were
assigned to the four categories in such a way that their mean diﬃculty was not
statistically diﬀerent. The threat objects were built into the new bags if necessary,
again considering superposition. Lastly, the items were shifted between the two sets
(always incorporating the twin structure) in order to equalize the diﬃculty of the
sets. The revised test was administered to another sample (N = 95 airport security
screeners), repeating the revision steps as necessary. After a third (N = 359 airport
security screeners) and a fourth (N = 222 airport security screeners) revision, the
X-Ray CAT was acceptable in terms of stable reliability, item diﬃculty, and item-to-
total correlation. In summary, the test was revised according to the image diﬃculty,
the item-to-total correlation, and the balancing of the diﬃculty of the harmless bag
images. The aim is to achieve a high reliability with items featuring high item-to-
total correlations and acceptable item diﬃculty. The diﬃculty of a threat image
(a bag containing a prohibited object) should depend only on the object itself and
not on the diﬃculty of the bag. Otherwise, a comparison between the detection
performance for the diﬀerent threat categories could be biased.
1.4 Real World Application of the X-Ray Competency
Assessment Test (X-Ray CAT)
X-Ray CAT was used in several studies and in a series of international airports in
order to measure the X-ray image interpretation competencies of screening oﬃcers.
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In this section, the application of X-Ray CAT is presented along with discussions
and results obtained by means of the EU-funded VIA Project.
1.4.1 The VIA Project
The VIA Project evolved from the tender call in 2005 of the European Commission’s
Leonardo da Vinci program on vocational education and training. The project’s
full title is ”Development of a Reference Levels Framework for A’VIA’tion Secu-
rity Screeners”. The aim of the project is to develop appropriate competence and
qualiﬁcation assessment tools and to propose a reference levels framework (RLF)
for aviation security screeners at national and cross/sectoral level. To date, 11 air-
ports in six European countries are involved in the project. Most of these airports
are going through the same procedure of recurrent tests and training phases. This
makes it possible to scientiﬁcally investigate the eﬀect of recurrent weekly computer-
based training and knowledge transfer and subsequently to develop a reference levels
framework based on these outcomes. The tools used for testing in the VIA project
are the computer-based training (CBT) program X-Ray Tutor (for details please
refer to Schwaninger, 2004, 2005b), and the X-Ray CAT. Subsequently, the results
of the computer-based test measurements as part of the VIA project procedure are
reported in detail.
1.4.2 VIA computer-based test measurement results
As explained earlier, the X-Ray Competency Assessment Test (X-Ray CAT) con-
tains 256 X-ray images of passenger bags, half of which contain a prohibited item.
This leads to four possible outcomes for a trial: a ”hit” (a correctly identiﬁed threat
object), a ”miss” (a missed threat object), a ”correct rejection” (a harmless bag
correctly judged as being OK) and a ”false alarm” (an incorrectly reported threat
object). In terms of sensitivity, the hit rate alone is not a valid measure to assess
X-ray image interpretation competency. It is easy to imagine that a hit rate of 100
percent can be achieved by simply judging every X-ray image as containing a pro-
hibited item. In this case, the entire set of non-threat items is completely neglected
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by this measure (the false alarm rate would also be 100 percent). In contrast, Green
and Swets (1966) developed a signal detection performance measure d’ (pronounced
’d prime’), taking into account hit rates as well as false alarm rates. Often, d’ is
referred to as sensitivity, emphasizing the fact that it measures the ability to dis-
tinguish between noise (in our case an X-ray image of a bag without a threat) and
signal plus noise (in our case an X-ray image containing a prohibited item). d’ is cal-
culated using the formula d’ = z(H)−z(F ), where H is the hit rate, F the false alarm
rate, and z refers to the z-transformation6.For the application of d’, the data have to
fulﬁll certain criteria (noise and signal plus noise must be normally distributed and
have the same variance). If these requirements are not fulﬁlled, another established,
”non-parametric” measure is often used: A’ (pronounced ’A prime’). The measure
also meets the requirement of setting the hit rate against the false alarm rate in order
to achieve a reliable and valid measure of image interpretation competency. A’ was
the measure of choice for the current analyses because its non-parametric character
allows its use independently from the underlying measurements distributions. A’ can
be calculated as follows, where H represents the hit rate of a test candidate or group
and F represents its false alarm rate: A′ = 0.5+ [(H −F )(1 +H −F )]/[4H(1−F ).
If the false alarm rate is larger than the hit rate, the equation must be modiﬁed:
A′ = 0.5 − [(F − H)(1 + F − H)]/[4F (1 − H)]. For further information on the
mentioned measures and others, please refer to Stanislaw and Todorov (1999), to
Green and Swets (1966) for d’, and to Pollack and Norman (1964), Grier (1971), or
Macmillan and Creelman (1991) for A’. For more details on the application of these
formulae in airport security screening please refer to Hofer and Schwaninger (2004).
The reported results provide graphical displays of the relative detection performance
measures A’ at the eight European airports that participated in the present study,
as well as another graph showing the eﬀect of the two viewpoints on the diﬀerent
threat categories as explained earlier. In order to provide statistical corroboration of
these results, an analysis of variance (ANOVA) on the two within-participants fac-
tors, view diﬃculty and threat category (guns, IEDs, knives, and other items) and
the between-participants factor airport is reported as well. As part of the ANOVA,
6 Z-transformation transforms normal random variables to the standard normal. The standard normal
distribution is the normal distribution with a mean of zero and a variance of one.
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only the signiﬁcant interaction eﬀects are reported and considered to be noteworthy
in the context.
Detection performance comparison between airports
Figure 1.6 shows the comparison of the detection performance achieved eight Eu-
ropean airports that participated in the VIA project. First, the detection perfor-
mance was calculated for each screener individually. The data were averaged across
screeners for each airport. Thin bars represent the standard deviation (a measure of
variability) across screeners. Due to its security sensitivity and for data protection
reasons, the individual airports’ names are not indicated and no numerical data are
given here.
Fig. 1.6. Comparison between eight
European airports participating in the
VIA project. Thin bars represent stan-
dard deviations between screeners.
Although no numerical data is displayed in the graph, we can discern substantial dif-
ferences between the airports in terms of mean detection performance and standard
deviation. As described above, all VIA airports go through a similar procedure of
alternation of test phases and training phases. Nevertheless, there are considerable
diﬀerences between them. There were large diﬀerences in the initial positions when
the project was started, and the baseline assessment test, which is reported here, was
conducted at diﬀerent times at diﬀerent airports. The diﬀerences can be put down
to diﬀerences in the amount of training that was accomplished prior to this baseline
test as well as on diﬀerences in the personnel selection assessment. Some of the re-
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ported airports were already coached prior to the VIA project, though with diverse
intensity and duration. Taking these diﬀerences into account, the reported results
correspond fairly well with our expectations based on earlier studies on training
eﬀects.
Detection performance comparison between threat categories regarding
view diﬃculty
Figure 1.7 shows again the detection performance measure A’, but with a diﬀerent
focus. The data are averaged across airports shown in Figure 1.6, but analyzed
by view diﬃculty within threat categories. There is a striking eﬀect on detection
performance deriving from view diﬃculty. Performance is signiﬁcantly higher for
threat objects depicted in easy views than for threat objects depicted in diﬃcult
views (canonical view rotated by 85 degrees).
Fig. 1.7. Detection performance A’
broken up by category and views (un-
rotated (easy view) vs. 85 rotated ob-
jects (diﬃcult view)). The thin bars rep-
resent standard deviations between the
eight VIA airports. Pairwise compar-
isons showed signiﬁcant viewpoint ef-
fects for all four threat categories.
Although this eﬀect can be found in every one of the four threat categories, there are
signiﬁcant diﬀerences between them regarding general diﬀerences between the mean
detection performances and also between the eﬀect sizes of view diﬃculty that are
unequal between threat categories. Knives and IEDs, for example, diﬀer very much
in view diﬃculty eﬀect size but not so much in average detection performance.
As can be seen in Figure 1.8, the reason is quite simple: IEDs consist of several
parts and not all parts are depicted in easy or in diﬃcult view at same time. Some
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parts are always depicted in easy view when others are diﬃcult, and vice versa.
Knives have very characteristic shapes. They look consistently longish when seen
perpendicular to their cutting edge but very small and thin when seen in parallel
to their cutting edge. This interaction eﬀect between threat item category and view
diﬃculty can easily be observed in Figure 1.7, where the diﬀerence between easy and
diﬃcult views is much larger in knives than in IEDs. Furthermore, based on earlier
studies on training eﬀects, it is important to mention here that this pattern shown
in Figure 1.7 is also highly dependent on training (Koller et al., 2008) (interaction
eﬀects [category * airport and view diﬃculty * airport]).
Fig. 1.8. Illustration of how eﬀects of view diﬃculty diﬀer between the four ECAC threat categories. 8a
and b show an IED and a knife each in a frontal view and a rotated view from almost 90 degrees around
the vertical axis. 8c and d show a gun and a taser each in a frontal view and a rotated view from almost
90 degrees around the horizontal axis.
Analysis of variance (ANOVA)
The following statistics provide quantitative values of what has been reported
graphically. This allows us to compare the eﬀects of the diﬀerent factors. We
applied a three-way ANOVA with the two within-participants factors category
and view diﬃculty, and one between-participants airport factor on the detec-
tion performance measure A’. The analysis revealed highly signiﬁcant main eﬀects
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on threat category (guns, IEDs, knives, and other items) with an eﬀect size of
η2 = .131,F(3, 5602.584) = 339.834,MSE = 2.057, p < .001, on view diﬃculty
(easy view vs. diﬃcult/rotated view) with an eﬀect size of η2 = .47,F(1, 2257) =
2009.772,MSE = 9.031, p < .001, and also on the between-participants factor air-
port with an η2 = .080,F(1, 2257) = 28.128,MSE = 1.415, p < .001. The following
two-way interactions were also highly signiﬁcant: threat category * view diﬃculty:
η2 = .094,F(3, 6542.213) = 233.969,MSE = .931, p < .001, threat category * air-
port η2 = .068,F(3, 5602.584) = 23.411,MSE = .142, p < .001,and view diﬃculty *
airport η2 = .159,F(1, 2257) = 60.953,MSE = .274, p < .001. These results indicate
diﬀerent detection performance for diﬀerent threat categories and higher detection
performance for prohibited items in easy view than for rotated threat items (the ef-
fect of viewpoint, Schwaninger et al., 2004). This is consistent with results reported
in the view-based object recognition literature (for reviews see, for example, two
works by Tarr & Bu¨lthoﬀ, 1995, 1998). The eﬀect sizes were very large according to
Cohen’s conventions (Cohen, 1988).
1.4.3 Discussion
Although the reported real world application consists of baseline measurement data
only, some important features of the X-Ray CAT could be illustrated well. X-Ray
CAT allows us to measure and to evaluate the eﬀects of view diﬃculty and threat
objects practically and independently of each other. Furthermore, the X-Ray CAT
can be used as a very reliable tool to compare X-ray image interpretation competency
of security staﬀ at diﬀerent airports and other types of infrastructures using X-ray
technology for security control procedures.
1.5 Summary and Conclusions
The competency of a screener to detect prohibited items in X-ray images quickly and
reliably is important for any airport security system. Computer-based tests, TIP,
and to a limited extent covert tests can be used to assess individual competency
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in X-ray image interpretation. However, to achieve reliable, valid, and standardized
measurements, it is essential that the requirements and principles detailed in this
chapter are followed by those who produce, procure, or evaluate competency assess-
ment of the X-ray image interpretation tests of individual screeners. This chapter
introduced the competency assessment in airport security screening. In order to
achieve a meaningful result the assessment has to meet the criteria of reliability and
validity. Furthermore, the assessment has to be standardized to allow the evaluation
of screeners’ performance in relation to the population norm. Currently, there are
three means for assessing X-ray image interpretation competency: covert testing,
threat image projection (TIP), and computer-based image tests. Another important
feature of maintaining the high level of X-ray baggage screening within aviation
security is the initial and recurrent certiﬁcation of screening personnel. Threat im-
age projection (TIP) as a means to assess X-ray image interpretation competency
was illustrated in detail, as well as the conditions that have to be fulﬁlled in or-
der for TIP to be a reliable and valid instrument. This chapter also focused on
the computer-based X-Ray Competency Assessment Test (X-Ray CAT). It features
very high reliability scores and its design allows for measuring X-ray image inter-
pretation competency of aviation security screeners with regard to diﬀerent aspects
of their ability and knowledge. The X-Ray CAT is widely used at many diﬀerent
airports throughout the world, for competency assessment and certiﬁcation pur-
poses as well as in studies assessing the fundamentals of the demands required for
the job of the aviation security screener. This chapter continued by showing how a
reliable, valid, and standardized test can be used to compare X-ray image interpreta-
tion competency across diﬀerent airports and countries. The results of an EU-funded
project (VIA Project) showed remarkable diﬀerences in mean detection performance
across eight European airports. All these countries currently conduct weekly recur-
rent computer-based training. Since the X-Ray CAT will be conducted again in the
ﬁrst quarter of 2008, the VIA Project will also provide important insights on the
beneﬁts of computer-based training for increasing security and eﬃciency in X-ray
screening.
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2Investigating Training, Transfer, and Viewpoint
Eﬀects Resulting from Recurrent CBT of X-ray
Image Interpretation
2.1 Introduction
The importance of aviation security has increased dramatically in the last years.
As a consequence of the new threat situation, large investments have been made in
modern security technology. State of the art X-ray screening equipment oﬀers good
image quality, high resolution and many image enhancement functions. However, the
decision on whether an X-ray image of a passenger bag contains a suspected item or
not, is still being taken by a human operator, that is, an airport security screener.
Object shapes that are not similar to ones stored in visual memory are diﬃcult
to recognize (e.g., Graf, Schwaninger, Wallraven, & Bu¨lthoﬀ, 2002; Schwaninger,
2004, 2005a). Schwaninger, Hardmeier, and Hofer (2005) have shown that X-ray
screener performance depends on knowledge-based and image-based factors. A pre-
requisite for good X-ray detection performance is knowledge about which objects
are prohibited and what they look like in X-ray images. Such knowledge is acquired
by computer-based, class-room, and on-the-job training (knowledge-based factors).
Image-based factors refer to image diﬃculty resulting from viewpoint variation of
threat objects, superposition of threat objects by other objects in a bag, and bag
complexity due to the number and type of other objects in the bag. The ability
to cope with image-based factors is related to individual visual-cognitive abilities
rather than a mere result of training (Hardmeier, Hofer, & Schwaninger, 2006b).
Computer-based training is expected to be a very important determinant of X-ray
image interpretation competency, because many threat objects are not known from
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everyday experience and because objects look quite diﬀerent in X-ray images than
in reality. This is illustrated in Figure 2.1 with two examples.
Fig. 2.1. Diﬀerent types of prohibited
items in X-ray images of passenger bags.
a Electric shock device, b self defense
gas spray ”Guardian Angel”
Schwaninger and Hofer (2004) and Schwaninger, Hofer, and Wetter (2007) could
show that detection of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in hold baggage screen-
ing (HBS) can be signiﬁcantly improved if people are trained with an individually
adaptive training system such as X-Ray Tutor (XRT). Schwaninger et al. (2005)
compared detection performance of novices with the one of aviation security screen-
ers. A rather poor recognition of unfamiliar object shapes (e.g., self-defense gas
spray, electric shock device, etc.) in X-ray images was found for novices. For ex-
perienced aviation security personnel, a much higher recognition performance was
observed. McCarley, Kramer, Wickens, Vidoni, and Boot (2004) reported a better
performance after training of novices for the detection of knives in X-ray images.
When one takes into account the myriad of views that can be produced by a sin-
gle object, the question arises how the human brain stores and recognizes objects
even if they are presented in unusual views. In the object recognition literature,
two types of theories can be distinguished: structural description theories and view-
based theories. The former assume that objects are stored in visual memory by
their component parts and their spatial relationship. An object-centered description
of this nature was described by Marr and Nishihara (1978), who proposed that ob-
jects are hierarchically decomposed into their parts and spatial relations relative to
object-centered coordinates in order to access an object-centered 3D model in visual
memory. In the recognition by components (RBC) theory by Biederman (1987), non-
accidental properties like vertices, parallel vs. non-parallel lines, straight vs. curved
lines etc. (see Lowe, 1985, 1987) are extracted from a line drawing representation
of objects to deﬁne basic geometrical primitives (geometrical ions, ”geons”) that
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are relatively orientation-invariant. A geon structural description (GSD) in memory
is activated by extracting geons from the visual input and matching geon prop-
erties and their spatial relationship with the GSD (Hummel & Biederman, 1992).
For view-based theories, diﬀerent approaches have been proposed. Examples are
recognition by alignment to a 3D representation (Lowe, 1987), recognition by linear
combination of 2D views (Ullman & Basri, 1991), recognition by view interpolation
(e.g., using RBF networks) proposed by Poggio and Edelman (1990) and storing
of multiple views for each object plus performing transformations (Tarr & Pinker,
1989). What view-based theories have in common is the assumption that objects are
not stored in memory as rotation invariant structural descriptions but instead in a
format which is viewer-centered. A more detailed discussion of structural descrip-
tion theories vs. view-based theories and more recent hybrid theories is beyond the
scope of this paper (for reviews see for example Graf et al., 2002; Hayward, 2003;
Kosslyn, 1994; Peissig & Tarr, 2007; Schwaninger, 2005a; Tarr & Bu¨lthoﬀ, 1998).
However, it should be pointed out that empirical results seem to be correlated with
the required level of recognition (Bu¨lthoﬀ, Edelman, & Tarr, 1995; Tarr, 1995): if
the object has to be recognized at ’entry level’, behavioral measures are less aﬀected
by changes in perspective. However, in the case of subordinate recognition in which
ﬁne discrimination is typically required, both response times and accuracy are more
sensitive to the speciﬁc viewpoint used. Furthermore, diﬀerences in the task a sub-
ject has to perform (Lawson, 1999) and the speciﬁc paradigm that is used (Verfaillie,
1992) can inﬂuence which level of representation is tapped (see also Logothetis &
Sheinberg, 1996). The ﬁrst aim of this study is to investigate how well airport se-
curity screeners can detect guns, knives, IEDs, and other prohibited items in X-ray
images of passenger bags. The second aim is to examine whether screener detection
performance can be increased by conducting recurrent CBT. To this end, screeners
conducted weekly recurrent CBT (about 20 min per week). Detection performance
was tested with the X-Ray Competency Assessment Test (X-Ray CAT) by Koller
and Schwaninger (2006). This test measures how well people detect threat items in
X-ray images of passenger bags. It was conducted at the beginning and then after
three and six months of training. In addition to training eﬀects, the X-Ray CAT
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allows measuring transfer eﬀects, that is, to what extent visual knowledge that was
gained through CBT can be transferred to other threat items (see below). In the
X-Ray CAT all prohibited items are depicted from a canonical (easy recognizable)
perspective (Palmer et al., 1981) and unusual perspective which allows investigating
viewpoint eﬀects. The study was conducted at two mid-size European airports. In
Airport 1 (Experiment 1) one group of screeners used adaptive CBT (XRT) whereas
the other group of screeners (control group) used a conventional (not adaptive) CBT.
In Airport 2 (Experiment 2) the same experimental design was used except for the
fact that the control group used another conventional CBT system. This allows in-
vestigating whether a training eﬀect is dependent on the type of the CBT system
used.
2.2 Experiment 1
2.2.1 Method
Participants
A total of 209 airport security screeners of a mid-size European airport participated
in Experiment 1 and conducted the X-Ray CAT three times with an interval of three
months between the measurements. The adaptive CBT group (XRT group) consisted
of 97 screeners who conducted weekly recurrent CBT using X-Ray Tutor (XRT)
CBS 2.0 Standard Edition between all three test measurements. The control group
consisted of 112 screeners who used a conventional (not adaptive) CBT. According to
the security organization and their Appropriate Authority, airport security screeners
of both groups conducted about 20 min CBT per week. Analysis of XRT training
use showed that on average, each screener trained 20.26 minutes (SD = 3.65 min)
per week.
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Materials and Procedure
X-Ray Competency Assessment Test (X-Ray CAT)
The X-Ray CAT consists of 256 trials based on 128 diﬀerent color X-ray images of
passenger bags. Each of the bag images is used once containing a prohibited item
(threat image) and once without any threat object (non threat image). Figure 2.2 dis-
plays examples of the stimuli. Note that in the test the images are displayed in color.
Fig. 2.2. Example images from the X-Ray CAT. Left: harmless bag (non
threat image), right: same bag with a prohibited item at the top right
corner (threat image). The prohibited item (gun) is shown also separately
at the bottom right.
Prohibited objects can
be assigned to four
categories as deﬁned
in Doc 30 of the Eu-
ropean Civil Aviation
Conference (ECAC):
guns, IEDs, knives,
and other prohibited
items (e.g., self-defense
gas spray, chemicals,
grenades, etc.). The
threat objects were
selected and prepared in collaboration with airport security experts to be represen-
tative and realistic. For each threat category 16 exemplars are used (eight pairs).
Each pair consists of two prohibited items that are similar in shape (see Figure 2.3).
These were distributed randomly into two sets, set A and set B. Prohibited items
of set A (without bags) are contained in the XRT CBS 2.0 SE training whereas the
items of set B are not. This allows testing for transfer eﬀects.
Every item is depicted from two diﬀerent viewpoints. The easy viewpoint refers to
the canonical (i.e., easy recognizable) perspective (Palmer et al., 1981). The diﬃcult
viewpoint shows the threat item with an 85 degree horizontal rotation or an 85 degree
vertical rotation relative to the canonical view (see Figure 2.3 for examples). In each
threat category, half of the prohibited items of the diﬃcult viewpoint are rotated
vertically, the other half horizontally. Set A and B are equalized for the rotations of
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Fig. 2.3. Example of two X-ray images
of similar looking threat objects used in
the test. Left: a gun of set A. Right: cor-
responding gun of set B.
the prohibited objects. Every threat item is combined with a bag in a manner that
the degree of superposition by other objects is similar for both viewpoints. This was
achieved using a function that calculates the diﬀerence between the pixel intensity
values of the bag image with the threat object minus the bag image without the
threat object using the following formula:
SP =
√∑
[ISN(x, y)− IN(x, y)]2
ObjectSize
SP = Superposition; ISN = Grayscale intensity of the SN (Signal plus Noise) image
(contains a prohibited item); IN = Grayscale intensity of the N (Noise) image (contains
no prohibited item); ObjectSize: Number of pixels of the prohibited item where R, G, and
B are < 253
Using this equation (note the division by object size), the superposition value is
independent of the size of the prohibited item. This value can be kept relatively
constant for the two views of a threat object, independently of the degree of clutter
in a bag, when combining the bag image and the prohibited item. The bag images
were visually inspected by aviation security experts to ensure they do not contain
any other prohibited items. Harmless bags were assigned to the diﬀerent categories
and viewpoints of the threat objects in a way that their diﬃculty was balanced
across all categories1. The false alarm rate (the rate at which screeners wrongly
judged a harmless bag as containing a threat item) for each bag image served as
measure of diﬃculty based on a pilot study with 192 screeners of another airport.
The X-Ray CAT takes about 30-40 minutes to complete. Each image is shown for
a maximum of 15 seconds on the screen. Screeners have to judge whether the bag
1 The eight categories of test images (four threat categories in two viewpoints each) are similar in terms of
the diﬃculty of the harmless bags. This means, a diﬀerence of detection performance between categories
or viewpoints can not be due to diﬀerences in the diﬃculty of the bag images.
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is OK (contains no prohibited item) or NOT OK (contains a prohibited item).
Additionally, screeners have to indicate the perceived diﬃculty of each image on a
100 point scale (diﬃculty rating)2.The X-Ray CAT is built into the XRT training
system (see below). The interface of the X-Ray CAT is the same as in XRT except
there is no feedback and screeners do not have to click on the image to identify the
threat object.
X-Ray Tutor (XRT) Training System
X-Ray Tutor (XRT) is an individually adaptive training system for aviation security
screeners. It contains a large image library with hundreds of diﬀerent threat objects
depicted in up to 72 views, more than 6000 bag images and many millions of possible
threat object to bag combinations (see Schwaninger, 2004, for details).
The individually adaptive training algorithm of XRT starts with showing threat ob-
jects depicted from easy viewpoints with little superposition by other objects and in
bags of low complexity. On the basis of each individual screener’s learning progress,
threat objects are shown in more diﬃcult views, in more complex bags and with
more superposition. These parameters are adapted automatically by a scientiﬁcally
validated algorithm for each screener and threat object, which uses automatic image
processing algorithms as explained in Schwaninger, Michel, and Bolﬁng (2007). XRT
ﬁrst presents screeners prohibited objects in easy (canonical) views. The individually
adaptive training algorithm determines for each screener which views are diﬃcult to
recognize and adapts the training so that the trainee becomes able to detect threat
items reliably even if prohibited objects are substantially rotated away from the
easiest view. During the next diﬃculty levels, ﬁrst superposition and then bag com-
plexity is increased so that the trainee becomes able to detect threat items reliably
even if they are superimposed on other objects or if the complexity of a bag is very
high (for more information on XRT see Schwaninger, 2003a, 2004, 2005b). During
a training session, each image is displayed for 15 seconds on the screen. Within this
time screeners can use image enhancement functions which are also available when
working with the X-ray machine (e.g., grayscale, negative image, edge enhancement,
2 The diﬃculty ratings were not analyzed in this study.
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Fig. 2.4. Screenshot of the XRT CBS 2.0 training system during training. At the bottom right a feedback
is provided after each response. If a bag contains a prohibited item, an information window can be displayed
(see bottom left of the screen).
etc.). If the image contains a prohibited item, screeners have to click on it and then
click on the NOT OK button. If the bag is harmless, they have to click on the OK
button. After providing a conﬁdence rating using a slider control, feedback is shown
to inform the trainee whether the image has been judged correctly or not (see Figure
2.4). If the bag contains a threat item, it is highlighted by ﬂickering and the trainee
has the possibility to display information about the threat item (see bottom left
of Figure 2.4). By clicking on the ’continue’ button the next image is shown. As a
default setting, one training sessions takes 20 minutes. During this time screeners
see between 150 and 300 images.
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Procedure
As explained above, two groups of screeners participated in Experiment 1. The
XRT training group conducted weekly recurrent CBT using XRT CBS 2.0 Standard
Edition. The control group used a conventional (not adaptive) CBT. In order to
avoid potential negative consequences, we decided not to mention the exact CBT
product in this article. However, it can be mentioned that this CBT is also widely
used at many airports worldwide. It has a much smaller threat image library than
XRT; threat objects are not displayed in many diﬀerent views; threat objects are
not matched with diﬀerent bags on the ﬂy; and there is no individually adaptive
training algorithm. The XRT training group and the control group took the X-Ray
CAT prior to the beginning of training, after three months, and after six months
of weekly CBT. This allowed testing the eﬀectiveness of both CBT systems for
increasing X-ray image interpretation competency of airport security screeners. As
explained above, half of the prohibited items in the X-Ray CAT are also contained
in the XRT training system (although presented in diﬀerent bags). The other half of
the prohibited items of the X-Ray CAT is not part of the XRT training library. This
allows testing for transfer eﬀects, that is, testing whether training with the detection
of certain prohibited items helps increasing the detection of other prohibited items.
Finally, as speciﬁed above in the section on the X-Ray CAT, all prohibited items
are depicted in easy and diﬃcult views which allow testing eﬀects of viewpoint on
screener detection performance.
2.2.2 Results and Discussion
Detection performance was calculated using the signal detection measure d’ (Green
& Swets, 1966), which takes into account the hit rate (correctly judged threat images
as being NOT OK) and the false alarm rate (wrongly judged harmless bags as being
NOT OK). d’ is calculated using the following formula: d´ = z(H)−z(FA). Whereas
H is the hit rate, FA the false alarm rate and z refers to the z-transformation.
Performance values are not reported for security reasons. However, eﬀect sizes are
reported for all relevant analyses and interpreted on the basis suggested by Cohen
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(1988), see Table 2.1. For t-tests, d between 0.20 and 0.49 represents small eﬀect
size; d between 0.50 and 0.79 represents medium eﬀect size; d ≥ 0.80 represent large
eﬀect size. For analysis of variance (ANOVA) statistics, η2 between 0.01 and 0.05
represents small eﬀect size; η2 between 0.06 and 0.13 represents medium eﬀect size;
η2 ≥ 0.14 represent large eﬀect size.
Table 2.1. Classiﬁcation of eﬀect sizes from Cohen (1988)
Eﬀect size d η2
small 0.20-0.49 0.01-0.05
medium 0.50-0.79 0.06-0.13
large ≥ 0.80 ≥ 0.14
Figure 2.5 shows the detection performance of the ﬁrst, second, and third mea-
surement for both screener groups. As can be seen in the ﬁgure, there was a
large improvement as a result of training in the XRT training group while there
was no improvement in the control group. These results were conﬁrmed by an
Fig. 2.5. Detection performance with
standard deviations for the XRT train-
ing group (left) vs. the control group
(right) comparing ﬁrst, second, and
third measurement.
ANOVA for repeated measures using d’ scores with the within-participants factor
measurement (ﬁrst, second, and third) and the between-participants factor group
(XRT training group and control group). There were large main eﬀects of measure-
ment, η2 = .28, F (2, 414) = 81.04, p < .001, and group, η2 = .19, F (1, 207) =
47.62, p < .001. There was also a large interaction of measurement and group,
η2 = .25, F (2, 414) = 68.67, p < .001, which is consistent with Figure 2.5 show-
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ing large performance increases as a result of training only for the XRT training
group but not for the control group.
Separate pairwise t-tests of detection performance d’ revealed no signiﬁcant dif-
ference at the baseline measurement between the two groups t(177) = −0.91, p =
.363, d = 0.13, but already a signiﬁcant diﬀerence in the second measurement, that
is, after three months of training, t(207) = 7.52, p < .001, d = 1.04. Additional
paired-samples t-tests revealed signiﬁcant diﬀerences for the XRT training group
between all three test measurements but no signiﬁcant diﬀerences for the control
group (see Table 2.2).
t(96) p d
XRT Training Group (t1 - t2) -9.80 < .001 1.12
XRT Training Group (t2 - t3) -3.95 < .001 0.28
t(111) p d
Control Group (t1 - t2) 0.54 = .59 0.05
Control Group (t2 - t3) -1.89 = .06 0.17
Table 2.2. Results
of the t-tests compar-
ing the detection per-
formance of ﬁrst (t1),
second (t2), and third
(t3) measurement
Figure 2.6 shows the detection performance of both screener groups broken down
by prohibited item category and the three test measurements. A repeated-measures
ANOVA with the within-participants factors measurement (ﬁrst, second, and third)
and threat category (guns, IEDs, knives, and other), and the between-participants
factor group (XRT training vs. control) revealed the signiﬁcant main eﬀects and
signiﬁcant interactions given in Table 2.3a. In addition to the eﬀects that were
already found in the previous ANOVA, also the factor threat (or prohibited item)
category was signiﬁcant.
Figure 2.6 shows that, at the ﬁrst test measurement, guns were detected best, fol-
lowed by knives, other prohibited items and then by IEDs. There was a highly
signiﬁcant interaction between threat category and measurement. As can be seen
in Figure 2.6, detection of IEDs was initially much lower than gun detection. Af-
ter six months of training, screeners of the XRT training group could detect IEDs
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Fig. 2.6. Detection performance with
standard deviations for the XRT train-
ing group vs. the control group broken
down by prohibited item category and
test measurement.
even slightly better than guns. This result implies that IED detection is not diﬃcult
per se but rather a matter of the right training. Note that in this study all IEDs
contained a detonator, wires, explosive, a triggering device, and a power source.
Thus our conclusions are only applicable to the detection of multi-component IEDs.
Large performance increases were also found for other prohibited items in this group,
while for knives, only a small improvement as a result of training was found. Note
that after six months of training, performance for knife detection is lower than the
one for any other threat category in the XRT training group; although at baseline
measurement it was higher than the performance for IED detection or other threat
objects. The interaction between threat category, group and measurement is also
worth mentioning. As can be seen in Figure 2.6 this results from the fact that there
was no training eﬀect for the control group. Their detection performance remains at
about the same level for each threat category even after six months of training with
the conventional (not adaptive) CBT system. Separate pairwise t-tests were con-
ducted to compare detection performance at the ﬁrst and the second measurement
for both groups and each threat category separately (Table 2.4). The XRT train-
ing group showed a signiﬁcant increase of the detection performance at the second
measurement for the categories guns, IEDs, and other threat objects. For knives, a
signiﬁcant diﬀerence could be found only in the third measurement. The comparison
of the eﬀect size d between the t-tests of the four threat categories conﬁrms the ear-
lier mentioned conclusion that the training eﬀect was particularly big for IEDs and
rather small for knives. Detection performance of the control group did not diﬀer
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signiﬁcantly between the measurements, conﬁrming that the conventional CBT did
not result in an increase of threat detection performance.
Table 2.3: Results of the ANOVAs in Experiment 1
Factor df F η2 p
Measurement (M) 2, 414 83.96 .29 < .001
Threat Category (T) 3, 621 240.03 .54 < .001
Group (G) 1, 207 56.20 .21 < .001
a) M x G 2, 414 70.49 .25 < .001
T x G 3, 621 45.05 .18 < .001
M x T 6, 1242 43.20 .17 < .001
M x T x G 6, 1242 40.65 .16 < .001
Measurement (M) 2, 414 80.55 .28 < .001
Set (S) 1, 207 4.18 .02 < .05
Group (G) 1, 207 49.40 .19 < .001
b) M x G 2, 414 67.99 .25 < .001
M x S 2, 414 8.80 .04 < .001
S x G 1, 207 51.32 .20 < .001
M x S x G 2, 414 11.54 .05 < .001
Measurement (M) 2, 414 87.69 .30 < .001
Set (S) 1, 207 2.37 .01 = .13
Threat Category (T) 3, 621 236.79 .53 < .001
Group (G) 1, 207 63.57 .24 < .001
M x G 2,414 71.16 .26 < .001
M x T 6, 1242 44.35 .18 < .001
c) M x S 2, 414 10.93 .05 < .001
S x G 1, 207 52.25 .20 < .001
S x T 3, 621 74.00 .26 < .001
T x G 3, 621 47.39 .19 < .001
M x T x G 6, 1242 41.04 .17 < .001
M x S x G 2, 414 10.74 .05 < .001
M x S x T 6, 1242 3.84 .02 < .01
S x T x G 3, 621 4.78 .02 < .01
M x S x T x G 6, 1242 2.99 .01 < .01
Continued on Next Page. . .
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Table 2.3: Results of the ANOVAs in Experiment 1
Factor df F η2 p
Measurement (M) 2,414 84.10 .29 < .001
View (V) 1, 207 1768.63 .90 < .001
Threat Category (T) 3, 621 258.62 .56 < .001
Group (G) 1, 207 61.91 .23 < .001
M x G 2, 414 65.80 .24 < .001
M x T 6, 1242 41.33 .17 < .001
M x V 2, 414 2.05 .01 = .13
d) V x G 1, 207 3.27 .02 = .07
V x T 3, 621 425.64 .67 < .001
T x G 3, 621 40.86 .17 < .001
M x T x G 6, 1242 40.25 .16 < .001
M x V x G 2, 414 2.23 .01 < .05
M x V x T 6, 1242 6.58 .03 < .001
V x T x G 3, 621 3.08 .02 < .05
M x V x T x G 6, 1242 2.68 .01 < .05
The results of the analyses considering the two prohibited item sets of the X-Ray
CAT, set A and set B, are shown in Figures 2.7 and 2.8. As explained above, set A
items are X-Ray CAT images which contain prohibited items which are part of the
XRT image library. Set B items are X-Ray CAT images which contain prohibited
items that are not part of the XRT image library. By comparing training eﬀects
for set A and set B transfer eﬀects can be investigated, that is, whether training
with XRT does not only improve detection of prohibited items that are part of the
XRT image library (set A) but also the detection of other prohibited items that
are visually similar (set B). Figure 2.7 shows the detection performance for both
screener groups broken down by test set for all three measurements. It shows a
clear increase in detection performance for the XRT training group, especially at
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Table 2.4. Results of the t-tests comparing the detection performance of the four categories between the
ﬁrst (t1), second (t2), and third (t3) measurement.
XRT training group t(96) df p d
Guns t1 - t2 - 5.96 96 < .001 0.70
IEDs t1 - t2 - 13.03 96 < .001 1.53
Knives t1 - t2 - 1.51 96 = .13 0.17
Other t1 - t2 - 8.47 96 < .001 1.07
Guns t1 - t3 - 4.69 96 < .001 0.60
IEDs t1 - t3 - 15.88 96 < .001 2.00
Knives t1 - t3 - 2.27 96 < .05 0.26
Other t1 - t3 - 12.56 96 < .001 1.51
Control group t(111) df p d
Guns t1 - t2 - 0.40 111 = .69 0.05
IEDs t1 - t2 0.03 111 = .98 0.00
Knives t1 - t2 0.83 111 = .41 0.09
Other t1 - t2 -0.17 111 = .87 0.02
Guns t1 - t3 -0.92 111 = .36 0.10
IEDs t1 - t3 -1.05 111 = .30 0.08
Knives t1 - t3 -0.73 111 = .47 0.08
Other t1 - t3 -1.39 111 = .17 0.15
the second measurement, after the ﬁrst three months of training. For the control
group, as in the previous analysis, no training eﬀect is evident.
Fig. 2.7. Detection performance with
standard deviations for the XRT train-
ing group vs. the control group compar-
ing ﬁrst, second, and third measurement
for set A and set B separately.
The results of the repeated measures ANOVA with the within-participants fac-
tors measurement (ﬁrst, second, and third) and set (A vs. B) and the between-
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participants factor group (XRT training group vs. control group) can be seen in
Table 2.3b. There was a signiﬁcant eﬀect of set in this analysis, which would im-
ply a diﬀerent detection performance for set A vs. set B. However, the eﬀect is
very small, as the eﬀect size of η2 = 0.2 clearly shows, which makes the diﬀer-
ence quasi negligible. This is also supported by the small eﬀect size for the inter-
action between set and measurement, η2 = 0.4. Pairwise t-tests showed a signif-
icant increase in detection performance at the second measurement for both sets
for the XRT training group, set A, t(96) = −10.27, p < .001, d = 1.19, set B,
t(96) = −7.68, p < .001, d = 0.92. These results indicate a large transfer eﬀect, that
is, visual knowledge regarding the visual appearance of the prohibited objects of the
XRT image library helped screeners to detect similar looking, but untrained objects
in the X-Ray CAT (set B). Consistent with previous analyses, there was no training
eﬀect for the control group, neither for set A, t(111) = .76, p = .45, d = 0.08, nor for
set B, t(111) = −0.28, p = .78, d = 0.03. Pairwise t-tests comparing both sets within
one group at the ﬁrst measurement revealed a signiﬁcant diﬀerence of the two sets
only for the control group t(111) = −2.82, p < .01, d = 0.17 but not for the XRT
training group, t(96) = −0.42, p = .68, d = 0.03. However, note that an eﬀect size of
d = 0.17 is very small which supports the assumption that the two sets are in fact
very similar in their diﬃculty level. Figure 2.8 includes also the threat category in
the analysis. The increase in detection performance for the XRT training group can
also be seen in the diﬀerent threat categories.
Pairwise t-tests between the ﬁrst and second measurement conﬁrmed a signiﬁcant
(p < .001, all d > 0.62) increase in detection performance for the XRT training
group for all threat categories per set except for knives (set A: p = .12, d = 0.19,
set B: p = .32, d = 0.12). In Figure 2.8, detection performance in Set A for guns
shows a decrease between the second and third measurement. However, this dif-
ference was not signiﬁcant (p = .13, d = 0.17). For the control group, detection
performance between the ﬁrst and third measurement was compared in order to
maximize the chances for ﬁnding a signiﬁcant training eﬀect. Even here, for all cat-
egories in each set, the detection between the ﬁrst and third measurement did not
diﬀer signiﬁcantly (all p > .12, d < 0.18). The extended ANOVA with the additional
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Fig. 2.8. Detection performance with standard deviations for the XRT training group vs. the control group
comparing ﬁrst, second, and third measurement for set A and set B and each threat category separately.
within-participants factor threat category revealed the main eﬀects and interactions
as speciﬁed in Table 2.3c. The main eﬀect of set was not signiﬁcant but there were
signiﬁcant interactions with set (see Table 2.3c). However, as can be seen in Figure
2.8, these interactions are rather small, which implies large transfer eﬀects. Figure
2.9 shows the results of the viewpoint analysis. An ANOVA was conducted on d’
scores with the within-participants factors measurement, threat category, and view-
point and the between-participants factor group. It showed signiﬁcant main eﬀects
of measurement, category, viewpoint, and group. For details and interactions see
Table 2.3d. The large main eﬀect of viewpoint indicates a higher detection perfor-
mance for objects in easy (canonical) viewpoint compared to objects presented in a
diﬃcult (rotated) view Figure (cf. Figure 2.9).
However, no signiﬁcant interaction between viewpoint and training could be found.
This would suggest that the viewpoint eﬀect is unaﬀected by the training and could
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Fig. 2.9. Detection performance with standard deviations for the XRT training group vs. the control
group comparing ﬁrst, second, and third measurement for both views and each threat category separately.
not be decreased. Pairwise t-tests showed a signiﬁcant increase in detection per-
formance at the second measurement for both views in all categories for the XRT
training group with the exception of knives in the easy view (p = .53, d = 0.07).
All other comparisons were signiﬁcant p < .05, d > 0.31). For the control group no
signiﬁcant increase in detection performance could be found (all p > .10, d < .0.19),
see Table 2.5 for details. Training with XRT has an eﬀect not only on the objects
in the easy view but also on those in the diﬃcult view. The screeners could make
the association between the rotated object they detected during training and the
canonical view of the object which is displayed in the object information in XRT.
In summary, a large and signiﬁcant training eﬀect was found for the group who
trained with XRT for three and six months compared to a control group who used
another CBT for the same time. A signiﬁcant training eﬀect has been observed for
all four threat categories (guns, knives, IEDs, and other), whereas the extent of the
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Table 2.5. Results of the t-tests comparing the detection performance of the four categories for easy view
(V1) and diﬃcult view (V2) between the ﬁrst (t1) and second (t2) measurement
XRT training group t(96) p d
Guns: V1t1 - V1t2 -4.21 < .01 0.53
IEDs: V1t1 - V1t2 -12.25 < .001 1.42
Knives: V1t1 - V1t2 0.64 = .53 0.07
Other: V1t1 - V1t2 -8.95 < .001 1.12
Guns: V2t1 - V2t2 -6.03 < .001 0.70
IEDs: V2t1 - V2t2 -11.45 < .001 1.43
Knives: V2t1 - V2t2 -2.53 < .05 0.31
Other: V2t1 - V2t2 -6.17 < .001 0.84
Control group t(111) p d
Guns: V1t1 - V1t2 -0.21 = .84 0.02
IEDs: V1t1 - V1t2 -0.76 = .45 0.08
Knives: V1t1 - V1t2 -0.66 = .51 0.07
Other: V1t1 - V1t2 -1.26 = .21 0.13
Guns: V2t1 - V2t2 -0.67 = .50 0.09
IEDs: V2t1 - V2t2 0.71 = .48 0.07
Knives: V2t1 - V2t2 1.65 = .10 0.19
Other: V2t1 - V2t2 0.64 = .53 0.07
eﬀect varied between categories. A large transfer of the acquired knowledge about
the visual appearance of objects used in training (set A) to similar looking objects
not used in the training (set B) was found for the XRT training group but not for
the control group. This means that training with XRT helped screeners to detect
other prohibited items which were not part of the XRT training. Substantial eﬀects
of viewpoint could be observed, that is, unusual views of prohibited objects were
much harder to detect than canonical views.
2.3 Experiment 2
The main aim of Experiment 2 was to replicate the results of Experiment 1 at
another European airport. In addition, another conventional CBT was used for the
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control group. Thus it could be investigated whether conventional CBTs diﬀer from
each other regarding training eﬀectiveness compared to XRT.
2.3.1 Method
Participants
A total of 163 airport security screeners of another mid-size European airport par-
ticipated in Experiment 2. All screeners conducted the X-Ray CAT three times with
an interval of three months between the measurements. The adaptive CBT group
(XRT group) consisted of 84 screeners who conducted weekly recurrent CBT using
X-Ray Tutor (XRT) CBS 2.0 Standard Edition between all three test measurements.
The control group consisted of 79 screeners and they used another conventional CBT
than the control group of Experiment 1. As in Experiment 1, according to the se-
curity organization and their Appropriate Authority, airport security screeners of
both groups conducted about 20 min CBT per week. Analysis of XRT training use
showed that on average, each screener trained 20.92 minutes (SD = 2.87) per week.
Materials and Procedure
Materials and procedure in Experiment 2 were the same as in Experiment 1. Again,
all screeners took the X-Ray CAT at the beginning and after three and six months
of CBT. The only diﬀerence was the CBT for the control group, which was not used
in Experiment 1. In order to avoid potential negative consequences, we decided not
to mention the exact CBT product in this article for Experiment 2, either. However,
it can be mentioned that also this CBT is widely used at many airports worldwide.
As the conventional CBT used in Experiment 1, this CBT has a much smaller threat
image library than XRT; threat objects are not displayed in many diﬀerent views;
threat objects are not matched with diﬀerent bags automatically on the ﬂy; and
there is no individually adaptive training algorithm.
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2.3.2 Results and Discussion
This section is structured the same way as in Experiment 1. Figure 2.10 shows the
detection performance d’ for both groups and all three test measurements. As in
Experiment 1, individual d’ scores were subjected to a repeated measures ANOVA
with the within-participants factor measurement (ﬁrst, second, and third) and the
between-participants factor group (XRT training group and control group). Again,
there were large main eﬀects of measurement η2 = .50,F(2, 322) = 163.52, p <
.001, group, η2 = .26,F(1, 161) = 56.34, p < .001, and a signiﬁcant interaction of
measurement and group η2 = .33,F(2, 322) = 78.40, p < .001.
Fig. 2.10. Detection performance
with standard deviations for the XRT
training group vs. the control group
comparing ﬁrst, second, and third
measurement.
The large interaction is consistent with Figure 2.10 showing a much larger per-
formance increase as a result of training for the XRT training group when com-
pared to the control group. This was conﬁrmed by independent samples t-tests.
There was no signiﬁcant diﬀerence between both groups for the ﬁrst measurement
t(161) = −.22, p = .83, d = 0.03, but a highly signiﬁcant diﬀerence already in the
second measurement t(161) = 6.66, p < .001, d = 1.05 after three months of training.
As in Experiment 1, additional paired-samples t-tests revealed signiﬁcant diﬀerences
for the XRT training group between all measurements. In contrast to Experiment
1, there were also signiﬁcant diﬀerences for the control group between the ﬁrst and
second measurement, although not between the second and third measurement (see
Table 2.6). Thus, the conventional CBT used in Experiment 2 did also result in
increased detection performance although substantially less than XRT.
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Table 2.6. Results of
the t-tests comparing
the detection perfor-
mance of ﬁrst (t1), sec-
ond (t2), and third (t3)
measurement
t(83) p d
XRT Training Group (t1 - t2) -12.21 < .001 1.57
XRT Training Group (t2 - t3) -7.07 < .001 0.65
t(78) p d
Control Group (t1 - t2) -3.67 < .001 0.36
Control Group (t2 - t3) -0.91 = .37 0.07
Figure 2.11 shows the detection performance of both screener groups broken down
by prohibited item category and the three test measurements. Again, a clear eﬀect
of training on the detection performance can be seen for the XRT training group
with the largest increase after the ﬁrst three months of training. However, also the
control group shows a slight increase in detection performance at least for the second
measurement.
Fig. 2.11. Detection performance with
standard deviations for the XRT train-
ing group vs. the control group compar-
ing ﬁrst, second and third measurement
for each threat category separately.
The analysis of variance (ANOVA) with threat category as additional within-
participants factor showed signiﬁcant main eﬀects and signiﬁcant interactions (for
details see Table 2.7a). The results are comparable to those in Experiment 1. Most
importantly, detection of guns was best initially, while detection of IEDs was much
lower. After six months of recurrent adaptive CBT, screeners of the XRT training
group could detect IEDs even slightly better than guns. This nice replication of the
results obtained in Experiment 1 clearly shows that IED detection is not diﬃcult
per se but only a matter of the right training. As mentioned above, all IEDs used in
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this study contained a detonator, wires, explosive, a triggering device, and a power
source. Thus our conclusions are only applicable to the detection of multi-component
IEDs.
Table 2.7: Results of the ANOVAs in Experiment 2
Factor df F η2 p
Measurement (M) 2, 322 160.78 .50 < .001
Threat Category (T) 3, 483 234.85 .59 < .001
Group (G) 1, 161 64.98 .29 < .001
a) M x G 2, 322 78.54 .33 < .001
T x G 3, 483 37.63 .19 < .001
M x T 6, 966 26.24 .14 < .001
M x T x G 6, 966 16.67 .09 < .001
Measurement (M) 2, 322 156.12 .49 < .001
Set (S) 1, 161 58.45 .27 < .001
Group (G) 1, 161 56.03 .26 < .001
b) M x G 2,322 82.16 .34 < .001
M x S 2, 322 8.88 .05 < .001
S x G 1, 161 31.37 .16 < .001
M x S x G 2, 322 15.52 .09 < .001
Measurement (M) 2, 322 162.28 .50 < .001
Set (S) 1, 161 41.88 .21 < .001
Threat Category (T) 3, 483 231.83 .59 < .001
Group (G) 1, 161 71.93 .31 < .001
M x G 2, 322 84.18 .34 < .001
M x T 6, 966 27.50 .15 < .001
M x S 2, 322 11.42 .07 < .001
c) S x G 1, 161 36.23 .18 < .001
S x T 3, 483 33.59 .17 < .001
T x G 3, 483 40.15 .20 < .001
M x T x G 6, 966 16.87 .10 < .001
M x S x G 2, 322 10.09 .06 < .001
M x S x T 6, 966 1.48 .01 = .18
S x T x G 3, 483 3.69 .02 < .05
Continued on Next Page. . .
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Table 2.7: Results of the ANOVAs in Experiment 2
Factor df F η2 p
M x S x T x G 6, 966 2.64 .02 < .05
Measurement (M) 2, 322 152.62 .49 < .001
View (V) 1, 161 1849.85 .92 < .001
Threat Category (T) 3, 483 216.74 .57 < .001
Group (G) 1, 161 70.32 .30 < .001
M x G 2, 322 80.05 .33 < .001
M x T 6, 966 26.57 .14 < .001
M x V 2, 322 2.99 .02 = .05
d) V x G 1, 161 0.62 .00 = .43
V x T 3, 483 288.98 .64 < .001
T x G 3, 483 34.91 .18 < .001
M x T x G 6, 966 14.95 .09 < .001
M x V x G 2, 322 1.21 .01 = .30
M x V x T 6, 966 2.82 .02 < .05
V x T x G 3, 483 1.69 .01 = .17
M x V x T x G 6, 966 1.89 .01 = .08
As shown in Table 2.8, t-tests between the ﬁrst and second measurement revealed
signiﬁcant training eﬀects for the XRT training group for all threat categories with
large eﬀect sizes (all d > .0.80). In contrast to Experiment 1, there were also signiﬁ-
cant eﬀects for the control group, although with rather low eﬀect sizes (all d < 0.56).
Thus the conventional CBT used in Experiment 2 also resulted in performance in-
creases although much less than XRT.
By an ANOVA with measurement and set as within-participants factors and group
as between-participants factor, we investigated if training eﬀects can also be shown
for threat objects which were not included in the training sessions. There were main
eﬀects and interactions for all factors showing similar results as in Experiment 1
(see Table 2.7b for details). As in Experiment 1, a large transfer eﬀect was found
2.3 Experiment 2 57
Table 2.8. Results of the t-tests comparing the categories between ﬁrst (t1), second (t2), and third (t3)
measurement
XRT training group t df p d
Guns t1 - t2 -6.01 83 < .001 0.86
IEDs t1 - t2 -12.84 83 < .001 1.74
Knives t1 - t2 -5.81 83 < .001 0.80
Other t1 - t2 -12.30 83 < .001 1.64
Guns t1 - t3 -8.19 83 < .001 1.15
IEDs t1 - t3 -20.22 83 < .001 2.70
Knives t1 - t3 -10.97 83 < .001 1.48
Other t1 - t3 -16.46 83 < .001 2.18
Control group t df p d
Guns t1 - t2 -2.19 78 < .05 0.23
IEDs t1 - t2 -3.60 78 < .01 0.42
Knives t1 - t2 -2.73 78 < .01 0.33
Other t1 - t2 -1.46 78 <¡ .15 0.18
Guns t1 - t3 -2.72 78 < .01 0.34
IEDs t1 - t3 -4.61 78 < .001 0.56
Knives t1 - t3 -2.05 78 < .05 0.23
Other t1 - t3 -2.59 78 < .05 0.30
(see Figure 2.12). Not only for the prohibited items of set A, which were included
in the training library of XRT, but also for the prohibited objects not used in
training of set B, screeners of the XRT training group showed a large increase in
detection performance after training. Paired-samples t-tests between the ﬁrst and
second measurement showed training eﬀects for both sets and also for both groups
whereas again large eﬀect sizes were found for the XRT training group and small
eﬀect sizes for the control group (trained group set A: t(83) = −13.10, p < .001, d =
1.77 and set B: t(83) = −9.53, p < .001, d = 1.24, control group set A: t(78) =
−2.32, p < .05, d = 0.24 and set B: t(78) = −3.00, p < .01, d = 0.32). Pairwise t-tests
showed no signiﬁcant diﬀerence in the diﬃculty of set A and Set B for both groups at
the ﬁrst measurement (XRT training group: t(83) = 1.16, p = .25, d = 0.10, control
group: t(78) = 1.93, p = .06, d = 0.19).
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Fig. 2.12. Detection performance with
standard deviations for the XRT train-
ing group vs. the control group compar-
ing ﬁrst, second, and third measurement
for set A and set B separately.
Figure 2.13 includes also the threat category in the analysis. Paired samples t-tests
were calculated in order to investigate if the training eﬀect between the ﬁrst and
second measurement was signiﬁcant for each category in both sets for the XRT
training group. Results revealed signiﬁcant eﬀects for all categories in each set (p <
.01, d = 0.51 for knives in Set B, p < .001, d > 0.74 for all other categories). Thus,
as in Experiment 1, XRT resulted in large detection performance increases even for
prohibited objects that are not part of the XRT image library (X-Ray CAT image
set B). For the control group the diﬀerence between the ﬁrst and third measurement
was calculated in order to maximize the chances for ﬁnding a signiﬁcant training
eﬀect. The following t-tests were signiﬁcant: IEDs for both sets, knives only for
set A, and other threat objects for both sets (p < .05, d > 0.23). All other values
were not signiﬁcant (p > .06, d < 0.28) and reveal no eﬀect of training between the
diﬀerent measurements.
As in Experiment 1, individual d´ scores were subjected to an extended ANOVA
with the within-participants factors measurement, X-Ray CAT image set, threat
category, and the between-participants factor group. All main eﬀects and interac-
tions were signiﬁcant except the interaction between measurement, set, and threat
category (see Table 2.7c for details). In contrast to Experiment 1, the ANOVA re-
vealed a main eﬀect of set and signiﬁcant interactions with set. However, as can be
seen in Figure 2.13 they were rather small, which implies large transfer eﬀects. As in
Experiment 1, the results clearly show a training eﬀect for each category and in both
sets. This is consistent with the results of the t-tests explained above. The training
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Fig. 2.13. Detection performance with standard deviations for the XRT training group vs. the control
group comparing ﬁrst, second and third measurement for set A and set B and each threat category sepa-
rately.
eﬀect that was found for the control group revealed itself also in the sets, that is,
there was a transfer eﬀect for the control group, too. Last, the eﬀect of viewpoint
was investigated calculating a four-way ANOVA. Results show clear main eﬀects of
measurement, view, threat category, and group. For details on interactions please
refer to Table 2.7d. Detection performance is clearly much higher for objects that
are shown in the easy view (View 1) than for the objects that are shown from an
unusual viewpoint (see Figure 2.14).
This eﬀect is valid for all threat categories and for the XRT training group as well
as for the control group. However, the viewpoint eﬀect is not the same for diﬀerent
threat categories. The graphs in Figure 2.14 suggest that the largest viewpoint
eﬀect can be observed for the detection of knives, the smallest one for IEDs. As in
Experiment 1, pairwise t-tests showed a signiﬁcant increase in detection performance
at the second measurement for both views for the XRT training group for all four
threat categories (p < .01, d > 0.49. For the easy view, the control group showed
a signiﬁcant eﬀect for IEDs only (p < .05, d = 0.32), all other t-tests were not
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Fig. 2.14. Detection performance with standard deviations for the XRT training group vs. the control
group comparing ﬁrst, second, and third measurement for both views and each threat category separately.
signiﬁcant (p > .07, d < 0.25). For the diﬃcult view all t-test with one exception
were signiﬁcant for the control group (p < .05, d > 0.26). Only the training eﬀect of
knives in the rotated view was not signiﬁcant p = .07, d = 0.24 (see Table 2.9 for
details). But the results show that although some signiﬁcant eﬀects in the control
group were observed, eﬀect sizes were small compared to those of the XRT training
group.
In summary, very similar results as in Experiment 1 have been found in Experiment
2. A large and signiﬁcant training eﬀect was observed for the group who trained
with XRT compared to a control group who used a conventional CBT for the same
time. A signiﬁcant training eﬀect has been observed for all four categories (guns,
knives, IEDs, and other) for the XRT training group, whereas the eﬀect size varied
between categories. Also a large transfer of the acquired knowledge about the visual
appearance of objects used in the training (set A) to similar looking objects not
used in training (set B) was found for the XRT training group. Additionally, a
viewpoint eﬀect could be observed which shows that unusual views of forbidden
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Table 2.9. Results of the t-tests comparing the detection performance of the four categories for easy view
(V1) and diﬃcult view (V2) between the ﬁrst (t1) and second (t2) measurement
XRT training group t(83) p d
Guns: V1t1 - V1t2 -3.59 < .01 0.49
IEDs: V1t1 - V1t2 -10.93 < .001 1.51
Knives: V1t1 - V1t2 -4.35 < .001 0.48
Other: V1t1 - V1t2 -9.79 < .001 1.42
Guns: V2t1 - V2t2 -5.46 < .001 0.82
IEDs: V2t1 - V2t2 -9.99 < .001 1.45
Knives: V2t1 - V2t2 -5.79 < .001 0.88
Other: V2t1 - V2t2 -10.33 < .001 1.40
Control group t(78) p d
Guns: V1t1 - V1t2 -1.07 = .29 0.13
IEDs: V1t1 - V1t2 -2.64 < .05 0.32
Knives: V1t1 - V1t2 -1.87 = .07 0.25
Other: V1t1 - V1t2 -0.05 =.96 0.01
Guns: V2t1 - V2t2 -2.35 < .05 0.26
IEDs: V2t1 - V2t2 -3.24 < .01 0.41
Knives: V2t1 - V2t2 -1.81 = .07 0.24
Other: V2t1 - V2t2 -2.11 < .05 0.28
objects are much harder to detect than canonical views. In contrast to Experiment
1, the control group also showed increases of detection performance, which implies
that the conventional CBT used in Experiment 2 is more eﬀective than the one used
in Experiment 1 (although still much less eﬀective than XRT). Moreover, there was
also a transfer eﬀect for the control group.
2.4 General Discussion
The ﬁrst aim of this study was to investigate how well airport security screeners can
detect guns, knives, IEDs, and other prohibited items in X-ray images of passenger
bags. Two experiments conducted at two European airports provided very similar
results. A computer-based test (X-Ray CAT) was conducted before and after three
and six months of weekly (about 20 min per screener) CBT at each airport. The
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ﬁrst measurement revealed that guns were detected best, followed by knives, other
prohibited items, and IEDs. In both experiments and airports, one group used an
adaptive CBT (X-Ray Tutor, XRT) with individually adaptive algorithms, a large
library of prohibited items depicted in a variety of diﬀerent views, and automatically
created prohibited item to bag combinations (see Schwaninger, 2004, for details).
The other group used a conventional CBT system with no adaptive algorithms, a
smaller image library, and ﬁxed combinations of threat items in bags. While XRT
was used in both experiments and airports, two diﬀerent conventional CBT sys-
tems were used for the control groups of Experiment 1 (airport 1) and Experiment
2 (airport 2). At both airports, XRT training group results revealed a training ef-
fect for all types of threat objects (guns, knives, IEDs, and other prohibited items).
However, eﬀect sizes diﬀered remarkably for the four categories. While guns were
detected best and IEDs were detected worst at the beginning, IED detection of the
XRT training group was as good as or even slightly better than gun detection after
several months of training. This shows that the detection of IEDs is not diﬃcult
per se, but rather depends on the training of screeners. Note that all IEDs used in
this study contained a detonator, wires, explosive, a triggering device, and a power
source. Therefore, these conclusions are only applicable to the detection of multi-
component IEDs. However, a large training eﬀect for IEDs can be expected because
they are usually not encountered at airport security checkpoints and therefore not
known to screeners without enhanced training in IED detection. The relatively large
training eﬀect for the category ”other” which includes self defense gas spray, elec-
tric shock devices etc. might also be explained by less on the job exposure of these
prohibited items. In a study with hold baggage screeners, large training eﬀects for
IEDs were also found, which is consistent with results of this study (Schwaninger
& Hofer, 2004). In contrast to IEDs and other prohibited items, guns seem to be
well known by screeners either because of their typical shape or the frequency by
which they are encountered at the airport security screening checkpoint (e.g., toy
guns). Therefore, detection performance before training is already high for guns and
a large improvement is impossible. It is also noticeable that detection for knives
showed the smallest training eﬀect in both experiments. Although the detection
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was at the baseline measurement higher than for IEDs and other prohibited items,
after six months of training screeners’ performance was poorest for knives. On aver-
age, knives are smaller than IEDs and other threat items and show less diagnostic
features. This might be a reason for the lower detection performance increase for
this threat category. While training with XRT resulted in large training eﬀects, the
tested conventional CBT systems were less eﬀective. In Experiment 1, there were
no training eﬀects at all, while only small training eﬀects were observed for the
conventional CBT system used in Experiment 2. This could be due to one or a
combination of the following reasons: First, the conventional CBT systems tested
in this study do not feature individually adaptive training algorithms like XRT (see
Schwaninger, 2004, for details). Second, in contrast to XRT, the conventional CBT
systems did not contain such a large image library with many prohibited items
depicted from a variety of diﬀerent viewpoints. Third, while in XRT prohibited
items are blended into X-ray images of passenger bags on the ﬂy using scientiﬁcally
validated and individually adaptive algorithms based on image measurement, as de-
scribed in Schwaninger, Michel, and Bolﬁng (2007). The conventional CBT systems
used in Experiment 1 and 2 have only ﬁxed combinations of prohibited items in
bags. Finally, we had to rely on the statement of the appropriate authority and the
security companies regarding the amount of training that was conducted by screen-
ers of the control group and the XRT training group, which should have been on
average 20 min per week per screener. Analysis of XRT training data showed, that
this was clearly fulﬁlled for screeners of the XRT training group at both airports.
The X-Ray CAT is composed of two comparable (similar looking) sets (set A and
set B) and only the threat objects of set A were included into the XRT training sys-
tem. Therefore, transfer eﬀects can be tested, that is, whether training with certain
prohibited items helps increasing detection of other prohibited items that are not
contained in the training. Overall, the comparison of the two sets A and B at the
baseline measurement (before training) shows no signiﬁcant diﬀerence. However, in
Experiment 1 there was a slight diﬀerence for the control group between the two
sets indicating that the two sets are not exactly equal in terms of image diﬃculty for
this sample. But this possible objection to the transfer eﬀect can be disproved with
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two arguments: ﬁrst, the eﬀect size was only small according to the conventions of
Cohen (1988) and second, only one of the two control groups showed a signiﬁcant
diﬀerence. Therefore, the transfer eﬀect in the results of the XRT training group
can be attributed to the training of set A only. The small training eﬀect for the
control group in Experiment 2 is also reﬂected in the detection increase of both sets
after training. Although the conventional CBT system of this control group did not
contain any objects from the test, the training with this training system apparently
also led to a transfer of knowledge to the detection of objects in the test. In an-
other study it would be interesting to compare the objects that are used in the two
training systems used by the control groups regarding their similarity to the test
objects. Contrary to our results, Smith, Redford, Gent, and Washburn (2005) found
a large decrease in screeners’ detection performance when speciﬁc objects used in
the training were replaced with new images belonging to the same categories (see
also Smith, Redford, Washburn, & Taglialatela, 2005). According to these authors,
improvement in screening performance is attributable only to speciﬁc-token famil-
iarity that developed for the original images and not to a category generalization.
They state constraints on categorization and the use of category-general informa-
tion when humans face visual complexity and have to identify targets within it. Our
results can be interpreted in support of generalization of visual learning in X-ray
image interpretation. However, it might be possible that the objects of the set not
used in training in our study are so similar to the objects used in training that a
speciﬁc-token familiarity led to the detection performance increase and not a true
generalization eﬀect. The observation that a transfer eﬀect in knives was lacking
would mean that the objects in set A and set B are not similar enough in shape to
generate a speciﬁc-token familiarity. Therefore only the learnt objects could gener-
ate a training eﬀect but not the unlearnt ones. For Schwaninger and Hofer’s (2004)
ﬁndings of a large increase in detection performance of IEDs after recurrent CBT
with other members of the category than those included in the test, it would mean
that those objects were very similar in order to create a speciﬁc-token familiarity and
therefore a training eﬀect. In both Experiments a large viewpoint eﬀect was also re-
vealed. This is consistent with view-based theories of object recognition (for reviews
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see for example Graf et al., 2002; Hayward, 2003; Tarr & Bu¨lthoﬀ, 1995, 1998). After
training, easy and diﬃcult views were much better recognized. Interestingly, there
was no signiﬁcant interaction between measurement and viewpoint, that is, although
training resulted in improved performance for diﬃcult views, the viewpoint eﬀect
(impairment for unusual vs. canonical views) remained stable even after six months
of training. However, it must be pointed out that the XRT training algorithm only
provides the screeners with unusual views of objects once a screener can detect a
prohibited item well when depicted from an easy perspective. That is, when screen-
ers start to train with XRT all threat objects are shown in easy views. Only if these
objects are detected reliably, the diﬃculty level is increased for a certain threat item
by showing it in more diﬃcult views (Schwaninger, 2004). Thus, it is unclear whether
a signiﬁcant interaction between viewpoint and measurement would have been ob-
served if the training duration would have been increased (e.g., to one year). In
conclusion, it stands to reason that recognition of forbidden objects in X-ray images
is dependent on exposure and this has very important implications for an adaptive
training system. It has been assumed that diﬀerent views of each object become as-
sociated with one another during object rotation, either through active learning or
through passive experiencing of the successive appearance of nearby views (Fo¨ldia´k,
1991; Stryker, 1991). Hence, it is important that during training screeners are get-
ting feedback on which forbidden object has been detected or missed. This feedback
shows the photograph and also the X-ray image of that forbidden object always in
the canonical view whereas the forbidden object merged into a bag is presented in
diﬀerent viewpoints. This leads to an association between an unusual view of an ob-
ject and the canonical view which results in a sequential pairing of these views with
each other (G. Wang, Obama, Yamashita, Sugihara, & Tanaka, 2005). This associ-
ation, which forms during learning, is thought to underlie object recognition ability
across changes in viewing angle (Palmeri & Gauthier, 2004). For our future studies,
it could also be interesting to increase the interval between the end of training and
the testing of training transfer, as corresponding literature usually tests transfer
of training after a considerable period of time in order to measure the stability of
the transfer (e.g., Saks & Belcourt, 2006). In any case, our ﬁndings show that the
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knowledge about the visual appearance of forbidden objects, which airport security
screeners acquire during recurrent CBT, can be transferred to similar looking, but
not previously seen objects and also the eﬀect that rotated views are much harder to
detect can be decreased with training. To make sure that objects are well detected
it is important that a large and representative image library of prohibited objects is
used and that these objects are learned from diﬀerent viewpoints. Additionally, the
library should be updated constantly to adapt to new threats. Overall, this study
has shown that adaptive CBT can be a powerful tool to increase screeners’ X-ray
image interpretation competency in an eﬃcient and eﬀective way.
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3Change of Search Time and Non-search Time due
to Training in X-ray Baggage Screening
3.1 Introduction
Threat detection using X-ray images in airport security screening is a process that
only recently has become a major interest in research concerning object recognition
and inspection. The task of airport security screeners is to recognize threat objects
of various categories (guns, knives, improvised explosive devices, etc.) in passenger
baggage. By applying ﬁndings about object recognition this important part of com-
mon airport security concepts can be improved. The knowledge about how objects
are perceived has allowed the creation of a computer-based training system X-Ray
Tutor (XRT) (Schwaninger, 2005b). This training system considers the factors in-
ﬂuencing the recognition of objects, which are: the viewpoint in which an object is
depicted; the superposition of the object by other objects in the bag; and the number
and type of other objects in the bag (Schwaninger, 2003b; Schwaninger et al., 2004;
Wallis & Bu¨lthoﬀ, 1999). XRT is individually adaptive. It starts with threat items
depicted in easy views and increases image diﬃculty for each individual trainee by
showing threat items in more diﬃcult views and in more complex bags and with
increasing superposition by other objects. In order to prevent screeners from memo-
rizing images of bags, combinations of images of bags and threat objects are created
at the point of use. This approach considers the individual training level and visual-
cognitive abilities of each screener. Security inspection is a form of visual inspection
but there exist few studies quantifying human performance of security screening (see
Gale, Mugglestone, Purdy, & McClumpha, 2000; Gale, Purdy, & Wooding, 2005; Liu,
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Gale, Purdy, & Song, 2006; McCarley et al., 2004; Schwaninger et al., 2004). The
last two have shown that training increases the threat detection performance of air-
port security screeners signiﬁcantly. A deeper comprehension of the eﬀect of training
could be gained if the speciﬁc task of security inspection could be compared to more
general models of industrial and other inspection tasks. Recent ﬁndings conﬁrmed
the applicability of a two-component model of visual inspection (Drury, 1975; Spitz
& Drury, 1978) to X-ray screening data (Ghylin, Drury, & Schwaninger, 2006). Spitz
and Drury (1978) assumed the inspection task was composed of search and deci-
sion components. Each of these components occupies part of the time needed for
completing the task. Using the equations formulated by Drury (1975) and Spitz and
Drury (1978) the total inspection time can be divided into the functional compo-
nents of search and decision time. The general model created and tested by Drury
(1975) and Spitz and Drury (1978) is:
P(true target) =
[
1− exp
(
−(t−NSThit)
SThit
)]
∗ Pdhit (3.1)
P(false alarm) =
[
1− exp
(
−(t−NSTFA)
STFA
)]
∗ PdFA (3.2)
Where:
P(true target) = detect a true target at or before time t
P(false alarm) = make a false alarm at or before time t
SThit or STFA = search time for hits or false alarms
NSThit or NSTFA = non-search time for hits or false alarms
Pdhit or PdFA = the probability of detection found from the raw data for hits or
false alarms
t = the various raw reaction times obtained from the data
The model assumes an approximately exponential relationship between the time
needed for searching a target and the cumulative probability of detecting a target
(Morawski, Drury, & Karwan, 1980). Search time includes the visual scanning of an
area to be searched (i.e., eye movements) and is terminated by either directing the
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attention to a suspicious part of this area (i.e., potential threat object in this case)
or by deciding to stop searching. Decision time is everything except search and is
more correctly called non-search time. It includes, among other things, the ﬁxation
of the suspicious object, the matching of the visual stimulus with representations
stored in the visual memory, the decision (i.e., actually is threat object or not),
and the time to execute the response. This model has been applied successfully to
a number of diﬀerent screening data sets (e.g., Ghylin et al., 2006). Applying this
two-component model of visual inspection helps in identifying the sub processes of
the whole inspection task and therefore may give some evidence about how the two
processes improve diﬀerentially due to training. Feature Integration Theory (FIT)
(Treisman & Gelade, 1980) assumes that visual features of objects are represented
in feature maps. Features are those stimulus attributes that are processed rapidly
and in parallel across the ﬁeld of view. As soon as a visual ﬁeld of an observer
contains more than one object the binding problem arises (Treisman, 1998). Fea-
tures of various objects have to be combined correctly and assigned to the right
object in order to perceive it correctly. In the original feature integration model
(Treisman & Gelade, 1980) search for feature conjunctions is not allowed. Wolfe
(1994) found that combination of feature information permits the eﬃcient, guided
search for feature conjunctions and postulated this in the Guided Search 2.0 model
of visual search. When a threat object is, presumably deliberately, stowed in a bag,
it is typically not just a target among several distractors. Most likely its shape on
the X-ray image is interrupted by other objects surrounding it and superimposed
on it. This complicates the assignment of features to an object, particularly if this
object is only poorly known. If airport security screening training for threat object
detection has the eﬀect of creating internal representations of objects used in the
training and storing them and making them available, respectively, in the visual
memory, then detection should improve because features are known and recognized
better. We would also expect that, with growing knowledge about the visual appear-
ance of threat objects in X-ray images of passenger bags, the number of required
features for the recognition of an object can be limited or once separately perceived
features can be combined as belonging to one object and thus becoming one feature.
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This would require building new feature maps. Considering the assumption of FIT
that visual search for a combination of features is serial and therefore more time
consuming than the visual search for a unique feature, the assumption would be
that detection time would decrease for threat objects that are detected better. In
other words, with increasing detection performance due to training the detection
time, more explicitly the search time, should decrease. Ghylin et al. (2006) found an
enhancement of both the search process and the non-search process of inspection in
the search for improvised explosive devices (IEDs). This study extends the analysis
to three other threat categories (guns, knives, and other threat objects), potentially
validating the ﬁndings of Ghylin et al. (2006) for other objects than IEDs. Prior
inspection research has found individual diﬀerences among inspectors to be large
(Czaja & Drury, 1981a; Dollinger & Hoyer, 1996; McPhee, Scialfa, Dennis, Ho, &
Caird, 2004; Riegelnig & Schwaninger, 2006; Schwaninger et al., 2004; M. J. J. Wang,
Lin, & Drury, 1997) so that analyses of detection performance and reaction times in
this study are controlled for age, gender and on the job experience. There has been
little examination of screener demographics in relation to either overall performance
parameters or search and non-search measures. In the broader inspection literature,
age, gender, and experience have received some attention. Older screeners tend to
work more slowly and at times have lower detection performance (Czaja & Drury,
1981a; McPhee et al., 2004), although any deﬁcits can be largely negated by age-
speciﬁc training (Czaja & Drury, 1981b). The mechanisms for age-related deﬁcits
are quite well understood (e.g., Fozard, 1990). Aging decreases pupil diameter, spa-
tial resolution, visual acuity (particularly dynamic), contrast sensitivity (Owsley,
Sekuler, & Siemsen, 1983), depth perception and visual search (e.g., Plude & Hoyer,
1986) but not colour vision or temporal resolution. Gender has not been found to be
related to inspection performance (e.g., M. J. J. Wang & Drury, 1989). Experience
can either refer to novice/expert diﬀerences or to the eﬀective length of experience of
those with expertise. For example, Dollinger and Hoyer (1996) found novice/expert
diﬀerences while Leach and Morris (1998) found no eﬀect of longer experience. These
ﬁndings are typical of experience results: Novices diﬀer considerably from experts,
but length of time on the job beyond initial training may not show much eﬀect.
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3.2 Methods
3.2.1 Participants
A total of 193 airport security screeners of a European airport, all with on-the-
job experience of airport X-ray screening were used. Of these 193 screeners, 98 (44
females, mean age 36.3 years, mean time on job 3.0 years; 54 males, mean age 40.0
years, mean time on job 3.0 years) of them trained for six months with X-Ray Tutor
while the other 95 (48 females, mean age 35.1 years, mean time on job 3.0 years; 47
males, mean age 36.9 years, mean time on job 3.3 years) received no training with
X-Ray Tutor during this period. All then took the X-Ray Competency Assessment
Test (X-Ray CAT).
3.2.2 Materials and Procedure
The X-Ray CAT is composed of 128 X-ray images of bags. Each image can include
one threat object out of four threat categories according to international threat im-
age projection system speciﬁcation (guns, improvised explosive devices IEDs, knives,
and other threat objects). Stimuli were created from Smiths-Heimann Hi-Scan 6040i
colour X-ray images. Each bag was used once containing a threat object and once
containing no threat object, giving a total of 256 images. In each threat category 16
objects were depicted once in an easy viewpoint (frontal view) and once in a more
diﬃcult rotated viewpoint (85 degrees vertical or horizontal rotation). All threat
objects were combined with bag images so as to ensure that for each threat object
the degree of superposition (i.e., how much the threat object is superimposed by
other objects in the bag) was equal for both viewpoints. The diﬃculty of the bags
was equated across all categories and viewpoints by matching prior data on False
Alarm Rates for each bag image. For a more detailed description of X-Ray CAT see
Koller and Schwaninger (2006). The X-Ray CAT is a component of the X-Ray Tutor
training system and can be programmed to appear anytime when a screener is train-
ing. The only visible diﬀerence for the screener between test and training was that
feedback did not appear during the CAT test. The appearance of the images was
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the same for both training and test and therefore no instruction was needed. The
images of the test disappeared after 15 seconds. Screeners had to decide whether the
X-ray images contained a threat object or not (NOT OK or OK response). Diﬃculty
ratings had to be provided by changing the position of a slider on a 100 point scale.
Response times for each image were measured.
3.2.3 Results
The X-Ray Tutor program measured the response as hit, miss, false alarm (FA), or
correct rejection (CR) with the reaction time for each test image and each par-
ticipant. Detection performance in terms of A’ (Pollack & Norman, 1964) was
calculated for each threat category separately (see Figure 3.1), using the follow-
ing formula (Grier, 1971): A′ = 0.5 + [(H − F )(1 + H − F )]/[4H(1 − F )], where
H is the hit rate and F the false alarm rate. If the false alarm rate is greater
than the hit rate the equation must be modiﬁed (Aaronson & Watts, 1987):
A′ = 0.5 − [(F −H)(1 + F −H)]/[4F (1 −H)]. A’ scores were subjected to a uni-
variate analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) with age and years on job as covariates,
threat type treated as within-participants factor (guns, IEDs, knives, other) and
gender and training (trained vs. untrained group) as between-participants factors.
The results are summarized in Table 3.1.
Fig. 3.1. Detection Performance A’ for
trained and untrained participants for
guns, IEDs, knives, and other threat
objects. (Note: Performance values are
multiplied by an arbitrary constant for
security purposes).
A’ scores were also subjected to separate univariate ANCOVAs for each threat (see
Table 3.2).
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Table 3.1. Results of univariate ANCOVAs on A’, hit rate (HR), and false alarm rate (FAR)
Table 3.2. Results of univariate ANCOVAs on A’, hit rate, and search and non-search time for the threat
categories separately
Additionally, hit rates were subjected to a univariate ANCOVA with gender and
training as between-participants factors, threat as within-participants factor, and
age and years on job as covariates. See Table 3.1 for details. Separate ANCOVAs on
hit rates for each threat category were performed (see Table 3.2). An ANCOVA on
false alarm values with gender and training as between-participants factors and age
and years on job as covariates shows a signiﬁcant main eﬀect of training (see Table
3.1 for details and values on covariate eﬀects).
The eﬀect of training in detection performance comprised an increase in the hit rate
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Fig. 3.2. Hit rate for trained and un-
trained participants for guns, IEDs,
knives, and other threat objects (Note:
Performance values are multiplied by
an arbitrary constant for security
purposes).
and a decrease in the false alarm rate. Figure 3.2 displays the hit rate for all threat
categories for trained and untrained participants. The pattern is very similar to the
one for the detection performance A’ (see Figure 3.1). This could be an indication
that the diﬀerence of the detection performance between trained and untrained
participants can mainly be attributed to a change in the hit rate. Nevertheless,
the ANCOVA on false alarm values showed a signiﬁcant eﬀect of training, which
means that also the false alarm rate is aﬀected by training. The average reaction
time in seconds was calculated for hits, false alarms, misses, and correct rejections
for trained and untrained screeners (see Figure 3.3). Reaction times were subjected
to an ANCOVA with age and years on job as covariates, gender and training as
between-participants factors and answer as a within-participants factor (hit, false
alarm, miss, correct rejection). The results including the signiﬁcance values can be
seen in Table 3.3.
Fig. 3.3. Reaction times in seconds for
trained and untrained participants for
hits, misses, false alarms, and correct
rejections.
3.2 Methods 75
Table 3.3. Results of univariate ANCOVAs on reac-
tion time (RT)
Reaction times were subjected to separate univariate ANCOVAs for hits, false
alarms, misses, and correct rejections with gender and training as between-
participants factors (detailed results are summarized in Table 3.4).
Table 3.4. Results of univariate ANCOVAs on reaction time (RT) for each answer category separately
The intercorrelation matrix in Table 3.5 shows the correlations between the predictor
variables (age, gender, and years on job) and the performance variables (hit rate,
false alarm rate, reaction times of hits, false alarms, correct rejections, and misses)
as well as intercorrelations between the set of performance measures.
The mean search time and the mean non-search time were calculated for each
screener individually and for hits and false alarms separately by applying the inspec-
tion model (Spitz & Drury, 1978, see Introduction) to the reaction times. If there
were less than ﬁve responses (i.e., hit or FA) available for a person or a reaction time
exceeded 14 seconds this data was discarded from analysis. Data elimination was
eﬀected for 3.7% of the trials (1839 of 49407 cases with RT bigger than 14 seconds).
Final sample sizes were n=98 (hit RT) and 97 (FA RT) for trained participants,
and n=95 (hit as well as FA RT) for untrained participants. The hits were again
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Table 3.5. Intercorrelation matrix with predictor variables (gender, age, years on job) and performance
variables (pHit, pFA, RTHit, RTFA, RTCR, RTMiss)
separated by threat category (guns, IEDs, knives, and other threat items) where for
the IEDs one untrained participant achieved less than ﬁve hits within 14 seconds.
Sample size therefore was 94 for IEDs. For false alarms no threat categories exist.
Using the cumulative distributions of reaction times, search time and non-search
time were calculated using a linear regression model (Drury, 1975; Spitz & Drury,
1978). Figures 3.4 and 3.5 show search and non-search times for false alarms and for
hits per threat category, respectively.
Fig. 3.4. Search time and non-search time for
false alarms by trained (n=97) and untrained
(n=95) participants.
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Fig. 3.5. Search time and non-search time for hits, calculated separately for guns, IEDs, knives, and other
threat items by trained (n=98) and untrained (n=95; IEDs n=94) participants.
The applicability of the two-component model (Spitz & Drury, 1978) to security
inspection task was tested by goodness of ﬁt values (r2) averaging above 0.9 both
for hits (Mean = 0.961, SD = 0.035) and false alarms (Mean = 0.905, SD = 0.069).
The scores of search times and non-search times for hits were subjected to separate
ANCOVAs with age, gender, and years on job as covariates, threat as a within-
participants factor and training as a between-participants factor. Table 3.6 summa-
rizes the results.
Individual search and non-search parameters were subjected to separate univariate
ANCOVAs for each threat category with training and gender as independent factors
and age and years on job as covariates. Non-search time was aﬀected by training
in all threat categories (see Table 3.2 for details). The covariate eﬀect of age was
signiﬁcant for all threat categories, whereas gender and years on job never had
covariate eﬀects (see Table 3.2). Table 3.2 also displays the eﬀects on search time.
Search time was only aﬀected by gender for the categories guns, IEDs, and other
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Table 3.6. Results of univariate ANCOVAs on search times and non-search times
threat objects with small to medium eﬀect sizes, but not for knives. Age had an eﬀect
on all threat categories and years on job on none. Training inﬂuenced only the search
time for the categories IEDs and other threat objects, but not for guns and knives.
Gender had signiﬁcant eﬀects on A’ (also on each threat category separately) and
false alarm rate with small to medium eﬀect sizes according to Cohen (1988), but
not on the hit rate (all analyses of eﬀect sizes are interpreted according to Cohen,
1988). The eﬀect of training is slightly inﬂuenced by gender that means there was
a signiﬁcant interaction between gender and training with a small eﬀect size (see
also Figure 3.6). There was a signiﬁcant eﬀect of gender on the reaction time with
a medium eﬀect size (see Tables 3.1 - 3.3).
Fig. 3.6. Detection Perfor-
mance A’ for trained and
untrained participants for
guns, IEDs, knives, and other
threat objects for males and
females separately. (Note:
Performance values are mul-
tiplied by an arbitrary con-
stant for security purposes).
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Age had signiﬁcant eﬀects on A’ (also on each threat category separately), on the
false alarm rate and on the hit rate (all threat categories except knives). The eﬀect
size was large for A’ and small to medium for hit and false alarm rates. Age had also
a signiﬁcant eﬀect on the reaction time with a medium eﬀect size (see Tables 3.1 -
3.3). Job experience (years on job) had signiﬁcant eﬀects on A’ (all threat categories
except IEDs) as well as on hit rate (only on IEDs and other threat objects) and
false alarm rate. Eﬀect sizes were small to medium. Reaction time was not aﬀected
by working experience (see Tables 3.1 - 3.3).
Fig. 3.7. Correlation between age and A’ of each threat category. ** = Correlation is signiﬁcant at the
0.01 level.
Signiﬁcant correlations were found between the detection performance A’ and age
and between the detection performance A’ and years on job, separated for threat
category (see Figures 3.7 and 3.8). However, if controlled for age, the correlation
between detection performance A’ and job experience (years on job) is not signiﬁcant
anymore (r = .069, p = .34).
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Fig. 3.8. Correlation between years on job and A’ of each threat category. ** = Correlation is signiﬁcant
at the 0.01 level, * = Correlation is signiﬁcant at the 0.05 level.
3.3 Discussion
The data from this study show a substantial increase of threat detection performance
in X-ray security screening due to training, regardless of age, gender, or on the job
experience, conﬁrming prior ﬁndings of Schwaninger and Hofer (2004), McCarley et
al. (2004), and also of Ghylin et al. (2006), in a more limited similar study of IEDs.
Age and gender were taken into account because there is previous evidence that
many aspects of cognition are impaired because of aging (for a review see Craik &
Salthouse, 2000) and that gender inﬂuences cognitive tasks (see Halpern, 1992, for
a review). Although our results point to such diﬀerences in detection performance,
with partly signiﬁcant values, the eﬀect sizes are small to medium according to the
conventions of Cohen (1988). From our results, detection performance decreases with
increasing age and also with increasing job experience. However, since the correla-
tion disappears with a partial correlation, controlling for age, this last interrelation
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presumably exists because age and job experience are confounded variables. As for
gender, males perform overall slightly better than females. As mentioned before,
detection performance increase due to training was not aﬀected by these factors,
except for gender, where males tend to beneﬁt a little more than females. Riegelnig
and Schwaninger (2006) contributed a more detailed study on the inﬂuence of age
and gender on detection performance in X-ray screening.
The aim of this study was to analyze the eﬀect of training on a more explicit level,
that is, which functions (search, decision) of the threat detection process change
because of training. High goodness of ﬁt values (r2 > 0.90) conﬁrm the applicability
of the two-component inspection model to X-ray security screening data, as was
also found by Ghylin et al. (2006). The application of the two-component inspec-
tion model (Spitz & Drury, 1978) to X-ray screening data allows a more detailed
investigation of the eﬀect of training on inspection performance of X-ray security
screeners. Findings of industrial inspection studies on the cumulative distributions
of reaction time for visual search showed that the inspection process can be divided
conceptually and operationally into two sub processes. The search process comprises
the actual searching of an area (i.e., by a sequence of eye movements); the non-search
process comprises all other components of the search (e.g., identiﬁcation, recogni-
tion, decision, response execution, etc.). A similar model has been proposed by Gale
et al. (2005) for use on inspection studies. This comprises an initial glance, then se-
rial search followed by ”detection and interpretation”. Eye movements, rather than
cumulative distribution ﬁtting, were proposed to validate that model. Using the two-
component inspection model, portions of the reaction time, that is, the time needed
for the whole search, can be assigned to one of the two sub processes. Analyzing
search and non-search time can give a better understanding of which processes of
search change due to training. These ﬁndings also quantify the eﬀectiveness of the
training system. Comparing the reaction times of trained and untrained screeners
reveals a signiﬁcant decrease for hits but not for false alarms, correct rejections or
misses. This, and also the eﬀect of training on hit rates, proves the eﬀectiveness of
the training system. Screeners have to learn to detect threat items, and therefore hit
rates increase and the time needed for detection decreases, respectively. Although
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reaction time for false alarms was not aﬀected signiﬁcantly by training, false alarm
rate actually was. However, as discussed in the next paragraph, reaction time of
search and non-search components of false alarms both showed an eﬀect of training.
The comparison of the search and the non-search time, respectively, of trained and
untrained screeners revealed a signiﬁcant decrease of the non-search time for hits due
to training, speciﬁcally to each threat category. Search time of hits was also aﬀected
by training. Examining the separate threat categories, this eﬀect was only signiﬁcant
for IEDs and other threat objects, but not for guns and knives. Presumably, guns and
knives are well-known objects for experienced screeners so that training does not af-
fect their detection substantially. For false alarms, the tendency for non-search time
goes in the same direction but for search time the untrained screeners performed
faster. These contrary eﬀects lead to the fact, that overall reaction time for false
alarms shows no diﬀerence between trained and untrained screeners, as mentioned
earlier. The substantial increase of detection performance A’ for trained screeners
indicates the more eﬀective search behaviour they achieve due to training. As trained
screeners also showed signiﬁcantly lower non-search times than untrained screeners,
the training eﬀect seems to come from faster detection, matching of ominous ob-
jects seen in the bag with memory representations of prohibited threat objects, and
faster recognition and decision about whether the object actually is a threat. Note
also that the faster search times of trained screeners for hits were not accompanied
by reduced times for correct rejection, that is, the times when the screener failed
to ﬁnd a threat and moved to the next bag image. Thus search was in fact more
thorough after training, in that stopping time was a greater multiple of mean search
time for hits. An improvement in speed of search is possible if threat objects are
learned and therefore stored in the visual memory which indicates that the training
system eﬀectively provides more exemplars of threat images. It becomes easier to
recognize common attributes of threat objects because they are represented in the
visual memory. A decrease of search time implies faster search, but only for IEDs,
conﬁrming the ﬁndings of Ghylin et al. (2006), and for other threat items. It remains
to be investigated why search only gets faster for IEDs, and slightly faster for other
threat objects, but not for guns and knives. The former category has wide visual
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variability as IEDs can take many forms and their individual components can be
scattered throughout the bag. In all studies of security X-ray inspection, they are
harder to detect without training (Drury, Ghylin, & Holness, 2006). In contrast the
’other’ threat items list changes frequently so that it can never achieve the same
level of familiarity as guns or knives, or even IEDs. Thus IEDs have more ’head
room’ for improved detection and other threat items are always in a learning cycle.
It has also to be observed if this speed up continues with training or if it is a side
eﬀect of the dramatic improvement of detection performance of IEDs which is far
greater than for the other categories. This would imply that search stops improving
as soon as detection performance of IEDs is at a higher level for all screeners. A
possible reason for the decrease of search time for IEDs and other threat objects
could be the building of new feature maps (Treisman & Gelade, 1980) for IEDs and
some threat objects belonging to the category of other (e.g., gas spray, tazer, etc.).
The assumption is that prior to training they exist with smaller probability than
feature maps for guns or knives, because IEDs and other threat objects are rarely to
never seen in everyday life, unlike guns or knives, and therefore are mostly unknown
to untrained screeners. The applicability of the two-component inspection model
(Drury, 1975; Spitz & Drury, 1978) to X-ray inspection provides the possibility of
investigating the inspection process and its change due to training more closely and
to gain more knowledge about the individual components within inspection. This
helps improving the technologies, procedures, and methods currently in use for X-ray
security screening, and therefore optimizes the human-system interface.
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Part II
Beneﬁt or Drawback? Potential Decision Aids for
X-Ray Screening

4Do ”Image Enhancement” Functions Really
Enhance X-Ray Image Interpretation?
4.1 Introduction
In recent years, the importance of baggage X-ray screening at airports has increased
dramatically. The image quality of older X-ray screening equipment was sometimes
in need of improvement. For example, an early version of a coloring algorithm as en-
hancement function did not serve the purpose of increasing detection performance of
threat objects, actually it impaired it. This was due to the occlusion of object parts
by the opaque coloring algorithm (Schwaninger, 2005a, 2005b). But there has been
much technological progress in the last years, especially regarding X-ray screening
machines, which nowadays provide high image quality and various image enhance-
ment functions (IEFs). The main objective of such functions is to process an image
so that the result is more suitable than the original image for a speciﬁc application
as for example X-ray screening at airports (Gonzalez & Woods, 2002). In X-ray im-
ages, the image enhancements might increase the visibility of objects within the bag
and remove background noise. State-of-the-art X-ray machines provide many IEFs.
The aim of this study is to investigate whether IEFs actually help human operators
(screeners) to better detect threat items in X-ray images of passenger bags. Interest-
ingly, reports regarding an evaluation of IEFs have not been publicly available except
two recent publications (Klock, 2005; Schwaninger, 2005b). Klock (2005) examined
whether IEFs increase screeners’ threat detection performance when visually in-
specting carry-on bags using a Rapiscan emulator. She found that high penetration,
organic stripping and inorganic stripping functions resulted in decreased probability
of detection (see below for more information on diﬀerent IEFs). Crystal clear, black
and white, and low penetration resulted in the best performance, while it should be
noted that the original color image was not included in the analysis. Klock (2005)
also found that these eﬀects are dependent on threat type, that is, whether guns,
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knives, improvised explosive devices (IEDs), or other prohibited items had to be
detected. Schwaninger (2005b) reported a study on the eﬀects of IEFs for the detec-
tion of IEDs in hold baggage. He found that the original image resulted in the best
performance, whereas the organic stripping, organic only and luminance negative
functions substantially impaired detection of IEDs. The purpose of this study is to
extend previous research in order to evaluate the value of diﬀerent IEFs. In addi-
tion, a comparison between IEFs used in cabin baggage screening (CBS) and hold
baggage screening (HBS) was of interest. The nine IEFs examined in this study can
be applied to the X-ray images online when working at an aviation security check-
point. Each pixel in the image format used in these X-ray machines has a material
and a luminance value. To show the images on a screen, the pixel values are color
coded using red for organic, blue for metallic and green for mixed organic/metallic
material. The luminance value deﬁnes the luminance of the pixel. Table 4.1 gives an
overview and description of all IEFs used in Experiment 1.
Table 4.1: Image Enhancement Filters
Grayscale
(GR)
The Grayscale ﬁlter removes the material information from
the image and shows only the luminance value.
Luminance
High (LH)
In this ﬁlter, the luminance of the image is increased by ap-
plying a gamma correction (Pratt, 2001) to the luminance
value. This allows the screeners to see details in dark ar-
eas of X-ray images, but as a consequence the visibility of
details in light areas of the images is reduced.
Luminance
Low (LL)
As the opposite of the Luminance High ﬁlter, the luminance
of the image is decreased. Details in light areas of the image
become more visible, dark areas lose the details.
Luminance
Negative
(LN)
In the Luminance Negative ﬁlter, the luminance of the im-
age is inverted. The material value and therefore the hue of
each pixel remains the same.
Continued on Next Page. . .
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Table 4.1: Image Enhancement Filters
Metal Only
(MO)
Here, only the metallic parts of the image are shown in
color. The organic parts are transformed to light gray
with low contrast. The organic parts of the mixed or-
ganic/metallic pixels are removed as well, giving them a
blue color similar to the all-metallic parts. The motivation
for this ﬁlter is to allow the screeners to concentrate on the
metallic objects perhaps leading to less search time for such
objects.
Metal Strip-
ping (MS)
The Metal Stripping ﬁlter removes the metal from the
image. Metallic parts are transformed to light gray and
from the mixed organic/metallic pixels the metallic part
is removed. As some mixed organic-metallic parts originate
from metallic objects laying upon organic objects, this re-
moval of metal sometimes shows the complete organic ob-
ject without potentially distracting metallic parts.
Organic
Only (OO)
The Organic Only ﬁlter shows the organic parts of the im-
age in color, while the metallic pixels are set to gray. The
mixed organic/metallic pixels are assigned to the metallic
or organic parts depending on the proportion of metallic
and organic material. The diﬀerence to the Metallic Strip-
ping ﬁlter is that less of the image remains visible and that
the remaining mixed organic/metallic pixels are still green.
Original
(OR)
Original (OR) refers to the unaltered images as produced
by the x-ray screening machine without applying any image
enhancement ﬁlter.
Organic
Stripping
(OS)
As the opposite to the Organic Only ﬁlter, the metallic
parts of the image remain colored and the organic parts
are shown in light gray with low contrast. The resulting
image is similar to the Metal Only image, except that in
this ﬁlter the mixed organic/metallic pixels are still green.
Continued on Next Page. . .
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Table 4.1: Image Enhancement Filters
Super En-
hancement
(SE)
The Super Enhancement ﬁlter adaptively adjusts the con-
trast of the image. Similar to a Local Histogram Equaliza-
tion (Gonzalez & Woods, 2002) or an Adaptive Contrast
Enhancement (Stark, 2000), the luminance of each pixel is
adjusted to the luminance of its surrounding pixels. In the
resulting image, each area has a medium average luminance.
4.2 Experiment 1
Experiment 1 was conducted to evaluate IEFs available in conventional cabin bag-
gage screening (CBS).
4.2.1 Participants
A total of 443 airport security screeners of the CBS at a European airport partici-
pated in this study. All had on-the-job experience of at least 6 months. A between-
participants design was used to compare the eﬀect of the IEFs on detection perfor-
mance with each other. To this end, participants were randomly assigned to one of
nine experimental groups, one group for each of the nine IEFs speciﬁed in Table 4.1.
The control group was used for testing detection performance when images were
displayed using the Original (OR) image type. The assignment of participants to
groups was conducted so that the distribution of gender, age, and days on job were
equal across groups. The ten groups showed an equal average of detection perfor-
mance A’, which was calculated using data of a separate test conducted prior to
this study. The experimental groups varied in size between 37 (Luminance Negative
ﬁlter) and 66 screeners (Grayscale ﬁlter); the control group consisted of 39 screeners.
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The diﬀerence in the group sizes is due to missing values (i.e., incomplete tests) for
several screeners who originally were assigned to the study.
4.2.2 Method and Procedure
The X-Ray Competency Assessment Test (X-Ray CAT) was used in Experiment
1. This computer-based test contains 256 X-ray images of real passenger carry-on
bags. Half of these images contain one prohibited item. The prohibited items have
been selected by police experts to be representative for the variety of diﬀerent threat
types. The test contains 32 X-ray images of passenger bags with guns, 32 images
with knives, 32 images with improvised explosive devices (IEDs), and 32 images
with other prohibited items. For further details on the X-Ray CAT, see Koller and
Schwaninger (2006). In order to create the stimuli for Experiment 1, the nine IEFs
explained in Table 4.1 above were applied to the X-ray images. The participants’
task is to visually inspect the images and to judge whether they are OK (contain
no prohibited item) or NOT OK (contain a prohibited item). In this study, images
disappeared after 10 seconds. The experiment consisted of two blocks. In block 1,
each of the 9 experimental groups was tested with only one IEF and the control group
was tested with the Original image (OR). The purpose of block 2 was to conﬁrm
that the participant groups are equivalent regarding their X-ray image interpretation
competency. In block 2, all participants were tested again using the same bags as in
block 1 but images were displayed in the OR format (see Table 4.1).
4.2.3 Results and Discussion
Detection performance was measured using A’, a measure derived from hit and false
alarm rates (Pollack & Norman, 1964; see Hofer & Schwaninger, 2004, for X-ray
image interpretation competency). The hit rate refers to the proportion of all images
containing a prohibited item that have been judged as NOT OK. The false alarm
rate refers to the proportion of NOT OK judgments for harmless bags. A’ scores
were calculated for each block separately. Figure 4.1 shows means and standard
errors of A’ scores of block 1 broken up by IEF and pooled across threat categories,
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including the results of the control group (OR). The results in Figure 4.1 suggest
that the OR image type results in the best performance, while some IEFs result in
substantial impairment of detection performance. Note that due to security reasons,
A’ scores are not shown in the ﬁgures. To estimate eﬀect sizes we employ eﬀect size
analysis and interpret the results based on Cohen (1988).
Fig. 4.1. Detection performance Experiment 1, block 1, pooled across threat categories. IEFs were tested
between participant groups: GR = Grayscale, LH = Luminance High, LL = Luminance Low, LN =
Luminance Negative, MO = Metal Only, MS = Metal Stripping, OO = Organic Only, OS = Organic
Stripping, SE = Super Enhancement, OR = Original (control group)
An analysis of variance (ANOVA) with the between-participants factor IEF was
carried out on individual A’ scores averaged per screener across threat category.
There was a main eﬀect of IEF with a large eﬀect size of η2 = .46,F(9, 433) =
41.67, p < .001. Figure 4.2 shows means and standard errors of A’ scores of block
1 broken up by IEF and threat category. For all four threat categories, the OR
image type resulted in the best performance. Again, some IEFs impaired detection
performance substantially. Moreover, the results in Figure 4.2 suggest that the eﬀects
of IEFs on performance vary between threat categories. These results were conﬁrmed
by a separate ANOVA using individual A’ scores calculated for each of the four
threat categories (guns, knives, IEDs, other prohibited items). The ANOVA with the
between-participants factor IEF and the within-participants factor threat category
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gave a large main eﬀect of IEF with an eﬀect size of η2 = .48,F(9, 433) = 43.66, p <
.001. There was also a large main eﬀect of threat type with an eﬀect size of η2 =
.30,F(3, 1299) = 180.84, p < .001. And there was also a large interaction between
threat category and IEF with η2 = .32,F(27, 1299) = 22.91, p < .001. The same A’
scores were subjected to one-way ANOVAs that were conducted separately for each
threat category. There was a large main eﬀect of IEF for all threat categories. For
guns, there was an eﬀect size of η2 = .64,F(9, 433) = 86.09, p < .001, for IEDs η2 =
.32,F(9, 433) = 22.38, p < .001, for knives η2 = .32,F(9, 433) = 23.10, p < .001, and
for other prohibited items η2 = .43,F(9, 433) = 36.27, p < .001.
In short, the OR image type resulted in the best performance for all threat cat-
egories. Moreover, some IEFs resulted in a substantial impairment which clearly
depended on threat category. This interaction would be predicted if one takes into
account that color information in X-ray images represents diﬀerent materials and
that diﬀerent prohibited items vary in their material composition. For example, the
Metal Only (MO) ﬁlter removes organic material from the X-ray image (see also
Table 4.1). Since guns and knives usually consist of metallic material, their pixels
in the ﬁltered X-ray image remain largely unaﬀected when the MO ﬁlter is used.
However, explosive material of IEDs is organic, thus it is not surprising that the
MO ﬁlter results in a large impairment of IED detection (see Figure 4.2). A similar
explanation applies to the eﬀect of the Organic Stripping (OS) ﬁlter. When this
ﬁlter is applied, all metallic parts of the image remain colored and the organic parts
are shown in light gray with low contrast. The resulting image is similar to the MO
image, except that for this ﬁlter the mixed organic/metallic pixels are still green.
Since the Metal Stripping (MS) ﬁlter removes metallic information from the image,
this IEF results in a substantial impairment of the detection of guns and knives,
which usually contain much metal. Because organic explosive material in IEDs re-
mains visible when the MS ﬁlter is used, IED detection is not aﬀected substantially.
The results in Figure 4.2 also indicate that the MS ﬁlter might be a better option
than the Organic Only (OO) ﬁlter. As explained in Table 4.1, the MS ﬁlter includes
information about organic material hidden behind metallic parts, whereas the OO
ﬁlter simply removes these parts from the image. A comparison between the original
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Fig. 4.2. Detection performance in Experiment 1, block 1, broken up by threat category.
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image (OR) and the grayscale version gives some indications on the relevance of color
information. The removal of the color-coded material information by the Grayscale
ﬁlter (GR) does impair threat detection, while this eﬀect is less pronounced for the
detection of guns. Apparently, the luminance information seems to be more impor-
tant than the material information. When inserting a threat object into a bag, the
part of the bag with the object inside normally becomes darker than its surround-
ing. This is particularly the case for guns which contain much metallic material.
Note however, that the removal of material information can conceal objects with
the same luminance but diﬀerent material than its surrounding. A similar problem
appears when using the Super Enhancement (SE) ﬁlter. For this IEF, the material
information remains the same, but the luminance contrast is slightly reduced which
has a negative inﬂuence on detection performance. The Luminance High (LH) ﬁlter
allows better threat detection than the Luminance Low (LL) ﬁlter. With the LL
ﬁlter, most objects inside the bag have a luminance close to black, which generally
reduces the diﬀerentiation of these objects. When using the Luminance Negative
(LN) ﬁlter, material and luminance information remain in the image, but the lumi-
nance is inverted. The impairment of threat detection when using this IEF shows
that screeners perform better with a dark object on a light background than if the
luminance is inverted. The results reported so far refer to block 1. As explained
in the method section above, all participants conducted the X-Ray CAT again in
block 2 using the original image type (OR). This was conducted to conﬁrm post-hoc
that the diﬀerent participant groups are equivalent in terms of their X-ray image
interpretation competency. This a prerequisite for the interpretation of the results re-
ported above involving ANOVAs with IEF as between-participants factor. Separate
ANOVAs of the data from block 2 conﬁrmed that the 9 experimental groups and the
control group were equivalent. Individual A’ scores were calculated for each screener
based on all trials of block 2. These data were subjected to a one-way ANOVA
with participant group as between-participants factor. All groups were equivalent,
since there was no eﬀect of group, η2 = .02,F(9, 433) = 1.08, p = .38. Individual A’
scores were calculated also for each threat category separately and this data were
then analysed using an ANOVA with participant group as between-participants fac-
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tor and threat category as within-participants factor. Again, the results show that
the participant groups were equivalent in terms of their X-ray image interpretation
competency, since there was no main eﬀect of participant group, and no interaction
between participant group and threat category, η2 = .02,F(9, 433) = 1.04, p = .41,
and η2 = .02,F(27, 433) = 0.86, p = .63, respectively.
4.3 Experiment 2
In hold baggage screening (HBS) X-ray images feature slightly diﬀerent colors. Fig-
ure 4.3 shows examples of the stimuli used in Experiment 2. As explained in the
introduction, screeners mainly search for IEDs, as other threat objects like for ex-
ample knives do not pose a threat to the aircraft and passengers when placed in
hold baggage. HBS screeners are often also more experienced screeners as it was the
case in this participant sample. The main aims of Experiment 2 were to examine
whether similar results are found in HBS regarding the eﬀect of IEFs despite the
operational and training diﬀerences between HBS and CBS.
Fig. 4.3. IEFs for HBS as used in Ex-
periment 2. From top left to bottom
right: GR, LN, OO, OR, OS, SE (see
Table 4.1).
4.3.1 Participants
Data of 83 aviation security screeners of the HBS of the same European airport was
analyzed. As in Experiment 1, a between-participants design was used to compare
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the eﬀect of the IEFs. Due to the smaller sample size only 5 IEFs and the OR
image could be tested. The 83 HBS screeners were randomly assigned to one of ﬁve
experimental groups (GR, LN, OO, OS, SE ﬁlters) or the control group (OR ﬁlter).
The assignment of participants to groups was conducted so that the distribution of
gender, age, and days on job was equal across groups. The six groups showed an equal
average of detection performance A’, which was calculated using data of a separate
test conducted prior to this study. The number of screeners in each experimental
group were between 10 (GR) and 17 (OO); the control group (OR) consisted of 15
screeners. As in Experiment 1, the diﬀerence in the group sizes is due to missing
values (i.e., incomplete tests) for several screeners.
4.3.2 Method and Procedure
The Bomb Detection Test (BDT) was used in this study. This computer-based test
contains 200 X-ray images of real hold baggage, whereas 100 images contain an IED.
The IEDs were created by police experts. Participants were instructed to decide for
each X-ray image whether it is OK (does not contain an IED) or NOT OK (contains
an IED). Images disappeared after 10 seconds. As in Experiment 1, there were two
blocks. In block 1, each of the 5 experimental groups was tested with their respective
IEF. In block 2 all participants were then tested again using the same images but
using the Original (OR) image function. The control group conducted the test twice
using the OR image type in block 1 and block 2. As in Experiment 1, the purpose
of block 2 was to conﬁrm the comparability of the groups post hoc.
4.3.3 Results and Discussion
Analyses were similar to Experiment 1 but there was only one threat category,
namely IEDs. Figure 4.4 shows means and standard errors of A’ scores broken up
by image enhancement function. As mentioned above, A’ scores are not shown in
the ﬁgure for security reasons. Eﬀect sizes are calculated using eﬀect size analysis
and they are interpreted based on Cohen (1988). A one-way ANOVA with IEF as
between-participants factor revealed a large main eﬀect of IEF with an eﬀect size
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of η2 = .26,F(5, 77) = 5.29, p < .001. As in Experiment 1, the original image (OR)
resulted in the best performance. Consistent with the results found in Experiment 1,
we found in Experiment 2 that the Organic Stripping (OS) and Luminance Negative
(LN) functions resulted in a substantial impairment of detection performance for
IEDs. All participants conducted the test again in block 2 using the original image
type (OR). The aim was to conﬁrm post-hoc that the diﬀerent participant groups
are equivalent in terms of their X-ray image interpretation competency. To this
end, individual A’ scores from block 2 were subjected to a one-way ANOVA with
participant group as between-participants factor. There was no main eﬀect of group,
η2 = .05,F(5, 77) = 0.75, p = .59, conﬁrming that the six groups are equivalent
regarding their X-ray image interpretation competency.
Fig. 4.4. Detection performance Experiment 2, block 1. GR = Grayscale, LN = Luminance Negative, OO
= Organic Only, OR = Original, OS = Organic Stripping, SE = Super Enhancement.
4.4 General Discussion
The aim of this study was to investigate the eﬀect of image enhancement functions
(IEFs) on X-ray detection performance of airport security screeners. Experiment 1
was conducted with cabin baggage and Experiment 2 with hold baggage. In both
experiments the original image (OR) resulted in the best performance. One inter-
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pretation could be that for this manufacturer the default image is indeed the best
image. However, since the OR image is the default image on the tested X-ray ma-
chine and since screeners received more training with OR images, further research
is needed to clarify whether the beneﬁt of the OR image type is due to expertise
and training or whether it truly reﬂects better image quality. In both experiments,
it was also found that some IEFs resulted in substantial impairments of detection
performance. This general result is consistent with previous reports (Klock, 2005;
Schwaninger, 2005c). The IEF eﬀects are dependent on threat category; most likely
due to diﬀerences in material properties of the diﬀerent threat categories. For exam-
ple, guns contain more metal than IEDs. Removing metallic content (MS function)
therefore results in a larger impairment of detection performance for guns than for
IEDs. The main conclusions of this study are that user testing is crucial before
implementing such ﬁlters into a system. Moreover, training when and how to use
each of the ﬁlters is crucial to make eﬀective use of them. We are conducting a set
of additional experiments to further investigate the value of IEFs. For example, it
could be that although on average certain IEFs impair detection, they could still be
useful for detecting certain threat objects under certain conditions. Moreover, we are
currently looking at CBT data where screeners have the possibility to choose a ﬁlter
and to switch between ﬁlters. This allows investigating whether perhaps a certain
combination and sequence of IEFs is useful for certain threat types and images. In
addition, we are trying to clarify, whether IEFs actually do not improve detection of
prohibited items or if however, when used according to individual preferences and
to speciﬁc features of the image, they can improve the ability to locate targets. Fi-
nally, we also have implemented IEFs in a CBT system (X-Ray Tutor) to investigate
potentially supporting eﬀects that only can become manifest through training and
familiarization.
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5The Role of Consideration Information for X-ray
Image Interpretation in Aviation Security
5.1 Introduction
The task of aviation security screening oﬃcers at an airport comprises many diﬀer-
ent components. The main task is to prevent passengers from bringing prohibited
objects onto the plane. The prohibited objects are deﬁned by Doc 30 of the European
Civil Aviation Conference (ECAC) and include - among others - for example guns,
knives, and improvised explosive devices. These objects are prohibited because they
could pose a danger to the safety of passengers during a plane travel. In order to
carry out this task eﬃciently all passenger bags have to go through an X-ray screen-
ing machine. In this way, screening oﬃcers do not have to manually open and search
every single suitcase. Instead, they search the X-ray image of the passenger bag and
decide based on this information if a bag is clear to be carried onto the plane or if it
contains a suspicious object. If this is the case, or if the interpretation of the X-ray
image is not possible due to high density of the content, the bag has to be opened
and searched manually and appropriate measures have to be taken, respectively. The
aim of the X-ray screening process is to detect all prohibited objects with minimum
number of bags to be opened. In order to achieve this goal, the screening oﬃcers
have to be able to discriminate between threat objects and harmless everyday ob-
jects when they see them on the X-ray screen. At the moment, screening oﬃcers at
many airports are supposed to conduct individually adaptive computer-based train-
ing (for example with X-Ray Tutor (XRT), Schwaninger, 2004) in order to enhance
their skills in detecting threat objects and in discriminating them from harmless
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everyday objects. Detection of threat objects and object recognition in general is
dependent on several factors. On one hand, screening oﬃcers have to know which ob-
jects are prohibited and what they look like in X-ray images. Object shapes that are
not similar to ones that are stored in visual memory are diﬃcult to recognize (e.g.,
Graf et al., 2002; Schwaninger, 2004, 2005a). This is the knowledge-based factor.
Detection of (threat) objects is also depending on image-based factors (Schwaninger
et al., 2005). Image-based factors refer to attributes of an object that change the
diﬃculty of its detection or recognition if they are varied. Diﬃculty to recognize an
object can be increased if it is seen in an unusual angle, that is, if the viewpoint
is varied. Various studies on object recognition found orientation eﬀects not only
for novel objects (e.g., Bu¨lthoﬀ & Edelman, 1992; Edelman & Bu¨lthoﬀ, 1992; Tarr
& Pinker, 1989) but also for known, familiar objects (e.g., Hayward & Tarr, 1997;
Lawson & Humphreys, 1996, 1998; J. E. Murray, 1997, 1999; Newell & Findlay, 1997;
Palmer et al., 1981). The view of an object in which it is easiest to recognize is often
referred to as canonical view (Palmer et al., 1981). Furthermore, an object becomes
more diﬃcult to recognize if it is superimposed by other objects. With increasing su-
perposition characteristic features of an object might get lost which are essential to
recognize this object as what it is. Several studies found reduced object recognition
for incomplete pictures (e.g., Biederman, 1987; F. S. Murray & Szymczyk, 1978).
Another factor inﬂuencing the recognizability of an object is its surrounding. In the
case of passenger bags it is deﬁned as bag complexity which depends on the type and
number of other objects in the bag. Too much information distracts attention and
impedes detection and recognition of objects. The computer-based training system
XRT incorporates these factors in its individually adaptive algorithm. Screening of-
ﬁcers see X-ray images of passenger bags and have to judge if a bag is OK (contains
no threat object) or if it is NOT OK (contains threat object). Every screening of-
ﬁcer starts at the ﬁrst level and reaches the next level by accomplishing a certain
detection performance. This means, enough threat objects have to be recognized
and detected, but enough clear bag images have to be judged as OK as well (as evi-
dence of discrimination ability). In each level the diﬃculty of these images increases.
First, the viewpoint is exacerbated. Then, with increasing levels, superposition and
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bag complexity are also exacerbated. In the highest level screening oﬃcers see very
complex bags containing - if - highly rotated threat objects which are superimposed
by other objects. For more details on XRT and the individually adaptive algorithm
please refer to Schwaninger (2004) and Schwaninger, Michel, and Bolﬁng (2007). A
study by Koller et al. (2008) has shown that there is a large increase of detection
performance when screening oﬃcers are trained with XRT. In this study another
approach is examined to support the screening oﬃcers in their decision about OK
or NOT OK while they search an X-ray image of a passenger bag. The aim of this
study is to investigate whether displaying consideration information can help secu-
rity screening oﬃcers to identify prohibited items in X-ray images of passenger bags,
and to make a decision if a detected object actually is a threat object or not. The use
of consideration information serves the intention to inﬂuence the screening oﬃcers
to make fewer mistakes regarding the detection and identiﬁcation of threat objects.
Consideration information refers to simultaneously presented X-ray image patches
which contain visually and conceptually similar prohibited items as well as X-ray
image patches which are visually similar but do not contain a prohibited item. The
role of consideration information for increasing detection performance and eﬃciency
is investigated with novices, intermediate and expert screeners and for the time being
focuses on the detection of improvised explosive devices (IEDs). The classiﬁcation
into novices, intermediate, and expert screeners is done under the assumption that
consideration information may have a diﬀerent eﬀect depending on expertise. The
concept of consideration information is derived from the mainly marketing research
related concept of the consideration set. The consideration set is a subdivision of
a consumer’s awareness set, which constitutes all brands available on the market
of which the consumer is aware of. Those brands out of the awareness set that the
consumer would consider purchasing is called the consideration set. The purchase
decision is restricted to brands belonging to the consideration set (e.g., Kotler, 1988;
J. H. Roberts & Lattin, 1991, 1997). There is a substantial diﬀerence between the
two concepts in that the consideration set is a model to describe consumers’ (human
subjects’) layered decision process whereas the consideration information represents
the context to inﬂuence human subjects’ decision. In fact, the concept of consider-
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ation information has its root in consumer behavior research where context eﬀects
are used to inﬂuence human subjects’ choices (e.g., Hamilton, 2003). There is little
literature available on consideration information as help in visual search and decision
making. Among these, Bernstein and Li (2005) investigated the role of consideration
information on a digit recognition task and found evidence that the consideration
information did improve the participants’ performance.
5.2 Method
5.2.1 Participants
The study was conducted at a large European airport with 294 screening oﬃcers par-
ticipating voluntarily. After eliminating incomplete data sets, data of 198 was used
for analysis. The screening oﬃcers were divided into three groups: novices, intermedi-
ate, and expert screeners. Since there is no explicit deﬁnition of novice, intermediate,
and expert screener, this assignment was done twice. Once based on the duration of
their employment and once based on their performance in the certiﬁcation test last
year. This means, in the ﬁrst approach, experts are those screening oﬃcers with the
longest working experience. In the second approach, experts are those screening oﬃ-
cers with the best X-ray image interpretation competency. Working experience was
assessed based on the duration of employment and calculated in days on job (DOJ).
Thereby, novices were deﬁned as persons working less than 1.5 years (i.e., 547.5 days)
in this job. Screening oﬃcers working between 1.5 and 5 years (i.e., between 547.5
and 1825 days) in the job were classiﬁed as intermediate screeners, and experts are
those screening oﬃcers who have been working more than 5 years (i.e., more than
1825 days) in the job. These deﬁnitions are chosen arbitrarily and in a way that the
distribution of the screening oﬃcers yields comparable group sizes. See Table 5.1 for
details. Table 5.1 also displays the average and standard deviation of days on job for
the three groups as well as for the three status groups deﬁned by the performance
approach. The other approach deﬁnes the expertise status on performance instead
of time on job. Therefore, results of an X-ray image test (X-Ray CAT, see Koller
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& Schwaninger, 2006) provide the basis for this assessment. The X-Ray CAT was
solved by every screening oﬃcer in the course of their yearly certiﬁcation in 2007.
Performance was measured using A’. Mean A’ in X-Ray CAT for the experimental
group was m = 0.910, SD = 0.033. Based on these values expert status is deﬁned as
a minimum A’ ≥ (m+0.5SD), that is, 0.926. Novice status is deﬁned as a maximum
A’ ≤ (m − 0.5SD), that is, 0.893. Screening oﬃcers that achieved an A’ between
0.893 and 0.926 in the X-Ray CAT are classiﬁed as intermediate. See Table 5.1 for
details. Table 5.1 also displays mean A’ values from the X-Ray CAT for each group.
Table 5.1. Figures of the expertise groups, deﬁned by days on job (DOJ, top half) and by test performance
(CAT, lower half). SD = Standard deviation.
Status DOJ Deﬁnition n Mean
DOJ
SD of DOJ Mean
A’
SD of A’
Expert DOJ > 1825 69 4592.9 2140.4 0.909 0.028
Intermedi-
ate
DOJ 547.5 - 1825 63 966.0 332.4 0.915 0.038
Novice DOJ < 547.5 66 357.4 140.8 0.903 0.030
Status CAT Deﬁnition n Mean
DOJ
SD of DOJ Mean
A’
SD of A’
Expert A’ > 0.926 60 2187.0 2213.0 0.942 0.012
Intermedi-
ate
A’ 0.893 - 0.926 68 2297.6 2440.7 0.910 0.010
Novice A’ < 0.893 70 1627.1 2163.9 0.868 0.024
5.2.2 Materials and Procedure
Stimuli were created from Smiths-Heimann Hi-Scan 6040i colour X-ray images of
improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and passenger bags (Figure 5.1 displays an
example of the stimuli). Ten prototypical IEDs were chosen and manually built into
four bag images each, controlling for the superposition. This was done with a tool
which applies a special algorithm when combining two X-ray colour images.
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Using the following formula, this tool calculates the superposition of the built-in
prohibited item, that is, how much the pixels of the IED in this case are superimposed
by pixels of the bag:
SP =
√∑
[ISN(x, y)− IN(x, y)]2
ObjectSize
SP = Superposition; ISN = Grayscale intensity of the SN (Signal plus Noise) image
(contains a prohibited item); IN = Grayscale intensity of the N (Noise) image (contains
no prohibited item); ObjectSize: Number of pixels of the prohibited item where R, G, and
B are < 253
Superposition is kept constant for each IED in the four diﬀerent bags.
Fig. 5.1. Left: main IED. Middle and right: reference IEDs as
used in consideration information.
In the experiment the ex-
aminees see all 40 bags
containing an IED (threat
images) and additionally
the same 40 bags but
not containing an IED
(non-threat images). The
consideration information image patches are created by combining princi-
ple component analysis (PCA) (Jolliﬀe, 2002) and manual IED insertion.
Fig. 5.2. Example images. Left: harmless bag (non-threat image), right:
same bag with an improvised explosive device (IED) at the top right corner
(threat image). The IED is shown also separately at the bottom right.
Speciﬁcally, ﬁrst, for
each threat image the
image patch contain-
ing the IED was cut
out (same size for all
items). Formally, we
name them threat im-
age patches. Then, the
threat image patches
are used to search for
visually similar image patches through a large set of non-threat passenger bags
(empty bags). In principal, similarities among the images are measured by project-
ing the images into a constructed feature space and deﬁning a distance over the
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feature space. There are many ways to construct features (e.g., spreading from low
level feature detection of edge, corner, blob, ridge to more complex features re-
lated to texture, shape or motion) from the images depending on the desired target
(e.g., face detection) (Morris, 2004). Since we are interested in the general visual
similarities among images, the general dimensional reduction techniques (e.g., PCA,
semideﬁnite embedding, multifactor dimensionality reduction, Isomap, Kernel PCA,
etc) become suitable tools to construct features. It is unclear which dimensional re-
duction technique should be chosen due to the absence of the quantitative visual
similarity measurement criterion, and it is not a topic of this paper, either. To focus
on our interests, we optionally pick up the simple PCA as the feature construction
tool and adopt a Euclidean distance to deﬁne the similarities among X-ray images.
Formally, we denote the threat image patches as Xi, and the non-threat passenger
bag set as XE. Then the following procedure is used to compute the similarity be-
tween a threat image patch xi ∈ Xi and every non-threat passenger bag xe ∈ XE.
PCA-Based x-ray Image Similarity Computation Procedure
Input: Xi, XE
1. Combine Xi and XE together and denotes the combined image set as X = [Xi, XE ], where
each column of X represents an image.
2. Compute the covariance matrix of X as COV = (X −X)(X −XT . Note, X denotes the mean
matrix of X, where each column of X has the identical value, which equal to the average
intensity of corresponding image in X.
3. Compute 30 maximum eigenvalues λ = [λ1, ..., λ30] and corresponding eigenvectors Q =
[q1, ..., q30] of COV .
4. Project X into feature space Q by a dot product QT (X − X). Here we denote the projec-
tion of X as XPCA, where each column of XPCA represents a 30-PCA transformation of the
corresponding original image.
5. For each xi,PCA ∈ Xi,PCA,
a) loop through XE,PCA, for each xe,PCA ∈ XE,PCA, compute Euclidean distance between
xi,PCA and xe,PCA as di,e = (xi,PCA − xe,PCA)T (xi,PCA − xe,PCA)
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b) select 8 diﬀerent xe,PCA ∈ XE,PCA, which have the minimum Euclidean distances from
xi,PCA and store the corresponding images as 8 most similar non-threat passenger bags for
a given threat image patch xi
With above technique, for each threat image patch 8 similar looking patches from
the empty bag selection were extracted. These 8 image patches were distributed
randomly to the appropriate threat and non-threat image pair (4 for the threat
image and 4 for the non-threat image). In the experiment, each image is presented
with 4 consideration information image patches, whereof 2 are images containing a
reference IED and 2 are empty images. For each of the 10 main IEDs 2 reference IEDs
were selected which are similar concerning the visual appearance and the structure of
the IED. An example of a main IED with the two reference IEDs is depicted in Figure
5.2. Both reference IEDs are built into the consideration information image patches
and presented with the main IED, accompanied by the two empty consideration
information image patches. Figure 5.3 shows the user interface of the experiment.
The non-threat images are presented with 4 consideration information image patches
as well, 2 of them containing the reference IEDs corresponding to the belonging
threat image.
The images are divided into two blocks (Block 1 and Block 2) and presented ran-
domly, where each threat and non-threat image pair is split up in the two blocks.
Screening oﬃcers had the possibility to activate the experiment during a training
session by clicking the corresponding button on the screen. They were randomly
assigned to one of three groups with diﬀerent experimental designs (Consideration
Information, Feedback, and Control condition) and two blocks within each experi-
mental group. Screening oﬃcers in Block 1 started with images of Block 1 and then
saw the images of Block 2 and vice versa for screening oﬃcers in Block 2. The block
design is applied to avoid a threat image to be followed immediately by the corre-
sponding non-threat image. These data will not be analyzed within this study. The
task is the same for all three experimental conditions: the main image has to be
judged whether it contains an IED (click Nicht OK) or if no IED is enclosed in the
bag (click OK) (see Figure 5.3 for the user interface). Furthermore, the screening
oﬃcers had to rate their conﬁdence of the judgment on a sliding bar (not analyzed
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Fig. 5.3. Screenshot of the Consideration Information Test Platform. The big bag image has to be judged
if it is ”OK” (contains no IED) or ”Nicht OK” (NOT OK, contains IED). The four little image patches on
the bottom are consideration information. The images with the red border contain a reference IED, the
images with the green border contain no IED. By clicking on the button ”Bombe zeigen” (show bomb)
the IED could be highlighted with a ﬂicker. A timer on the top right indicates the seconds the main image
remains on the screen.
in this paper). This conﬁdence rating was only activated after the response OK or
Nicht OK (NOT OK) was given. The main image was displayed for 30 seconds but
responses could also be given when the main image was removed. In the Consid-
eration Information condition (n = 68), the consideration information is presented
simultaneously to the main image, which has to be judged. By clicking on ”Bombe
zeigen” the IED in the corresponding consideration information image patch can be
highlighted through a ﬂicker (see Figure 5.3). In the Feedback condition (n = 66),
the consideration information is presented only after the response (OK or Nicht OK)
is given. This is to rule out any eﬀect on the results of presenting information. In
the Control condition (n = 64) no consideration information was presented at all.
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5.3 Results
Hits, misses, false alarms and correct rejections were reported for each screener’s re-
sponse to each single trial. Hits are deﬁned as all correctly identiﬁed bombs (i.e., the
response NOT OK to a threat image). Misses are missed bombs (i.e., the response
OK to threat images). False alarms are NOT OK responses to non-threat images
and correct rejections are OK responses to non-threat images. Individual data were
averaged across all images in order to eliminate an item-speciﬁc factor. Hit rate and
false alarm rate were calculated. The hit rate is the proportion of all threat images
that were correctly judged as containing a bomb. The false alarm rate is the pro-
portion of all non-threat images that were incorrectly judged as containing a bomb.
Using these two parameters and applying signal detection theory the detection per-
formance measure d’ was calculated: d’ = zHit - zFalse, where zHit and zFalse are the
standardized hit and false alarm rates. Furthermore, reaction times were analyzed
as well, that is, the time during which the main image is presented on the screen
until a response was given. The analyses regarding status group (novices, intermedi-
ate and expert screeners) were made twice, once with the status classiﬁcation based
on working experience (Status DOJ) and once with the status classiﬁcation based
on X-ray image interpretation competency (i.e., certiﬁcation results, Status CAT).
Table 5.2 gives an overview on the number of screeners per group, once according
to the classiﬁcation by working experience, once according to the classiﬁcation by
performance.
Table 5.2. Number
of screeners for the
diﬀerent expertise
groups in the three
experimental condi-
tions Consideration
Information, Feed-
back, Control
Status DOJ Status CAT
Consideration Information Expert 28 17
Intermediate 22 31
Novice 18 20
Feedback Expert 24 22
Intermediate 21 21
Novice 21 23
Control Expert 17 21
Intermediate 20 16
Novice 27 27
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5.3.1 Detection Performance
Figure 5.4 shows the average detection performance d’ for the three experimental
groups, independent of the status (Note: All d’ values are multiplied with an ar-
bitrary constant for security reasons). A univariate Analysis of Variance (ANOVA)
with the between-participants factor experimental condition (Consideration Infor-
mation, Feedback, and Control) conﬁrmed the visual impression that there is no sig-
niﬁcant diﬀerence in detection performance between the three experimental groups
(p = .799). So in general it can be said that the presentation of consideration infor-
mation does not help to improve detection performance, in this case of IEDs. Looking
Fig. 5.4. Detection performance for
the three experimental conditions: Con-
sideration Information, Feedback, and
Control condition. Thin bars are stan-
dard deviations.
at the results broken up by DOJ status group (Experts, Intermediate, Novices, see
Figure 5.5), performance diﬀerences can be noted between the conditions. Indeed it
seems that consideration information has a diﬀerent eﬀect depending on the status
group. However, ANOVAs with the between-participants factor experimental con-
dition for each of the status groups revealed no statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerences
between the experimental conditions (Experts: p = .118; Intermediate; p = .760;
Novices: p = .263). This means, again, that detection performance is not aﬀected
by the experimental condition. Still, a tendency can be observed that novices can
proﬁt from consideration information, whereas for intermediates there is no eﬀect
and for experts it actually impairs detection performance.
If broken up by CAT status group (see Figure 5.6), the pattern seems to be diﬀerent.
However, here as well the ANOVAs with the between-participants factor experimen-
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Fig. 5.5. Detection performance bro-
ken up by DOJ status group and for
the experimental conditions separately.
Thin bars are standard deviations.
tal condition for each of the status groups revealed no statistically signiﬁcant diﬀer-
ences between the experimental conditions (Experts: p = .779; Intermediate: p =
.916; Novices: p = .371). This is another indication that the detection performance
is not aﬀected by the experimental condition and that consideration information in
particular did not improve detection performance. Figures 5.7 and 5.8 show scatter
Fig. 5.6. Detection performance bro-
ken up by CAT status group and for
the experimental conditions separately.
Thin bars are standard deviations.
plots of the data from the consideration information condition group only. Figure 5.7
depicts the detection performance for all screeners of the consideration information
condition group in relation to their working hours (i.e., working experience). There
is a strong negative correlation (r = -.682, p < .01) between detection performance
in this study and days on job. This means, the shorter the working experience, the
higher the performance in the consideration information condition. It seems as if
inexperienced screeners can proﬁt more from consideration information. However,
5.3 Results 113
it has to be considered that we have no baseline measurement for this group. The
correlation between days on job and detection performance for the control group
is r = -.289 with p < .05 (see Figure 5.9). Figure 5.8 displays the detection per-
Fig. 5.7. Detection performance d’ in
relation to the days on job for each
screener in the consideration informa-
tion condition group. Each dot repre-
sents one screener.
formance in relation to the test performance in X-Ray CAT during certiﬁcation for
each screener in the consideration information condition group. Here, the trend is in
the opposite direction. There is a signiﬁcant correlation (r = .374, p < .01) between
detection performance in this study and test performance in X-Ray CAT, meaning
that experts deﬁned as screeners with high X-ray image interpretation competency
achieved higher scores in this study. This leads to the assumption that performance-
based experts can proﬁt more from consideration information. However, again we
have no baseline measurement for these groups. The correlation between test perfor-
mance in X-Ray CAT and detection performance for the control group is r = .405
with p < .01 (see Figure 5.10).
5.3.2 Reaction Time
The same analyses as for detection performance have been made for reaction times.
Figure 5.11 shows the average reaction times per experimental condition, indepen-
dent of status. Here, the data suggests that the group with consideration infor-
mation on average needed most time to respond to the main image, compared
to the group receiving feedback and to the control group. In average, the control
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Fig. 5.8. Detection performance d’ in
relation to the detection performance A’
in the X-Ray CAT, taken during cer-
tiﬁcation 2007. Each dot represents a
screener in the consideration informa-
tion condition group.
Fig. 5.9. Detection performance d’ in
relation to days on job for the control
condition group. Each dot represents
one screener.
Fig. 5.10. Detection performance d’ in
relation to the test performance in the
CAT for the control condition group.
Each dot represents one screener.
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Fig. 5.11. Averaged reaction time in
seconds for the three experimental
conditions: Consideration Information,
Feedback, and Control. Thin bars are
standard deviations.
group was fastest to respond to the main image. The ANOVA with the between-
participants factor experimental condition conﬁrms a signiﬁcant main eﬀect with
medium eﬀect size (η2 = .083,F(2, 195) = 8.824, p < .001). All eﬀect sizes are
interpreted according to the conventions by Cohen (1988). Separate pairwise com-
parisons relate the diﬀerence to the consideration information condition, where a
signiﬁcantly higher reaction time was generated than in the feedback condition
(p < .05) and therefore also than in the control condition (p < .001). The dif-
ference between the feedback and the control condition is not signiﬁcant (p = .096).
Again, analyses were made broken up by status group. Figure 5.12 shows mean
reaction time broken up by DOJ status group. All groups needed more time for
the consideration information condition than in the feedback or control condition.
ANOVAs with the between-participants factor experimental condition for each sta-
tus group revealed a just about signiﬁcant main eﬀect of experimental condition
on reaction time for the experts (η2 = .095,F(2, 66) = 3.467, p < .05) and novices
(η2 = .101,F(2, 63) = 3.534, p < .05), with medium eﬀect sizes as well. For interme-
diate screeners the diﬀerence was not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent between the experimental
conditions. Although there was a signiﬁcant main eﬀect, separate pairwise compar-
isons between the conditions revealed no signiﬁcant diﬀerence for the expert group.
For the novices only the diﬀerence between the consideration information and the
control condition was signiﬁcantly diﬀerent (p < .05).
If broken up by CAT status (see Figure 5.13), the pattern is similar. ANOVAs with
the between-participants factor experimental condition for each status group re-
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Fig. 5.12. Average reaction time bro-
ken up by DOJ status group and for
each experimental condition separately.
Thin lines are standard deviations.
vealed a large and signiﬁcant main eﬀect only for the intermediate screeners group
(η2 = .245,F(2, 65) = 10.564, p < .001). Separate pairwise comparisons of the con-
ditions for the intermediate group showed a signiﬁcant diﬀerence between consid-
eration information and feedback condition (p < .05) and between consideration
information and control condition (p < .001), but not between the feedback and
control condition. This means, if status group is deﬁned according to X-ray image
interpretation competency, screeners with medium performance need signiﬁcantly
more time for responding to the main image in the consideration information con-
dition. Other than that, there is only the tendency in the same direction for the
novices, but no other signiﬁcant eﬀects of the experimental condition on reaction
times.
Fig. 5.13. Average reaction time bro-
ken up by CAT status group and for
each experimental condition separately.
Thin bars are standard deviations.
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It is also interesting to have a look at the behavior of the screeners during the
test regarding consideration information. In the consideration information condition
and the feedback condition, where the consideration information was displayed as
feedback after the response, screeners had the possibility to highlight the IEDs within
the two threat image patches of the consideration information by clicking on the
button (see Figure 5.3 for the user interface). Figure 5.14 shows the number of
clicks on the two buttons for the consideration information group and the feedback
group, averaged over the status groups. It can be seen that the number of clicks on
average is considerably higher for the feedback group. However, as could be seen in
Figure 5.4, there was no beneﬁt of consideration information or feedback whatsoever
for the detection performance.
Fig. 5.14. Number of clicks on the two
buttons (Button 1 and Button 2) used
to highlight the IED within the threat
image patch of the consideration infor-
mation for the Consideration Informa-
tion group and the Feedback group.
If split up by DOJ status, there is an interesting fact to be observed (see Figure
5.15). In the feedback condition, novices highlight the IEDs in the consideration
information far more often than intermediate or expert screeners. However, this dif-
ference is not signiﬁcant, neither between the novices and the intermediate screeners
(p = .125) nor between the novices and the experts (p = .075). This may be due
to the large standard deviations which are not depicted in the graph (see Table
5.3 for details). In all cases (except for the intermediate screeners in the feedback
condition), standard deviations are larger than the mean values which indicates
substantial diﬀerences in the use of the buttons between the screeners.
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Table 5.3. Average use of Button 1 and Button 2 for the three DOJ expertise groups in the two experi-
mental conditions Consideration Information and Feedback. SD = Standard deviation.
Status DOJ Button 1 SD Button 1 Button 2 SD Button 2
Consideration Information Expert 15.107 25.053 14.429 23.050
Intermediate 13.273 15.144 13.545 15.121
Novice 9.722 11.208 9.333 9.677
Feedback Expert 28.792 39.208 27.333 36.151
Intermediate 30.238 28.117 29.667 28.472
Novice 59.667 68.007 62.619 77.486
A diﬀerent pattern can be seen in the consideration information condition. There
is no signiﬁcant diﬀerence between the three status groups regarding use of the
buttons. Here as well there are large diﬀerences between the screeners regarding the
use of the buttons (see Table 5.3 for standard deviations).
Fig. 5.15. Number of clicks on the
two buttons used to highlight the IED
within consideration information broken
up by DOJ status group.
If broken up by CAT status (see Figure 5.16), the pattern is again similar to the
analysis based on working experience. Here, the novices - deﬁned by low X-ray image
interpretation competency - are using the highlighting buttons more frequently in
both experimental groups. However, the diﬀerences between this group and the
intermediate and expert screeners are smaller and in no case signiﬁcant. In general,
the tendency shows that, the higher the X-ray image interpretation competency, the
fewer the use of the highlighting buttons.
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Fig. 5.16. Number of clicks on the two
buttons to highlight the IEDs in consid-
eration information broken up by CAT
status group for the Consideration In-
formation and the Feedback condition.
5.4 Discussion
The aim of this study was to investigate the concept of consideration information
within aviation security screening. Aviation security screening oﬃcers have to search
every passenger bag for threat objects which are prohibited from being carried onto
an airplane. This important task is being executed by means of X-ray screening. That
means, screening oﬃcers have to judge if a bag is harmless or not by interpreting the
X-ray image of the respective bag. This is a demanding task which requires certain
aptitudes and abilities and speciﬁc training (e.g., Koller et al., 2008; Schwaninger
et al., 2005). Deriving from ﬁndings regarding consideration information for digit
recognition the question arose if providing consideration information can improve
X-ray image interpretation competency by giving a decision aid. Bernstein and Li
(2005) investigated the role of consideration information on a digit recognition task
and found evidence that the consideration information did improve the participants’
recognition performance. In this study it was assessed if screeners, when presented
consideration information, achieve a higher detection performance for IEDs. The
results indicate that this is not the case. There was no diﬀerence found in detection
performance between the three experimental conditions Consideration Information,
Feedback, and Control. This means, there is no advantage of the consideration infor-
mation for the X-ray screening task, which is contrary to the ﬁnding of Bernstein and
Li (2005). However, it has to be pointed out that the task is very diﬀerent. Although
it is about recognition, in the X-ray screening task there is much more information
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to be taken into consideration (a passenger bag packed with many other objects),
whereas in the digit recognition task only one digit was presented which had to
be recognized. Even if the expert status (novice, intermediate or expert screener)
is taken into account, there is no eﬀect to be observed. No signiﬁcant diﬀerences
between the experimental conditions could be found for any status group, which is
deﬁned considering working experience or considering X-ray image interpretation
performance level. The distinction between experts considering working experience
and experts considering performance level seemed interesting because diﬀerent cri-
teria are provided for. Signiﬁcant correlations were found for the relation between
detection performance in this study and days on job and performance level, re-
spectively, and that for the consideration information condition, which in this case
interested most. These correlations say that the shorter the working experience and
the higher the performance level, respectively, the better the detection performance
when consideration information is provided. Since there could not be found an eﬀect
of experimental condition on detection performance for neither status group, other
factors seem to play a role causing this eﬀect. The most probable reason is that
screeners with shorter working experience in general have higher X-ray image inter-
pretation competency. This may very well be since in the last years job applicants
have to pass an X-ray image test in the course of a pre-employment assessment.
This signiﬁes that all screeners with a working experience of less than four years
feature a minimum level of X-ray image interpretation competency, which is not the
case for screeners who were employed prior to the application of an X-ray image
test in pre-employment assessment. Although there is no real baseline measurement
which could conﬁrm this assumption, the correlation for the control group points
in the same direction. Another fact which has to be considered is that IED detec-
tion is mostly rather weak at the beginning and can be increased signiﬁcantly with
training (Schwaninger & Hofer, 2004). However, as Schwaninger and Hofer (2004)
showed, after only two months of training detection performance of IEDs could al-
ready be increased considerably. So this argument plays no important role here.
Another assumption, however, could be that younger people (hereby assuming that
short working experience correlates with younger age, which, however, would have
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to be investigated thoroughly in the future) are less reluctant towards the use of new
features like consideration information. Regarding the positive correlation between
detection performance in this study and X-ray image interpretation competency
the relation is obvious. It can be assumed that the higher detection performance
in the consideration information condition is due to the screeners’ generally higher
X-ray image interpretation competency. Again, the signiﬁcant correlation between
detection performance and X-ray image interpretation competency for the control
group supports this assumption, although a real baseline measurement is lacking.
The analysis regarding reaction time revealed that the consideration information
condition group had signiﬁcantly higher reaction times on average than the other
experimental condition groups. This makes sense considering their use of the consid-
eration information. However, seeing that detection performance with consideration
information did not improve, it means that it is only a waste of time. Screeners are
focusing on something else instead of the main image and losing time without having
a beneﬁt from it. This is consistent over the status groups when deﬁned by working
experience: novices, as well as experts and intermediate screeners show the longest
reaction time in the consideration information condition. According to the ANOVA
this is only signiﬁcant for the expert and the novices group. However, the diﬀer-
ences are very small compared to the other experimental conditions. When status
is deﬁned by X-ray image interpretation competency the pattern is the same, but
the ANOVAs reveal a signiﬁcant eﬀect only for the intermediate screeners, which
is exactly contrary to the results based on DOJ status. But since the eﬀects are
very small and only state what is logical, they are not interpreted further. Another
analysis revealed that the number of clicks on the buttons to highlight the IED in
the consideration information is considerably higher on average in the feedback con-
dition than in the consideration information condition (in the control condition no
consideration information was displayed at any time). But here as well, no beneﬁt for
detection performance resulted from it. When looking at the status groups, novices -
when deﬁned by working experience - in the feedback condition highlight the IEDs in
the consideration information far more often than intermediate or expert screeners.
However, this diﬀerence is not signiﬁcant, which may be due to the large standard de-
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viations. There appears to be a large diﬀerence between the screeners with regard to
how often they use the buttons. Just interpreting this tendency it could be presumed
that - again assuming that little working experience correlates with younger age -
younger people are less reluctant towards new features and technological facilities
and thus activate them more frequently. However, in the consideration information
condition there is no diﬀerence between the three DOJ status groups regarding use
of the buttons. Again, there are large diﬀerences between the screeners regarding
the frequency of button activation. If analyzed by CAT status, the pattern is again
similar to the analysis based on working experience. Here, the novices - deﬁned
by low X-ray image interpretation competency - are using the highlighting buttons
more frequently in both experimental groups. The data show a steady increase in use
of buttons from experts over intermediate screeners to novices. The diﬀerences be-
tween the status groups are smaller. In general, the tendency shows more frequent
use with decreasing X-ray image interpretation competency. It could be assumed
that screeners with higher competency are more ”self conﬁdent” and therefore do
not feel the need to use a decision aid. The selection of consideration information
using PCA has been done with regard to the potential application. If there would
have been a signiﬁcant beneﬁt of consideration information in the X-ray screening
task it might have been worth considering its implementation. The idea would be
that, whenever an X-ray image appears on the screen, the appropriate consideration
information would be automatically selected by an algorithm and displayed on the
screen. This algorithm would have to base on image features and pixel information.
To sum up, according to the data in this study it seems that consideration informa-
tion, presented simultaneously to the main image as well as in the form of feedback,
only needs time to look at but has no beneﬁt for detection performance whatso-
ever. At least, this holds for the IED detection. IEDs were chosen because there are
large diﬀerences in detection performance between screeners and a large increase
in detection performance can be achieved with appropriate, individually adaptive
computer-based training (e.g., Koller et al., 2008). To deﬁnitively rule out any ad-
vantage of consideration information in the task of X-ray security screening further
studies will have to be conducted. For example, in another study it would have to be
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ensured more carefully that the screeners understand the instructions. The diﬃculty
in such a study is that participants must not receive too much information regarding
the aims in order not to distort the results. Furthermore, the supporting eﬀect could
only develop with recurrent use and increased familiarity of the tool. And last but
not least, the so far only vague but not statistically signiﬁcant eﬀects could become
manifest with a larger sample of aviation security screening oﬃcers.

Part III
Certiﬁcation Analysis and Standard Setting

6Diﬀerent Ways of Analyzing Certiﬁcation Tests
for Aviation Security Screening Oﬃcers and Their
Implications
There are many situations where people have to produce evidence of their knowledge,
be it in school, at university or at work. This knowledge is usually assessed using
some sort of test or exam. Widely used forms of tests are multiple choice tests
and open-ended questions. However, there are as well areas in which more speciﬁc
tests and practical tests, respectively, are likely. For example, in ﬁelds where the
interpretation of any kind of image material is an essential component of the task,
image-based tests can be applied. Thus, the optimal test format depends on the topic
and the purpose of the test. In this paper we do not focus on the tests which should
be applied, but discuss diﬀerent kinds of analysis for the two test forms, multiple-
choice tests and image interpretation tests in the ﬁeld of aviation security. Aviation
security screening oﬃcers have to be certiﬁed periodically in order to ensure and
monitor the high level of security. The task of aviation security screening oﬃcers is
to prevent individuals from bringing potentially hazardous objects on a plane which
could endanger the safety and lives of other passengers and the crew. The usual
procedure for reaching this goal is to subject all passengers and their baggage to a
strict security check. While the passengers have to pass a metal detector and are
hand searched when under suspicion of carrying a prohibited object, their baggage
is being X-rayed. The screening oﬃcers see the X-ray images of the passenger bags
on their monitor and have to search it for objects not allowed to be carried on the
plane. Depending on their operational area screening oﬃcers have to solve image-
based tests covering this area. Furthermore, a theoretical exam in the form of a
multiple choice test has to be conducted. The ﬁrst part of this paper, therefore,
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focuses on multiple choice tests, their characteristics, strengths and weaknesses and
discusses some issues regarding the scoring of multiple choice tests. The second part
deals with image-based tests and their analysis.
6.1 Multiple Choice Tests
Multiple choice tests allow an eﬃcient and economic assessment of theoretical knowl-
edge by giving predeﬁned response options. To be correct, multiple choice refers to
questions where one of n response options has to be chosen as the correct answer
(L. J. Gross, 1982). Oftentimes the term multiple choice is used for each kind of test
with predeﬁned response options to be marked. However, there are several alterna-
tives of this form of test. For the sake of clarity the most common forms of multiple
choice tests and their names as used in the remainder of this manuscript should be
pointed out.
Table 6.1. Diﬀerent forms of multiple choice tests.
Item format Characteristic
Multiple Choice [MC]
n > 2 response options where only
one is correct
True-false [TF]
n = 2 response options where one is
correct
Multiple true-false [MTF]
n > 2 response options where more
than one can be correct
Besides being more eﬃcient and economic, the advantages of multiple choice tests, as
compared to open-ended questions, are their higher reliability per testing hour and
their less expensive costs of production. They also allow for standardized analysis.
Following the general rule that the more items a test possesses the more reliable it is,
multiple choice tests result in featuring a higher reliability per hour of testing time.
This is because multiple choice tests, having only predeﬁned response options which
have to be marked, require less time to be solved, that is, more items can be solved
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within an hour (Schuwirth & Vleuten, 2004). Open-ended questions, however, pro-
vide a very ineﬃcient measurement. Not only do they require a large investment of
examinee time to produce scores with acceptable reliability, they also yield complex
responses which are time consuming and demanding to evaluate (Ward, 1982).
Besides their advantages, multiple choice tests bear some problems. In comparison
with tests using a free response format, the question arises of whether the same or
diﬀerent measurement dimensions are being used. This is because experiments on
learning have shown that examination of learnt materials is harder if reproduction
rather than recognition of the learnt materials is required (Kubinger & Gottschall,
2007). Another problem is the guessing phenomenon which can occur when using
a multiple choice response format for the test items. A test-taker who does not
know the correct answer to a question nonetheless can select it by sheer luck with
a non-negligible probability (i.e., 1/n, where n is the number of response options).
If a test-taker has partial knowledge this probability can even be increased because
some options can be eliminated with certainty. Many investigations of guessing on
multiple choice tests have come to the generally agreed on conclusion that guessing
contributes to error variance and diminishes the reliability and validity of tests (e.g.,
Angoﬀ, 1989; Carroll, 1945; Frary, 1969; Glass & Wiley, 1964; M. E. Gross & Wright,
1985; Horst, 1933; Plumlee, 1952; A. O. H. Roberts, 1962; Zimmerman & Williams,
1982; Zimmerman, Williams, & Symons, 1984). There exists the dilemma between
encouraging test-takers to answer all questions, independently of their knowledge,
which introduces a source of random variance decreasing both reliability and valid-
ity, and discouraging test-takers from guessing, which causes the test results to be
contaminated by personality factors regarding compliance (Rowley & Traub, 1977).
The probability of guessing correct answers can in theory be reduced by increas-
ing the number of response options (MacCann, 2004). However, this opinion is not
shared by all authors. Rodriguez (2005), among others, recommends using only three
options. According to some authors, examinees are unlikely to engage in blind guess-
ing but rather eliminate what appear to them to be the least plausible distractors,
thereby essentially reducing 4- or 5-option items to 3-option items (e.g., Costin,
1972, 1976; Kolstad, Briggs, & Kolstad, 1985). Kolstad et al. (1985) argue that the
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quality of the distractors guards against guessing and not the number of distractors.
However, as Rodriguez (2005) points out, this might only be valid for low speed tests
but not for lower-ability students in high speed tests. According to Zimmerman and
Williams (2003), who performed mathematical calculations on the eﬀect of chance
success, guessing is a nontrivial source of error in multiple choice tests, perhaps
the largest in some tests, especially for tests with small numbers of items and/or
response options. However, in many situations eliminating the guessing component
of scores would increase reliability only at the greater expense of reducing validity
(Frary, 1969). Besides the negative eﬀect on reliability and validity, guessing eﬀects
indicate unfair assessment: the probability of passing the test is to a certain extent
independent of the ability of the test-taker, but depends rather on the luck in guess-
ing. This discriminates test-takers with moderate ability compared to test-takers
with lower ability since a certain score can be achieved without any knowledge but
only with lucky guessing (Kubinger & Gottschall, 2007). Furthermore, guessing has
a reciprocal eﬀect with item diﬃculty which in turn depends signiﬁcantly on the con-
ceptualization of diﬀerent multiple choice response formats (Kubinger & Gottschall,
2007). Bar-Hillel, Budescu, and Attali (2005) present and criticize two ways in which
test makers try to attempt to reduce the guessing problem, namely minimizing the
incentives for guessing and reducing the opportunities for successful guessing. Usu-
ally, the approach to minimize the incentives is to penalize errors by subtracting
points or fraction of points for each wrong answer. Minimizing the opportunities
for guessing successfully can be achieved by avoiding clues in the response options
(e.g., grammatical incompatibility of the option with the question, elaborating the
correct answer in more detail than distractors, disproportional probability of a cor-
rect answer at a certain position, i.e. in the middle, etc.), which is referred to as
key balancing. Bar-Hillel et al. (2005) criticize the key balancing method, instead of
reducing cues for guessing, of actually introducing into answer keys a powerful cue
to successful guessing, namely the negative dependencies between the positions of
correct answers in successive questions. However, the use of computer-based tests
allows for randomizing the appearance of the questions which would diminish the
criticism of the key balancing method.
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There exist several response-scoring modes which can be applied to multiple choice
tests the aims of which are to improve on score characteristics over those obtainable
by simply counting correct responses with no inhibition of guessing (number-right
response-scoring method). Response-scoring is based on the assumption that ex-
aminees either know the answer to a test item or else choose among all alternative
response options randomly (e.g., Diamond & Evans, 1973; Lord, 1975). According to
Lord (1975) the advantage of formula scoring over number-right scoring depends on
the number of omitted responses which in turn is depending on the knowledge level
of the test-takers: the advantage will be negligible for high-ability students knowing
the correct answers and be greatest for low-ability students omitting many items.
Bar-Hillel et al. (2005) even recommend using number-right scoring. They criticize
formula scoring as being more demanding, featuring incomplete, misleading, and
unethical instructions, being self defeating, and introducing irrelevant variance. For-
mula scoring is adopted with the intention that it reduces the variability of the
guessing-tendency variable in the test scores which in turn reduces test reliability
(Cureton, 1966). However, mixed and even contradictory results with respect to
reliability and validity tests resulting from the use of such response-scoring modes
reported in the literature are found fault with (Frary, 1982). Typically, in MC ques-
tions (see Table 6.1) one point is awarded for a correct response and zero points
are awarded for an incorrect response. One prominent procedure to deal with the
guessing problem in multiple choice tests is the correction for guessing (CFG) which
is used to weight response options. It is calculated with the formula
S = R−W/(k − 1)
where S is a corrected score, R is the number of items marked correctly, W is the
number of items marked incorrectly, and k is the number of response options for each
item. Using this formula the examinee’s score is corrected for the eﬀects of guessing.
This equation underlies the assumptions that all wrong answers are guessed wrong
and that all correct answers are obtained either by knowledge or by guessing. No
consideration is given to misinformation and partial information (Diamond & Evans,
1973), some authors criticize CFG because it overcorrects for misinformation and
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undercorrects for partial information (e.g., Hammerton, 1965; Little & Creaser, 1966;
Rowley & Traub, 1977).
Muijtjens, Mameren, Hoogenboom, Evers, and Vleuten (1999) obtained results in
their study indicating that partial knowledge is measured more completely when
number-right scoring is used. Davis (1964) and Gronlund (1965) seem to agree that
the amount of overcorrection and undercorrection, respectively, depends on the par-
ticular test and the examinees. With CFG, correct answers receive a weight of 1,
incorrect answers receive a weight of -1/(k-1), and omissions receive a weight of 0.
Several studies (Sherriﬀs & Boomer, 1954; Votaw, 1936) have shown that the CFG
results in certain types of examinees being penalized more than others on the basis
of irrelevant personality factors (Frary, 1969; L. J. Gross, 1982). However, there is
no clear agreement on what inﬂuences the extent of guessing more: knowledge or
personality factors (Diamond & Evans, 1973). Cross and Frary (1977) recommend
assuring that clear test directions be formulated and that test-takers be taught eﬀec-
tive test-taking behavior before adopting conventional correction-for-guessing. For
TF (see Table 6.1) items the eﬀects of guessing are apt to be great since the chance
of guessing correctly is 50%. Under the TF test format the CFG formula reduces
to (R-W). The MTF format as a special case of both the MC and the TF format
gives credit to partial knowledge since the examinee is allowed to make a judgment
on every option independently of the others. With MTF the question on scoring
arises: should each item be scored as an extension of the MC type, whereby the item
is scored as one entity, or should it be scored as an extension of the TF type, in
which each option is scored independently. The latter provokes the issue of whether
CFG should be utilized (L. J. Gross, 1982). Most research articles discussing MTF
scoring techniques advocate the application of CFG with the aim of minimizing or
even eliminating the eﬀects of guessing (e.g, Buckley-Sharp & Harris, 1971; Dugdale,
1971; Harden, Lever, & Wilson, 1969; Lennox, 1967; Sanderson, 1973). Generally,
with MTF those options are required to be marked that are believed to be true and
no mark is given to options believed to be false. One point is awarded for each cor-
rect mark and one point is subtracted for each incorrect mark. Thereby there is no
possibility to distinguish between a false opinion and an omission. L. J. Gross (1982)
6.1 Multiple Choice Tests 133
recommends not applying CFG on MTF tests because the score range is in favor
of being suﬃciently large for adequate variability and discrimination without it and
factors unrelated to ability or achievement that lower validity may be introduced.
L. J. Gross (1982) postulates that examinees should be instructed to mark each
response option to be true or false and the score being only the number of correct
responses. This strategy eliminates the eﬀects of subjectivity in response style and
allows an adequate discrimination between students.
Much research has been conducted on the advantages, disadvantages, and diﬀerences
of various multiple choice test formats (cf. Table 6.1). Frisbie (1992) conducted a
review especially on MTF items and comes to the conclusion that the measurement
of educational achievement could be improved if MTF items were used more widely
be it for program placement, classroom assessment, or certiﬁcation of competence.
MTF items automatically assess partial knowledge via the answers provided to each
true-false option. It is only a matter of scoring method whether partial information
is taken advantage of or not (Albanese & Sabers, 1988). Findings relating formula
scoring and test reliability are very mixed and even contradictory. In part, this in-
consistency is undoubtedly based upon the extreme variation in the character of the
tests and populations involved (Frary, 1982). Test instructions regarding guessing
have a crucial eﬀect on the reliability depending on the scoring mode as well. Studies
investigating instructional patterns (e.g., no comment on guessing, encouragement
to guess with no scoring penalty, ”do not guess” instructions with scoring penalty)
and their relative scoring (e.g., rights-only, corrected scores) revealed diﬀerent results
regarding reliability. Most of the studies found higher reliabilities for uncorrected
scores (e.g., Glass & Wiley, 1964), however, some found no diﬀerence in reliabil-
ity estimates subject to scoring methods (Diamond & Evans, 1973) or even higher
reliability for formula scoring (e.g., Muijtjens et al., 1999). According to Mattson
(1965) and Magnusson (1967) random guessing reduces reliability by increasing er-
ror variance without a corresponding increase in true score variation. Brandenburg
and Whitney (1972) found in their study, comparing diﬀerent scoring methods for
matched pair true-false item tests, larger internal consistency coeﬃcients for scoring
methods having larger eﬀective score ranges. Waters (1976), under the assumption
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that partial knowledge is deﬁned as the selection of an option through the elimi-
nation of one or more alternatives as incorrect or implausible, hypothesizes that a
scoring system which assesses the partial knowledge of an examinee would increase
the reliability and validity of the test.
Tests commonly used in educational and psychological measurement feature the
property that the longer they are the more reliable are the scores they yield (Ebel,
1969, 1972). Zimmerman and Williams (2003) emphasize an interaction between the
number of items of a test and number of response options for the items as deter-
minants of the reliability (see also MacCann, 2004). According to these authors,
increasing the number of response options strongly inﬂuences the reliability of rela-
tively short tests, whereas for relatively long tests increasing the number of response
options has a smaller eﬀect on the reliability. Their practical message is to use ﬁve-
choice items for short tests whenever possible, or in other words, if a small number of
choices per item is used, it is essential to make the test as long as possible. Haladyna
and Downing (1989) recommend to ”develop as many functional distractors as are
feasible”, that is, the key is not the number of options but the quality of distractors.
However, Haladyna, Downing, and Rodriguez (2002) and Rodriguez (2005) are even
of the opinion that three response options are suﬃcient in most instances arguing
that the eﬀort of developing the fourth option is probably not worth it. They state
that using more options does little to improve item and test score statistics and
often results in implausible distractors. Rodriguez (2005) points out though, that
the impact of changing the number of options depends on the method of deleting
options; if they are deleted randomly, say from 4- to 3-options, this can have a detri-
mental eﬀect on reliability. However, test reliability is not aﬀected if only ineﬀective
distractors are deleted.
Regarding the validity of a test, depending on test instructions and scoring, the
tendency was found that validity is slightly higher for corrected scores and for the
”do-not-guess” instruction. However, as with reliability, results are not clearly with-
out ambiguity and the opinions of authors regarding the use of correction and the
instructions are not unanimous (Diamond & Evans, 1973). Contradictory results
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have been reported on whether the use of CFG improves test validity (e.g., Cureton,
1966) or if it fails to increase test validity and in comparison with number-right scor-
ing features even lower validity despite the fact of higher KR-20 reliability (Jaradat
& Sawaged, 1986). Validity should be enhanced whenever the criterion measure is
sensitive to partial knowledge (Frary, 1980).
6.2 Image-based Tests
Image-based tests are applied to measure the ability of aviation security screening
oﬃcers to detect prohibited items in passenger bags and to discriminate them from
harmless objects. Economic reasons, among others, require the screening oﬃcers
to do a very eﬃcient job. That is, the time used per passenger for the security
check should be as short as possible, but without compromising the security. This
should also minimize the waiting queue at the security checkpoints. By screening
the bags with X-rays it is not necessary to open each bag and manually search it.
This should be reduced to bags that seem to contain a prohibited item or bags
that cannot be interpreted from the X-ray image due to their complexity or low
transparency. Therefore, the screening oﬃcers have to exhibit a high ability to detect
prohibited items and to discriminate them from harmless everyday objects. This
ability can also be termed sensitivity in the sense of signal detection theory. With
the X-ray image-based tests this sensitivity should be measured for certiﬁcation
of aviation security screening oﬃcers. Image-based tests are typical members of
yes-no experiments, belonging to the one-interval design. The screening oﬃcers are
presented with a single stimulus on each trial (i.e., an X-ray image of a passenger
bag), drawn from one of two stimulus classes. In this case, the two stimulus classes are
the passenger bags containing only harmless objects (Noise trial) and the passenger
bags containing additionally a prohibited item (Signal-plus-Noise trial). The yes-
no experiment measures discrimination, that is, the ability to tell the two stimulus
classes apart. If, in this case, one stimulus class contains only the null stimulus (Noise
trial), the task is called detection (Macmillan & Creelman, 1991). Therefore, we are
also talking of detection performance of screening oﬃcers, meaning the sensitivity or
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the ability to detect prohibited items and tell them apart from harmless items. As
the test concerns two kinds of stimuli, Noise and Signal-plus-Noise trials, and two
possible responses, OK (the bag does not contain any prohibited item) and NOT OK
(the bag contains a prohibited item), any of four joint events can occur on a trial.
Correctly detecting a prohibited item is called a hit; failing to detect it is called a
miss. Mistakenly detecting a harmless object as prohibited is a false alarm; correctly
responding OK to a Noise trial is called a correct rejection (Macmillan & Creelman,
1991). The proportion of all Signal-plus-Noise trials to which a person responded
NOT OK is the hit rate (H); the proportion of all Noise trials to which a person
responded NOT OK is the false alarm rate (F). It would not make much sense to
just count all hits in order to assess the detection performance of a screening oﬃcer.
A high hit rate could easily be achieved by simply responding NOT OK to all trials.
This would generate a hit rate of 1 (all bags containing a prohibited item have been
judged correctly) completely ignoring the high false alarm rate of 1 as well (all bags
without any prohibited item have been incorrectly judged as containing one). At the
airport security checkpoint, this would entail opening all bags and thus unnecessarily
generate a long waiting queue. Therefore, the false alarm rate is an indicator of a
person’s eﬃciency. The sensitivity or detection performance of a person taking all
bags out would be zero and the detection of prohibited items would be by chance
instead of sensitivity. So for a reasonable measure of detection performance the false
alarms also have to be taken into account. Sensitivity equals a speciﬁc measure of the
discrepancy between a hit rate and a false alarm rate (Macmillan & Creelman, 1991).
A common way to achieve this is by applying signal detection theory, generating
measures as for example d’. The sensitivity measure d’ is deﬁned in terms of z, the
inverse of the normal distribution function: d’ = z(H)-z(F) (Green & Swets, 1966).
Until now, the image-based tests used for certiﬁcation of aviation security screening
oﬃcers have been analyzed with signal detection measures. However, this approach
is not immune to guessing and incorporates a certain inaccuracy in the measurement.
It is based on the assumption that when responding with NOT OK the person has
detected the prohibited item correctly. However, this could be a ﬂuke because the
person could have judged a harmless object as prohibited and actually missed the
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real prohibited item. Nevertheless, it would have been a hit. To measure whether
there is a large diﬀerence between judging a bag as NOT OK from the actual threat
item or from a harmless object, screener oﬃcers have to identify the prohibited item
by marking it on the screen. If analyzed according to this data, the true hits can be
assessed, namely, only those hits where the target (i.e., the prohibited item) has been
identiﬁed. This deﬁnition raises the question of how the other response possibilities
are deﬁned (the Noise trials still generate false alarms and correct rejections). With
the instruction to mark the threat object in the image two kinds of ﬂukes for hits
can result: either a wrong (i.e., harmless) object was marked or nothing was marked
at all. The ﬁrst case we call false click, the second one false hit. Intuitively, the
false hits and false clicks would count as misses, as do the Signal-plus-Noise trials
that have been judged as OK. The false clicks could just as well be counted as false
alarms though (the person marked a harmless object as prohibited). For the pure
assessment of a screening oﬃcer’s detection ability of prohibited items this question
is of no consequence since the real hits serve as a good measure. However, there
are two critical points. First, this approach does not eliminate the guessing problem
completely; a screening oﬃcer can still mark a dubious object by luck (probably
because it looks suspicious even if this person cannot deﬁne the object). Second,
although the detection ability can be measured quite well using only the true hit
rate, there is no information in this data about the eﬃciency of a screening oﬃcer.
Still the false alarm rate has to be taken into account in order to assess the sensitivity,
that is, the ability to discriminate harmless from prohibited objects. This however
raises the question on which values are to be used for signal detection measures.
What is the deﬁnition of a false alarm? Unfortunately no literature can be found on
this speciﬁc topic within signal detection theory. This study examines how big the
diﬀerence in the hit rate, on the one hand, and in the detection performance values,
on the other, will be when calculating with all hits and with true hits, respectively.
If a diﬀerence can be found the question of the meaning of these results arises and
ultimately the one which measure should be used to assess the sensitivity of the
aviation security screening oﬃcers. To simplify matters, false hits and false clicks
are counted as misses for the true hit analysis within the scope of this study.
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6.3 Experiment 1
The ﬁrst experiment of this study deals with the scoring of a theoretical Multiple
True-False (MTF) test using a theoretical exam for aviation security screening oﬃ-
cers as an example. The question is how diﬀerent scoring modes aﬀect diﬃculty and
reliability of the test and which one should be used. A further focus of investigation
lies on the instruction and its eﬀect on the diﬃculty level and reliability of the test.
One data set is based on no information for the test-takers on how many response
options are correct, the second data set is based on the information if an item has
1 out of n correct options or n out of n.
6.3.1 Method
Participants
In the course of their yearly certiﬁcation 192 aviation security screening oﬃcers
from a European airport conducted the theoretical exam on computer (TEC). The
screening oﬃcers conducted the TEC under one of two conditions. One group of
aviation security screening oﬃcers (n = 78) received the information whether only 1
or whether n of n response options were correct. The other group (n = 114) received
no information about the number of correct response options.
Materials
The computer-based theoretical exam (TEC) consists of two main parts. One part
includes a number of questions which are deﬁned by the national appropriate au-
thority. The second part is adapted to each individual airport with airport speciﬁc
questions. These questions are deﬁned by the airports themselves. The version of the
TEC used in this study contained 40 questions of the appropriate authority. The
questions cover all job aspects, from knowledge about the actual task of security
screening over administrative issues up to regulations. The questionnaire consists of
MTF items where 1 up to n of n response options can be correct. Table 6.2 gives an
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overview on the number of items depending on their number of response options,
including the information on how many of them are correct, only one or more than
one. The questions of the appropriate authority served as database for the following
analyses. The questions appeared in random order and the examinees had to answer
the questions by marking the correct response options and not marking the wrong
response options, respectively. Marks could be deleted by clicking on the box again
until the question was submitted. A once submitted question could not be repeated.
Table 6.2. Number of questions per number of response options in the questionnaire. Also indicated is
the number of the respective questions with one correct response option and the number of questions with
more than one correct response options, respectively.
Number of response
options
Number of questions in
questionnaire
Number of questions
with n = 1
Number of questions
with n > 1
3 14 13 1
4 17 11 6
5 7 2 5
6 2 1 1
TOTAL 40 27 13
Procedure
The aviation security screening oﬃcers conducted the theoretical exam in the course
of their periodic certiﬁcation. One group of the examinees was informed if only one
response option was correct or if n response options were correct, however, without
any information on the exact number. The second group received no information
about how many response options were correct for the diﬀerent questions. The test
results were analyzed with four diﬀerent scoring methods. The following scoring
methods were applied:
Multiple Response (MR) (Albanese, Kent, & Whitney, 1979): one item is treated
as an entity and one point is awarded only if all the response options of an item
were marked correctly. In the case of this study not marking a false response op-
tion counted as correct answer (neglecting the problem of omissions due to lacking
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knowledge). Harasym, Norris, and Lorscheider (1980) referred to this scoring method
as dichotomous scoring. In the remainder of this paper it is always referred to as
MR. The MR scoring method is based on the assumption that reduced probability
of chance success results in increased reliability of the test (Frary & Zimmerman,
1970). The reduced probability of chance success is suggested to be achieved through
longer tests and more response options per multiple-choice item (Ebel, 1969; Wes-
man, 1971). A potential weakness of the MR method is its ignorance of partial
knowledge. Any useful information contained in the score of a person answering
only some but not all response options correctly is ignored. Answering some but not
all of the response options correctly counts as if none were answered correctly. There
is evidence that factoring partial knowledge into test scores will lead to increased
test reliability and validity. However, it is questionable as to whether the eﬀort of
applying such complicated procedures is worth the gain (Albanese & Sabers, 1988).
Scoring method #2: Unlike the MR method, which is an all-or-nothing propo-
sition, the second scoring method takes into account some partial knowledge by
apportioning credit for beyond chance success levels but awarding no credit for per-
formance at or below chance levels. In the case of an item with 4 response options
1
2
credit would be awarded for three options correct and full credit for all options
correct (Albanese & Sabers, 1988).
Scoring method #3: The third scoring method rewards even more partial knowl-
edge, namely performance at chance level. In the case of an item with 4 response
options 1
3
credit would be awarded for 2 options correct (chance level), 2
3
credit would
be awarded for 3 options correct, and full credit would be awarded for all options
correct (Albanese & Sabers, 1988).
Multiple true-false (MTF) (Albanese et al., 1979): The MTF scoring method ap-
portions credit evenly for all true-false options answered correctly. The basic prin-
ciple underlying MTF is the assumption that each response an examinee makes
contains valid information, even for performance below chance levels. It is impor-
tant to distinguish the MTF item format (see Table 6.1 above) and the MTF scoring
method. Table 6.3 shows the distribution of credits awarded for each correctly an-
swered response option depending on the scoring method and the number of response
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options per item. As mentioned before, a correctly marked response option, as well
as a correctly unmarked response option, counts as correct answer.
Table 6.3. Credits awarded for a certain number of correct response options depending on scoring method
and number of response options per item. MR = multiple response, Method #2 = scoring method 2, Method
#3 = scoring method 3, MTF = multiple true-false.
Scoring method
MR Method #2 Method #3 MTF
Item with 3 response options
1 correct 0 0 0 1
3
2 correct 0 1
2
1
2
2
3
3 correct 1 1 1 1
Item with 4 response options
1 correct 0 0 0 1
4
2 correct 0 0 1
3
2
4
3 correct 0 1
2
2
3
3
4
4 correct 1 1 1 1
Item with 5 response options
1 correct 0 0 0 1
5
2 correct 0 0 0 2
5
3 correct 0 2
4
1
3
3
5
4 correct 0 3
4
2
3
4
5
5 correct 1 1 1 1
Item with 6 response options
1 correct 0 0 0 1
6
2 correct 0 0 0 2
6
3 correct 0 0 1
4
3
6
4 correct 0 2
4
2
4
4
6
5 correct 0 3
4
3
4
5
6
6 correct 1 1 1 1
Test diﬃculty, that is, mean scores, and reliability values are calculated and com-
pared for each scoring method and between the two groups.
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6.3.2 Results
The test scores for each screening oﬃcer are calculated according to Table 6.3.
Individual data were averaged across all examinees within one group (with vs. no
information) for each scoring method in order to obtain the mean test score and
test diﬃculty, respectively. Figure 6.1 compares the mean test scores obtained by
the calculation according to the four diﬀerent scoring methods and between the two
groups. Independently of the information level, that is, whether the candidates had
the information that one or more than one response options are correct or not, the
mean test score is lowest for the multiple response (MR) scoring method and highest
for the multiple true-false (MTF) scoring method. Mean score for scoring method 3
is slightly higher than for scoring method 2 but the increase is smallest between these
two scoring methods. Independently of the scoring method used, the mean test scores
are higher for the group which was informed that one or if more than one response
option is correct compared to the group which received no information regarding the
number of correct response options per question. However, the diﬀerence in mean
scores between the two groups is largest for the MR method and smallest for the
MTF method.
A two-factor analysis of variance (ANOVA) on mean percentage test scores with
group (with vs. no information) as between-participants factor and scoring method
(MR, method 2, method 3, MTF) as within-participants factor, revealed a signiﬁcant
main eﬀect for scoring method with a large eﬀect size of η2 = .94,F(3, 570) =
2990.61, p < .001. The main eﬀect of group was also signiﬁcant and large with
η2 = .20,F(1, 190) = 47.26, p < .001 as well as the interaction between method and
group: η2 = .21,F(3, 570) = 51.65, p < .001. All eﬀect sizes are interpreted according
to the conventions of Cohen (1988). Figures 6.2 and 6.3 show the Cronbach’s alpha
and Guttman split half reliability values, respectively, comparing the four scoring
methods and the two groups.
The Figures 6.2 and 6.3 reveal a substantially higher reliability for the test scores
achieved when candidates had no information regarding the correct number of re-
sponse options, regardless of the scoring method. Comparing the four diﬀerent scor-
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Fig. 6.1. Mean percentage scores for the two groups (with information vs. no information) for the four
scoring methods: multiple response (MR), scoring method 2 (Method 2), scoring method 3 (Method 3),
and multiple true-false (MTF). The thin bars represent the standard deviation.
ing methods, the reliability values amount on a comparable level, independently of
the mean test score a scoring method yields (cf. Figure 6.1).
6.3.3 Discussion
Looking at the percentage correct scores for the diﬀerent scoring methods, the ﬁnd-
ings of Albanese and Sabers (1988) could be replicated conﬁrming that incorporating
more partial information increases test scores. These authors also found the lowest
score for MR method and the highest score for MTF scoring with scoring method
2 and 3 lying in between. Despite the advantages of MTF over the other scoring
methods studied, several concerns are expressed concerning the use of MTF scoring.
First, compared with the other scoring methods, MTF tends to produce relatively
high percentage correct scores. Second, partial knowledge is not always worth being
rewarded (think of a physician not treating a disease correctly). Third, in some cir-
cumstances reduction of chance success may be the overriding concern, for example
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Fig. 6.2. Cronbach’s alpha reliability values for the four scoring methods: multiple response (MR), scoring
method 2 (Method 2), scoring method 3 (Method 3), and multiple true-false (MTF) and the two groups
(with information regarding the number of correct options vs. no information regarding the number of
correct options) separately.
for certiﬁcation examinations, where the intention is to only certify personnel with
the appropriate knowledge level. The last two concerns could be best overcome us-
ing MR scoring or one of the intermediate formulas, the scoring method 2 and 3
(Albanese & Sabers, 1988). These concerns imply the need to deﬁne the concerns
and demands for each domain individually. In the case of the theoretical certiﬁcation
of aviation security screening oﬃcers awarding partial knowledge can be regarded as
reasonable, which speaks for the MTF scoring. However, a combination of the two
methods depending on the question should also be taken into consideration. That
is, questions which do not allow for partial knowledge and others in which partial
knowledge should be awarded. Contrary to the results of Albanese and Sabers (1988)
and Frisbie (1973, 1992), we found no signiﬁcant change in reliability for the dif-
ferent scoring modes in our study. Albanese and Sabers’ (1988) data leads to the
conclusion that the last three scoring methods shown in Table 6.3 are essentially
equivalent to each other and superior to MR scoring in terms of reliability. This is a
contrary ﬁnding to the assumption that reduced probability of chance success results
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Fig. 6.3. Guttman split half reliability values for the four scoring methods: multiple response (MR),
scoring method 2 (Method 2), scoring method 3 (Method 3), and multiple true-false (MTF) and the two
groups (with information regarding the number of correct options vs. no information regarding the number
of correct options) separately.
in increased reliability of the test (Frary & Zimmerman, 1970). Frisbie (1973, 1992),
in his comparison of MC versus true-false items and his review on research about
MTF, conﬁrmed the tendency of higher reliability for MTF items than for MC (cf.
Table 6.1) or true-false item and other objective formats. However, no signiﬁcant
change in reliability can be denoted for the diﬀerent scoring modes in our study. This
would deny Waters’ hypothesis which says that, under the assumption that partial
knowledge is deﬁned as the selection of an option through the elimination of one or
more alternatives as incorrect or implausible, a scoring system which assesses the
partial knowledge of an examinee would increase the reliability of the test (Waters,
1976). Waters investigated tests with a slightly diﬀerent response format than the
one used in this study. There, the students did not have to mark all correct response
options, but rather had a selection of diﬀerent combinations of correct response op-
tions from which they had to pick the correct one1.The author found higher internal
1 Example: For a question with the answers A, B, C, and D, the response options could be as follows: 1)
B only, 2) D only, 3) A and C, 4) A, C, and D, 5) A, B. and D.
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consistency reliability if response options were scored that included the correct re-
sponses (e.g., if a student picked the response ”A and C” while the options A, C, and
D are correct) as compared to rights-only scoring. For the two tests Waters used
which the response format is reported for, reliability, based on the point-biserial
weighting, increased to .783 and .833, respectively, from reliability values based on
rights-only scoring of .520 and .615, respectively. The diﬃculty levels of the tests
used in Waters’ study and those of the tests in this study are at a comparable as well
(Waters, 1976: p = 0.563 and p = 0.653). Regarding information level, the group
which was informed that a question had one or more correct options yielded higher
percentage correct scores. However, this has a detrimental eﬀect on the reliability,
which is considerably lower for the data of this group. The reliability data therefore
argue towards giving test takers no information regarding the number of correct re-
sponse options which can be explained as follows. High performers can solve an item
correctly regardless whether they have the information about the number of correct
responses or not. They are capable to evaluate each response correctly whereas a
low performer rely his / her response on the given information. Thus, the no in-
formation method seems to discriminate better between the individual test takers
which results in higher reliability scores as well. Further, the diﬀerence in percentage
correct scores indeed is signiﬁcant; however, reliability values have a higher impact
in the discussion about instructions. While the reliability is an innate feature of a
test, a higher or lower mean percentage correct score can be compensated or taken
account of by a lower or higher pass mark.
6.4 Experiment 2
The second experiment is on scoring image-based tests. To assess the competency
of aviation screening oﬃcers diﬀerent computer-based X-ray image interpretation
tests are reasonable. In the applied X-ray screening tests, screening oﬃcers see X-
ray images of passenger bags on the screen and have to judge if these bags contain
a prohibited item or not. The images are of the same kind as those appearing on
the monitor at the security checkpoint, where passengers have to pass the security
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control and their baggage is being scanned with X-ray. During the test, the screening
oﬃcers have to give the answer OK if the respective bag does not contain any
prohibited item and the answer NOT OK if the respective bag contains a prohibited
item. Furthermore, if a prohibited item was detected, the screening oﬃcer has to
mark it by clicking on it on the monitor. This study examines whether it makes a
diﬀerence in the overall performance if the test items were scored solely according
to the judgment OK or NOT OK - and therefore to wrong or right and using signal
detection measures - or if test items containing a prohibited item are only counted
as a correct answer if the prohibited item was marked correctly. The ﬁrst approach
ignores the problem of the false hits and false clicks. If a bag containing a prohibited
item was judged as NOT OK it counts as a correct answer independently of whether
the actual prohibited item was detected or a harmless object was wrongly interpreted
as prohibited and the actual prohibited item in fact was missed. However, the second
approach only counts the true hit scores. As in Experiment 1, the aim is to ﬁnd
diﬀerences in diﬃculty and reliability of the tests depending on the scoring method
and to come to a conclusion which one of the two methods is appropriate to use.
Furthermore, the question arises on how to calculate signal detection measures with
the true hit score.
6.4.1 Method
Participants
In total, 912 screening oﬃcers conducted the certiﬁcation exam which constitutes
the data basis for this experiment. The certiﬁcation consists of the following four
tests: the X-Ray Object Recognition Test (X-Ray ORT), the X-Ray Competency
Assessment Test (X-Ray CAT), the X-Ray Bomb Detection Test (X-Ray BDT) and
the Theoretical Exam (TEC). The X-Ray ORT and the TEC have to be solved
by every screening oﬃcer in the course of their certiﬁcation independently of their
working domain. The X-Ray CAT has to be solved by screening oﬃcers who work
in cabin baggage screening (n = 817) and the X-Ray BDT by screening oﬃcers who
work in hold baggage screening (n = 155).
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Material
The screening oﬃcers had to solve two or three X-ray image interpretation com-
petency tests, depending on their working ﬁeld. All tests are computer-based. The
X-Ray ORT is used to measure the competency of interpreting X-ray images and
dealing with factors like rotation and superposition of an object and complexity
of an image in object recognition. It is often used as a pre-employment assess-
ment test for aviation security screening oﬃcers because it measures mainly sta-
ble aptitudes and therefore is a good tool for the selection of qualiﬁed person-
nel. It consists of 256 X-ray images of passenger bags. Each bag is used twice;
therefore 128 X-ray images of bags are used. Once each bag is presented as Noise
trial that is, without any additional prohibited item. Once each bag is presented
as Signal-plus-Noise trial, that is, containing one prohibited item. The prohib-
ited items are knives and guns. Since the X-Ray ORT is designed to measure the
abilities of a person to interpret X-ray images without requiring the domain spe-
ciﬁc knowledge, only guns and knives are used. It is assumed that every person
knows what a gun or a knife looks like. Furthermore, the images are depicted in
black and white since coloring of material in X-ray incorporates information that
is not implicitly known. This test has to be solved by every screening oﬃcer in
the course of the yearly certiﬁcation. So each examinee sees each of the 128 suit-
cases twice, once as harmless bag and once containing either a gun or a knife.
Fig. 6.4. Noise (left bag) and Signal-plus-Noise (right bag) trial of the
X-Ray ORT. The prohibited item (gun) contained in the Signal-plus-Noise
trial is depicted on the right.
Figure 6.4 shows an ex-
ample of the stimuli.
The items are depicted
on the monitor in ran-
dom order and dis-
appear after four sec-
onds. Within these four
seconds the prohibited
item, if one was there
and has been detected,
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has to be marked. For the other responses (OK or NOT OK and the diﬃculty rating)
the time is unlimited. For more details on the X-Ray ORT and further research see
for example Hardmeier, Hofer, and Schwaninger (2005) and Hardmeier et al. (2006a).
Fig. 6.5. Noise (left bag) and Signal-plus-Noise (right bag) trial of the
X-Ray CAT. The prohibited item (taser) which is contained in the Signal-
plus-Noise trial in the top left corner of the bag is depicted on the right
(X-ray image on the top, real photograph on the bottom).
The X-Ray CAT not
only assesses the abil-
ity to cope with X-ray
images but also the
knowledge of which
items are prohib-
ited and what they
look like in X-ray
images. Therefore,
not only guns and
knives but also im-
provised explosive devices (IEDs) and other prohibited items (like grenades,
electric shock devices, self-defense gas sprays, etc.) are included. Figure 6.5
shows and example of the stimuli. The structure is the same as for the X-Ray
ORT (256 items whereof 128 are Noise and 128 are Signal-plus-Noise trials)
Fig. 6.6. Noise (left bag) and Signal-plus-Noise (right bag) trial of the X-
Ray BDT. The improvised explosive device (IED) contained in the Signal-
plus-Noise trial on the right side is depicted on the right of the bag.
except that the items
are presented in color
for 15 seconds and the
prohibited items be-
long to one of the
four categories guns,
knives, IEDs, and other
threat objects. The X-
Ray CAT has only to
be solved by screen-
ing oﬃcers working in
cabin baggage screening. For more information on the X-Ray CAT see Koller and
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Schwaninger (2006). The task is the same for all three tests: the examinee has to
search each bag for a prohibited item and judge if one is existent or not. If an exam-
inee detects a prohibited item, it has to be marked by clicking on it with the mouse
and the bag has to be judged as NOT OK by marking the corresponding button.
If no prohibited item was detected, the response OK has to be given. Furthermore,
the diﬃculty of the item has to be rated on a slider bar2. In the X-Ray CAT, in
addition to the identiﬁcation of the prohibited item, the OK or NOT OK response,
and the diﬃculty rating, the category to which the prohibited item belongs to has
to be judged3. Except for the identiﬁcation of the prohibited item, which has to be
done while the image is on the screen, all answers can also be given after the image
has disappeared. Figure 6.7 illustrates the user interface for the image-based tests.
Fig. 6.7. User interface of
the X-ray image tests. This
example illustrates a ﬁctional
screenshot from the X-Ray
CAT.
6.4.2 Results
Before being subjected to analyses, the data was cleaned from data ﬁles where only
2 or less true hits were achieved. Most of these data ﬁles contained no true hits at
all. The assumption is that corresponding candidates did not perform the task of
marking the prohibited item. For the X-Ray ORT, data elimination was eﬀected for
2 These data are not included in the analyses in this study.
3 These data are not analyzed within this study either.
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0.032% (n=30), for the X-Ray CAT for 0.089% (n=80) and for the X-Ray BDT for
0.025% (n=4) of all data ﬁles. This results in a ﬁnal sample of 912 aviation security
oﬃcers for the X-Ray ORT, 817 for the X-Ray CAT, and 155 for the X-Ray BDT.
Detection Performance
Measures of detection performance hit rate and d’ were calculated. Both these mea-
sures were once calculated with uncorrected values and then compared to the ones
calculated with the corrected values. The uncorrected values are the hit rate based
on the response OK or NOT OK, regardless of whether the actual threat item was
detected or a harmless object was mistakenly interpreted as a prohibited one, and
the d’ value calculated with this hit rate. Corrected values means taking into ac-
count only the true hits, that is, those hits where the candidates actually marked
the target (the prohibited item). The false clicks, that is, the hits that resulted from
correctly responding NOT OK to a test item but marking the wrong object (i.e., a
harmless one) and the false hits, that is, the hits where nothing was marked at all,
are counted as misses. This means, with this approach the false alarm rate remains
the same for both procedures and only the hit rate is aﬀected by this deﬁnition.
Figure 6.8 shows the hit rate and the true hit rate and their standard deviations for
all tests. Individual paired-samples t-Tests revealed signiﬁcantly lower mean scores
for the true hit rate for all three tests (all p < .001, see Figure 6.8 for values). The
correlations between hit rate and true hit rate are signiﬁcant as well for all three
tests (all p < .001, see Figure 6.8 for values). Note: for security reasons values of all
analyses have been multiplied with an arbitrary constant.
Figure 6.9 shows the detection performance d’, once calculated with the uncorrected
hit rate and once calculated with the true hit rate. Individual paired-samples t-Tests
revealed signiﬁcant diﬀerences in d’ for all tests (see Figure 6.9 for values). The
correlations between the uncorrected and the corrected d’ scores are signiﬁcant for
all tests (see Figure 6.9 for values).
An independent samples t-Test with the false alarm rate of the X-Ray CAT and
the X-Ray BDT showed no signiﬁcant diﬀerence between the two false alarm rates
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Fig. 6.8. Hit rate (dark bars) and true hit rate (light bars) for the X-Ray ORT, X-Ray CAT, and X-Ray
BDT with standard deviations (thin black bars). The results of the paired-samples t-Tests are depicted in
the table on the top right. The correlations between the hit rate and the true hit rate for each test and
the signiﬁcance levels are depicted in the table on the bottom right.
Fig. 6.9. Detection performance d’ for the X-Ray ORT, X-Ray CAT, and X-Ray BDT, once calculated
with the uncorrected hit rate (dark bars) and once calculated with the true hit rate (light bars). Thin bars
represent standard deviations. The results of the paired-samples t-Tests are depicted in the table on the
top right. The correlations between the uncorrected and the corrected d’ for each test and the signiﬁcance
levels are depicted in the table on the bottom right.
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(t = −1.43, p = .155). A more detailed analysis of the hits in the X-Ray BDT was
performed to examine how the rather large diﬀerence between hits and true hits
came about. Figure 6.10 shows the diﬀerent types of hits that could result. Total
hits are the uncorrected hits, that is, those resulting from correctly judging a bag
as NOT OK that actually contains a threat. With signal detection analysis, which
was used for assessment of test results in certiﬁcation until now, these total hits are
taken into account. True hits are those hits where the candidates correctly marked
the threat item, in this case the IED, in the image. False clicks are hits but where
the candidates clicked on a wrong object in the bag. And false hits are hits where the
candidates did not mark anything in the image. That is, false clicks and false hits are
hits that are counted as hits when analyzing according to signal detection theory,
that is, taking into account every hit that resulted from correctly judging a bag as
NOT OK, whereas for the corrected analysis only true hits are taken into account.
Figure 6.10 shows that for the X-Ray BDT candidates mostly marked some object
in the image and therefore the diﬀerence between total hits and true hits are false
clicks. False hits are only responsible for a fractional portion of the hits. Pearson
Test r Hit rate - Proportion of true hits p
ORT 0.071 0.033*
CAT 0.091 0.009*
BDT -0.039 0.631
Table 6.4. Pearson correlation be-
tween the hit rate and the proportion
of true hits for each test including the
signiﬁcance level.
correlations between the hit rate and the proportion of true hits on hits (#true hits
/ #hits) were calculated to examine if those candidates with more hits also achieved
more true hits. Correlation results can be seen in Table 6.4. The results in Table 6.4
indicate that this seems not to be the case. That is, if a candidate achieves a high
true hit rate does not depend signiﬁcantly on the achieved hit rate.
Reliability
Cronbach’s alpha and Guttman split half reliabilities were calculated for each test
based on percent correct for Noise and Signal-plus-Noise trials separately. For the
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Fig. 6.10. Detailed graph of the hits for X-Ray BDT, averaged over all candidates and separated for the
three types of hits: true hits are correctly identiﬁed, i.e. marked IEDs; false clicks are lucky hits because
a wrong object was identiﬁed; false hits are lucky hits because nothing was marked in the bag. True hits,
false clicks, and false hits sum up to total hits.
Signal-plus-Noise trials two diﬀerent analyses resulted. Reliability was once calcu-
lated with percent correct according to the true hit system, that is, only correct
rejections and true hits were coded as correct (SN - Click Analysis). And once re-
liability was calculated with percent correct according to signal detection analysis,
that is, also false hits counted as correct (SN - Signal Detection). Noise trials are
not aﬀected by the diﬀerent coding since it pertains only to the counting of hits and
therefore only to Signal-plus-Noise images. Table 6.5 displays the reliability values.
6.4.3 Discussion
This study conﬁrmed the expectations that in X-ray image interpretation tests,
where images of bags have to be judged whether they contain a prohibited item
or not, not an inconsiderable amount of hits (correctly judged bags as containing a
prohibited item) result from a in fact harmless object. That is, the bags are very well
classiﬁed as dangerous in that they contain prohibited items, however the actual
prohibited items were not detected. Instead, harmless objects are interpreted as
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Table 6.5. Reliability analyses for the X-Ray ORT, X-Ray CAT, and X-Ray BDT. Cronbach’s alpha and
Gutman split half values for Signal-plus-Noise trials (SN) and Noise trials (N) separately. Click Analysis
shows the values based on percent correct according to true hits. Signal Detection shows the values based
on percent correct according to signal detection theory.
SN - Click Analysis SN - Signal Detection N
Alpha Split half Alpha Split half Alpha Split half
ORT .924 .871 .858 .745 .900 .851
CAT .927 .903 .918 .888 .933 .928
BDT .926 .848 .950 .877 .966 .917
being prohibited. As the results indicate, the hit rate as well as the d’ scores decrease
when only true hits are taken into account. The most striking decrease is to be found
for the X-Ray BDT. Here, the decrease is almost 18%. If the uncorrected hit rate or
the uncorrected d’ scores are considered the mean test score is at the same level as
for the X-Ray CAT. However, when only the true hits are included the performance
decreases substantially (whereas the decreases for the X-Ray ORT and the X-Ray
CAT are much smaller and quasi negligible with less than 5%). It seems as if in the
X-Ray BDT the candidates are not able to detect some of the improvised explosive
devices but still assess the bags as dangerous. This is all the more interesting because
the false alarm rate is equal for the X-Ray BDT and the X-Ray CAT (this can be
deducted from the d’ value which is nearly the same for both tests and can also
be conﬁrmed by the data. If d’ and the hit rate are comparable the false alarm
rate must be as well). This implies that the candidates must have some ”feeling”
that an improvised explosive is in the bag though without actually detecting it.
This can be conﬁrmed by the data displayed in Figure 6.10, which show that the
portion of hits that are not true hits, are actually false clicks. This means, candidates
marked some suspicious object in the bag, not hitting the actual IED though. Since
candidates know that in this test only IEDs have to be detected, the probability
that they ”detected” a threat object of another category should be rather small.
The large standard deviations for the X-Ray BDT are replicating ﬁndings of earlier
studies which also found a large increase in IED detection after training, even larger
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than for all other threat categories, and a generally larger standard deviation for
IED detection than for all other threat categories (Koller et al., 2008; Schwaninger
& Hofer, 2004; Schwaninger, Hofer, & Wetter, 2007). These facts indicate large
diﬀerences in the performance of IED detection between the candidates. Schwaninger
and Hofer (2004) and Schwaninger, Hofer, and Wetter (2007) could also show that
the performance increase for IED detection depends on the amount of training in that
more training leads to a larger performance increase. So the large standard deviations
for the X-Ray BDT could have their seeds in the fact that detection performance
of IEDs and its increase is heavily dependent on the amount of training which in
turn can diﬀer remarkably between the candidates, as does the capability of IED
detection. The correlations between the hit rate and the proportion of the true hits
on the hits show that there is no evidence that higher scoring candidates - regarding
hits - are generating more true hits, in relation to their hits, than lower scoring
candidates. Correlations for the X-Ray CAT and the X-Ray ORT are signiﬁcant;
however, in consideration of the small eﬀect size the eﬀect can be neglected (Cohen,
1988). For the IED detection this means that training does not help to increase the
proportion of true hits although the detection performance, when calculated with
uncorrected values, can be increased signiﬁcantly. This leads to the assumption that
training mainly reduces the false alarm rate at this stage.
The correlations between the hit rate and the true hit rate and between the uncor-
rected d’ and the corrected d’, respectively, are large and signiﬁcant. This indicates
that the same thing is measured with the two ways and therefore both ways of anal-
ysis could be used. However, the reliability has to be taken into account. For the
X-Ray ORT and the X-Ray CAT the calculation based on true hits yields higher
correlation coeﬃcients, for Cronbach’s alpha as well as for split-half. But for the X-
Ray BDT, true hit analysis yields lower reliabilities than signal detection analysis.
Interestingly, this is for the test with the largest diﬀerence between hits and true
hits. Although the diﬀerence is rather small and the correlations between hit and
true hit rate and between uncorrected and corrected d’ are large and signiﬁcant,
it seems that for an IED detection test signal detection analysis would be appro-
priate to apply. Since the correlation between the hit rate and the proportion of
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true hits is not signiﬁcant for the X-Ray BDT, the data seems to indicate that even
with training - assuming that candidates achieving a higher hit rate performed more
training - actual detection and identiﬁcation of IEDs is not given for a larger por-
tion of the hits than with little training. Indeed, the percentage of true hits does not
change signiﬁcantly. However, besides reliability also the practical meaning should
be considered.
The discussion about the analysis of test results mainly aﬀects evaluation of certiﬁ-
cation. It apparently makes a diﬀerence in the evaluation if all hits or only true hits
are counted. As mentioned earlier, in the work setting it is mostly kind of an irrele-
vant matter of fact how a hit comes about. The suspicious bag would be opened and
searched and the threat item should then be detected. However, it has to be taken
into account that some items should not be interpreted wrongly. For example, open-
ing a bag based on the suspicion of ﬁnding a knife and instead ﬁnding an IED would
not be in accordance with the rules and regulations. This argument supports also
the deﬁnition of false hits and false clicks as misses. However, a basic decision should
be taken about the importance of true hits and whether to focus on the assessment
of real detection and identiﬁcation competence or rather on eﬀectiveness.
6.5 General discussion
The two experiments of this study showed that it is worthwhile taking a closer
look at the analysis of tests. In Experiment 1 we could show that, depending on
the scoring method, test scores in a multiple-true-false test could be increased. The
lowest test scores were obtained with the MR method and the highest ones with
the MTF scoring. With the MR method a point is awarded only if all response
options of an item are marked correctly in contrast to the MTF scoring, where all
true-false options which were answered correctly are credited evenly. Our ﬁndings
are consistent with the ones of Albanese and Sabers (1988). In short, to assess the
theoretical knowledge using a multiple choice test depending on the area, it has to
be decided if partial knowledge shall be awarded or not. From our point of view it
makes sense to award partial knowledge in the ﬁeld of aviation security. However,
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it has to be considered if speciﬁc questions do not allow for partial knowledge and
should be analyzed diﬀerently. Contrary to Albanese and Sabers (1988) we found no
diﬀerence in the reliability using diﬀerent scoring methods. Further, the inﬂuence of
the instruction on the test scores and reliability was tested. The group which was
informed whether a question had one or more correct options achieved higher test
scores. However, this speciﬁc information led to remarkably lower reliability values.
It can be assumed that high performers can solve an item correctly independent of
the information. Thus, no information diﬀerentiates more across the test candidates
which in turn leads to higher reliability values. In Experiment 2 the inﬂuence of
the analysis method on test scores and reliability measures in diﬀerent image inter-
pretation tests (X-ray screening tests) was investigated. Results showed lower hit
rates and d’ values if aviation security screening oﬃcers had to mark the correct
prohibited item instead of only clicking on the NOT OK button. This decrease was
highest in the X-Ray BDT. Further, reliability values changed diﬀerently. For the
X-Ray ORT and X-Ray CAT reliability values were higher using the true hits in-
stead of the total hits. Contrary results were found for the X-Ray BDT. However,
it has to be mentioned that all reliability values are rather high and the changes
rather small. To summarize, diﬀerent ways of analyzing a test exist and mostly they
generate diﬀerent results, be it in terms of mean scores or in terms of reliability
scores they yield. While a diﬀerent mean score can be taken account of by adjusting
the pass mark which deﬁnes if a candidate passes or fails the test, reliability is an
innate feature of a test. Therefore, it is suggested that a test should be analyzed
with the method that generates the best reliability. Furthermore, the analysis can
focus on diﬀerent aspects of a task. For example, in the case of X-ray image tests for
certiﬁcation of aviation security screening oﬃcers there has to be taken the decision
if candidates are assessed regarding their real detection and identiﬁcation perfor-
mance for threat objects or regarding the eﬃciency their test behavior would imply
at the checkpoint. For multiple choice tests, the diﬀerent scoring methods should be
taken into consideration and it should be decided whether partial knowledge should
be awarded or not. As mentioned earlier, reliability values should always be taken
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into account as only tests with high reliability allow for a fair measurement of the
individual knowledge.

7Applying Angoﬀ Methods in Aviation Security
X-Ray Screening: Can Angoﬀ Methods be
Applied to Airport Security Certiﬁcation Tests?
7.1 Introduction
There are two diﬀerent approaches in deﬁning a standard (i.e., a pass mark) for a
test. The norm-referenced approach is based on already obtained data. That is, the
pass mark is established on the basis of test results obtained by the candidates. It is
decided, for example, that a maximum of 300 candidates can pass the test (e.g., for
an intermediate testing at the University, where the number of allowed students is
restricted). This means that the pass mark is the score which lies between the test
result of the best 300 candidates and the test result of the remaining candidates.
Another means of setting the pass mark can be to take other statistical measures,
for example the mean score minus one standard deviation. In a norm-referenced
approach the pass mark varies depending on the sample. If a candidate passes or
fails the test depends on the norm, that is, the sample he belongs to. This approach
implies that the pass mark cannot be set before applying the test, giving it a slightly
random touch. On the other hand, institutions applying the test can react to situ-
ational conditions. For example at the airport, a certain number of screeners have
to pass certiﬁcation in order to adhere operations. This can be governed by setting
the pass mark accordingly so that, for example, only a certain number of candidates
fail the test. Furthermore, the eﬀort of establishing the pass mark is minimal. The
criterion-referenced approach solves the problem of the normative approach (i.e.,
that the pass mark can only be set after application of the test) by setting a pass
mark without normative data. Here, a pass mark is deﬁned per test on the basis of
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the diﬃculty of the individual items of the test. If a candidate scores higher than
this pass mark, he or she passes the test, independently of how the other candi-
dates in the sample score. One of the criterion-referenced methods is the Angoﬀ
method (Angoﬀ, 1971). According to the Criterion referenced performance standard
setting (2004), the level of performance required for passing a credentialing test
should depend on the knowledge and skills necessary for acceptable performance in
the occupation and should not be adjusted to regulate the number or proportion of
persons passing the test. The pass point should be determined by careful analysis
and judgment of acceptable performance. Due to the relatively simple process of
determining the pass points the Angoﬀ method is probably the most basic form
of the criterion-based standard setting (Khalid & Saeed, 2007). The Angoﬀ method
includes the deﬁnition of a ”minimally competent candidate”, which is usually made
in discussion with the judges. The judges usually are experts in the ﬁeld of the test
topic. Judges in this method are expected to review each test item and a passing
score is computed from an estimate of the probability of a minimally acceptable
candidate answering each item correctly. After discussion and consensus of the char-
acteristics of a minimally acceptable candidate, each judge makes an independent
assessment of the probability for each item that a minimally acceptable candidate
will answer the item correctly. To determine the probability of a correct response
for each item, the judges’ assessments of the items are averaged. Then, these prob-
abilities for all items of the test are averaged to obtain the pass point (Criterion
referenced performance standard setting , 2004). The Angoﬀ method features several
advantages, that is, it is easy to implement, understand, and compute (Berk, 1986).
Besides these advantages, there are also disadvantages of the Angoﬀ method. First,
it assumes that judges have a good understanding of the statistical concepts, and
second, the panelists may lose sight of the students’ overall performance on the as-
sessment due to the focus on individual items, as this method carries an item-based
procedure (Khalid & Saeed, 2007). Furthermore, the continuum of item probabil-
ities tends to result in considerable variability among judges. Many judges have
diﬃculty, deﬁning students who are minimally competent (Berk, 1986). The Angoﬀ
method has undergone many alterations (Berk, 1986). Four of these alterations are
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used in this study: the original Angoﬀ method with and without discussion and the
two-choice Angoﬀ method with and without discussion. The original Angoﬀ method
as proposed by Angoﬀ (1971) requires a number of judges to estimate with which
probability a minimally competent candidate would solve each item of a test. In a
slight modiﬁcation of the original Angoﬀ method, Angoﬀ (1971) proposes that the
judges think of how many of 100 minimally competent candidates would solve the
items instead of the probability of one candidate to solve the items. It is assumed
that this approach is easier to imagine. The ﬁrst alteration is called two-choice An-
goﬀ method (Berk, 1986). The modiﬁcation here consists of restricting the possible
number of answers. The judges just have to say if a minimally competent candi-
date will or will not solve an item instead of giving the probability with which this
candidate will solve the item. Both these approaches can also be applied with dis-
cussion. The judges discuss their diﬃculty estimates with each other after having
given them separately ﬁrst. After the discussion the judges can alter their estimates
if they want. These alterations are called Iterative Angoﬀ method (Berk, 1986) and
Iterative two-choice Angoﬀ method, respectively (Berk, 1986; Cross, Impara, Frary,
& Jaeger, 1984; Jaeger, 1982). In both alterations there is the possibility to provide
the judges with normative data for their discussion. These four versions have been
studied many times regarding written, especially multiple-choice, tests. In this ex-
periment we want to examine if these methods can be applied to X-ray image tests
and if yes, which one is the best, regarding reliability, validity and convenience. X-
ray image tests can be used for certiﬁcation of aviation security screening oﬃcers
and consist of X-ray images of passenger bags which have to be judged regarding
dangerousness of their content. That is, the test items are two-alternative forced
choice items with the responses dangerous (NOT OK) and not dangerous (OK),
respectively.
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7.2 Method
7.2.1 Participants
Twenty-two (seven men) aviation security screeners participated in this study as
judges. They were randomly assigned to one of two groups. All of them were selected
based on their detection performance in X-ray screening. To this end, certiﬁcation
results and TIP1 data were taken into account. All screeners had at least three years
experience on the job.
7.2.2 Materials
To test all four Angoﬀ methods, the X-Ray Competency Assessment Test (X-Ray
CAT) by Koller and Schwaninger (2006) was used. This X-ray image test consists
of 256 X-ray images of passenger bags whereof 128 images include a prohibited
item (e.g., a gun, knife, improvised explosive device (IED), or other threat item like
grenade, etc.). In the test itself images are displayed for 15 seconds on the screen.
Then participants have to decide whether the bag was OK or NOT OK regarding
allowance to be transported on board. Additionally, they have to indicate how sure
they are in their decision by clicking on a 50 point slider. For all bags which were
judged as NOT OK they have to indicate to which of the four categories (gun, knife,
IED, other) the threat item belongs to. For the ﬁrst part of the study in which
participants have to judge each image of the X-Ray CAT we used the computer
program PCQuest. In the second part all X-ray images were projected and printed
out for discussion. The X-Ray CAT was used for certiﬁcation of the aviation security
screeners in 2007.
7.2.3 Procedure
Both Angoﬀ methods (original and two-choice) were explained. A minimally com-
petent candidate was not deﬁned; instead the participants were instructed to focus
1 Threat Image Projection (TIP) automatically inserts images of ﬁctitious threat items into the X-ray
image of passenger bags at the security checkpoint at an airport. TIP performance takes into account
how many of these virtually inserted threat objects are detected by the screening oﬃcer on duty.
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on the performance of two or three minimally competent aviation security screeners
they know, that is, those who would just be suﬃciently capable of doing their job.
They shortly discussed their task and these ”borderline” screeners. Participants were
informed that after their judgment of all items there will be a discussion and that
the goal will be to talk the diﬀerences in their judgments over. Before participants
started they received a short introduction and some exercise trials to familiarize
with the task. Within the ﬁrst part, participants had the possibility to take a short
break if desired. The ﬁrst part of the experiment was conducted computer-based.
Before participants judged each image regarding its diﬃculty to be solved correctly
they had to indicate by themselves whether the bag was OK or NOT OK and how
sure they are in their decision (same as in the test setting). Then they saw the
image again with the prohibited item depicted separately in case the X-ray image
included a prohibited item. One group had to indicate whether a minimally com-
petent screener would judge the X-ray image correctly or not (two-choice Angoﬀ
method, see Figure 7.1), the other group had to indicate with which probability
a minimally competent screener would judge the X-ray image correctly (classical
Angoﬀ method, see Figure 7.2). The latter group was instructed that they should
not take into account guessing probability (which in this case would be 50%), but
use the whole scale (0-100%) for the diﬃculty estimation.
Fig. 7.1. Screenshot of the experimental interface applying the two-choice Angoﬀ method. In a ﬁrst step
participants had to judge each item (left). In a second step the had to decide if a minimally competent
candidate would solve the item or not (right). In case the image contains a threat object it was depicted
separately.
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Fig. 7.2. Screenshot of the experimental interface applying the classical Angoﬀ method. In a ﬁrst step
participants had to judge each item (left). In a second step the had to decide with which probability a
minimally competent candidate would solve the item (right). In case the image contains a threat object it
was depicted separately.
After completing the ﬁrst sequence participants had to relax for at least 30 minutes.
After this break the discussion was started with both groups separately. In this part
participants had to discuss their decisions on each item within their group. To this
end, participants had a look at every test item once again. Pictures were presented in
random order. Participants had to discuss those items where the standard deviation
of their estimates was bigger than the average of the deviations plus one standard
deviation (SD+SDSD < SD). But they could discuss every other item as well. During
the discussion participants were allowed to change their estimates if they wished so
but were not forced to do so. Any changes were recorded. Discussions lasted about
2.5 (classical Angoﬀ method) and 3 (two-choice Angoﬀ method) hours. Neither of
the two groups discussed every item.
7.3 Calculations
First of all, it is important to assess whether the ratings obtained are reliable, that
is, whether there is consistency among raters or not. We have decided to apply two
measures to assess reliability of the ratings, namely Cronbach’s Alpha and intraclass
correlations. Cronbach’s Alpha is a widely recognized measure for the internal consis-
tency of a scale based on the average inter-item correlation. In this case, Cronbach’s
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Alpha as the interrater correlation was calculated as measure of internal consistency
between the ratings of the diﬀerent judges. The formula of Cronbach’s Alpha is
α = (N × r/(1 + (N − 1)× r)
whereas N equals the number of participants and r is the average interitem corre-
lation among the participants, respectively. Intraclass correlation coeﬃcients assess
interrater reliability. A ”two-way mixed model for absolute agreement” was chosen
since raters were deliberately selected and since the aim is to have absolute (not only
relative) agreement of the raters. In a next step, the hit rate (pHit) from the threat
images (”signal plus noise”, SN, i.e., those bags containing a threat object) and the
false alarm rate (pFA) from the non threat images (”noise”, N, i.e., those bags not
containing a threat object) were calculated. (Note that the false alarm rates for the
non threat images were obtained indirectly by subtracting the rating value from one,
since the raters assessed the probability of a correct answer (i.e., correct rejection)
and not a false alarm.) Since it is used in many scientiﬁc publications regarding
X-ray image interpretation competency and during training and testing procedures
we chose to compute the non-parametric performance measure A’ which is based on
pHit and pFA (Pollack & Norman, 1964; Macmillan & Creelman, 1991; see Hofer
& Schwaninger, 2004, for the application of detection theories to X-ray screening),
using the following formula (Grier, 1971):
A′ = 0.5 + [(H − F )(1 + H − F )]/[4H(1− F )]
whereas H is the hit rate and F the false alarm rate. If the false alarm rate is
greater than the hit rate, the equation must be modiﬁed (Aaronson & Watts, 1987;
Snodgrass & Corwin, 1988):
A′ = 0.5− [(F −H)(1 + F −H)]/[4F (1−H)]
The term non-parametric refers to the fact, that the computation of A’ requires no
a priori assumption about underlying distributions. A’ can be calculated when the
validity of the normal distribution and equal variance assumptions of the signal-noise
and noise distribution cannot be veriﬁed.
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7.4 Results
7.4.1 Reliability
Cronbach’s Alpha (see above for details on the calculation) and intraclass correla-
tions were applied on hit rates and false alarm rates. As shown in Tables 7.1 and
7.2, Cronbach’s Alpha was calculated separately for all four methods. Further, scores
were calculated for all images together, as well as for N and SN images only.
Table 7.1. Cronbach’s alpha for the rat-
ings with the classical Angoﬀ method
Classical Angoﬀ All images SN only N only
Without discussion .850 .894 .768
After discussion .949 .946 .952
Table 7.2. Cronbach’s alpha for the
ratings with the two-choice Angoﬀ
method
Two-choice Angoﬀ All images SN only N only
Without discussion .881 .951 .821
After discussion .952 .962 .937
Similarly, intraclass correlation coeﬃcients were calculated separately for all four
methods. It was again distinguished between all images together, all threat images
(SN) separately, and all non threat images (N) separately, as shown in Tables 7.3
and 7.4.
Table 7.3. Intraclass correlation coeﬃ-
cients for the ratings with classical Angoﬀ
method
Classical Angoﬀ All images SN only N only
Without discussion .268 .325 .176
After discussion .591 .574 .609
Table 7.4. Intraclass correlation coeﬃ-
cients for the ratings with the two-choice
Angoﬀ method
Two-choice Angoﬀ All images SN only N only
Without discussion .384 .481 .258
After discussion .641 .694 .566
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7.4.2 Criterion
As a measure of detection performance A’ was calculated for the X-Ray CAT (see
above for details on the calculation). A’ for the classical Angoﬀ method is .833 (SD
= 0.067). For the iterative Angoﬀ method, it is .847 (SD = 0.056), respectively. A’
for the two-choice Angoﬀ method is .811 (SD = 0.098). For iterative, two-choice
Angoﬀ method it is .838 (SD = 0.035), respectively. The mean A’ for all certiﬁed
screeners (n = 764) in 2007 was .898 (SD = .042). With the normative pass mark,
set by the Swiss Federal Oﬃce of Civil Aviation, 5 screeners (1%) failed the test
(Note: the pass mark cannot be published for security reasons). When applying the
criterion-referenced pass marks the failing rate is as follows: with classical Angoﬀ
method 65 screeners (9%) would fail, with iterative Angoﬀ method 86 screeners
(11%) would fail, with two-choice Angoﬀ method 31 screeners (4%) would fail, and
with iterative two-choice Angoﬀ method 65 screeners (9%) would fail the X-Ray
CAT certiﬁcation test.
7.4.3 Correlations
Table 7.5 shows all calculated Spearman correlations. We correlated the average
rating per image assessed by the raters for all four methods with each other and
with the hit rate (for threat images) and the correct rejection rate (for non threat
images) from the X-Ray CAT certiﬁcation test 2007. Signiﬁcant correlations are
depicted in scatter plots in Figures 7.3-7.8.
Table 7.5: Spearman correlations and p-values of average ratings
and CAT certiﬁcation data
All images SN only N only
Average classical Angoﬀ method - r = −.030 r = −.034 r = −.047
Average iterative Angoﬀ method p = .631 p = .704 p = .598
Average two-choice Angoﬀ method - r = .821 r = .879 r = .739
Average iterative two-choice Angoﬀ method p < .001 p < .001 p < .001
Continued on Next Page. . .
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Table 7.5: Spearman correlations and p-values of average ratings
and CAT certiﬁcation data
All images SN only N only
Average classical Angoﬀ method - r = .793 r = .834 r = .739
Average two-choice Angoﬀ method p < .001 p < .001 p < .001
Average iterative Angoﬀ method - r = .004 r = −.077 r = .084
Average iterative two-choice Angoﬀ method p = .943 p = .385 p = .644
Average classical Angoﬀ method - r = .719 r = .802 r = .608
Average iterative two-choice Angoﬀ method p < .001 p < .001 p < .001
Average iterative Angoﬀ method - r = −.099 r = −.141 r = −.056
Average two-choice Angoﬀ method p = .114 p = .112 p = .344
Average classical Angoﬀ method - r = .740 r = .847 r = .602
CAT certiﬁcation test p < .001 p < .001 p < .001
Average iterative Angoﬀ method - r = −.035 r = −.043 r = −.077
CAT certiﬁcation test p = .575 p = .644 p = .390
Average two-choice Angoﬀ method - r = .712 r = .818 r = .569
CAT certiﬁcation test p < .001 p < .001 p < .001
Average iterative two-choice Angoﬀ method - r = .643 r = .775 r = .472
CAT certiﬁcation test p < .001 p < .001 p < .001
7.4 Results 171
Fig. 7.3. Scatter plot of
judges’ averaged estimates of
the probability that a min-
imally competent candidate
will solve a test item, by two-
choice Angoﬀ method be-
fore discussion against classi-
cal Angoﬀ method before dis-
cussion. Each dot represents
a test item.
Fig. 7.4. Scatter plot of
judges’ averaged estimates of
the probability that a min-
imally competent candidate
will solve a test item, by
two-choice Angoﬀ method af-
ter discussion against classi-
cal Angoﬀ method before dis-
cussion. Each dot represents
a test item.
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Fig. 7.5. Scatter plot of
judges’ averaged estimates of
the probability that a min-
imally competent candidate
will solve a test item, by two-
choice Angoﬀ method after
discussion against two-choice
Angoﬀ method before discus-
sion. Each dot represents a
test item. Bigger dots com-
prise more than one item.
Fig. 7.6. Scatter plot of ac-
tual performance values for
each test item in the certi-
ﬁcation against judges’ aver-
aged estimates of the proba-
bility that a minimally com-
petent candidate will solve
a test item by classical An-
goﬀ method before discus-
sion. Each dot represents a
test item.
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Fig. 7.7. Scatter plot of ac-
tual performance values for
each test item in the certi-
ﬁcation against judges’ aver-
aged estimates of the proba-
bility that a minimally com-
petent candidate will solve a
test item by two-choice An-
goﬀ method before discus-
sion. Each dot represents a
test item.
Fig. 7.8. Scatter plot of ac-
tual performance values for
each test item in the certi-
ﬁcation against judges’ aver-
aged estimates of the proba-
bility that a minimally com-
petent candidate will solve a
test item by two-choice An-
goﬀ method after discussion.
Each dot represents a test
item.
Figure 7.9 shows the scatter plot of the diﬃculty estimates in the classical Angoﬀ
method before against after discussion.
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Fig. 7.9. Scatter plot of
judges’ averaged estimates of
the probability that a min-
imally competent candidate
will solve a test item by clas-
sical Angoﬀ method after dis-
cussion against classical An-
goﬀ method before discus-
sion. Each dot represents a
test item.
7.5 Discussion
Both the classical as well as the two-choice Angoﬀ method resulted in good reliabili-
ties (see Tables 7.1 and 7.2). All reliability values are well above .80, except for the N
images in classical Angoﬀ method without discussion. Furthermore, the reliabilities
are in a comparable range for all methods with slightly higher coeﬃcients for the
iterative methods (with discussion). This is all the more the case for the intra-class
correlations (see Tables 7.3 and 7.4), where correlation coeﬃcients before discussion
are rather low and increase substantially after discussion. The natural reason for
this is that after discussion judges mostly harmonize their diﬃculty estimates of
the items and therefore smooth the discrepancies between themselves out. This way,
the agreement of the raters and thus the interrater reliability increases. Since the
Cronbach’s alpha reliabilities are in the same range before and after discussion, the
discussion for setting a standard can be left out as this would save much time. When
comparing the mean A’ detection performance values as obtained with the four dif-
ferent methods there are only marginal diﬀerences. This indicates that on average
all methods result in a comparable mean detection performance - and therefore pass
mark - through the judgment of the single test items. However, if compared with
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the normative pass mark set by the Swiss Federal Oﬃce of Civil Aviation, criterion-
referenced pass marks as obtained through the four Angoﬀ methods in this study
are higher with the eﬀect that more screeners would fail the certiﬁcation test. In the
decision about which pass mark to use the actual purpose of a certiﬁcation would
stand against practical reasons. The actual purpose of a certiﬁcation is to evaluate
the knowledge and skills of practitioners seeking a credential to ensure that employ-
ees meet a desired level of competence (Althouse, 2000; Shimberg, 1981). Practical
reasons however sometimes call for a generous adaptation of the pass mark for the
simple reason of allowing to maintain operations. This implies a careful analysis of
the situation and the requirements before deﬁning a standard setting method and a
pass mark.
As shown in Table 7.5, the estimates resulting from the iterative Angoﬀ method
neither correlate with any other Angoﬀ rating nor with the results of the certiﬁca-
tion test 2007. This could be because the participants in this group adjusted their
estimates after the discussion as follows: For SN trials they normally corrected their
estimates to lower values. And for N trials they raised their ratings in most cases.
In doing this they raised the correct rejection rates and lowered the hit rates (see
Figure 7.9). Consequently, this method cannot be applied to the CAT certiﬁcation
test 2007.
Signiﬁcant correlations were found between the two-choice and iterative two-choice
method, between the classical and the two-choice method, less important between
the classical and iterative two-choice method, and, more important, between the
CAT test results and classical, two-choice, and iterative two-choice method. The
correlation between the item diﬃculty estimates obtained through two-choice and
iterative two-choice method (see Figure 7.5 signiﬁes that the judges did not change
their estimates signiﬁcantly after discussion unlike the judges of the classical An-
goﬀ method group. Prior to the discussion the two groups estimated the test items
rather similarly as indicates the signiﬁcant correlation between the classical and
the two-choice method (see Figure 7.3). As a consequence of these two facts the
correlation between the classical and the iterative two-choice method is signiﬁcant
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as well (see Figure 7.4). Interesting with regards to the normative approach are
the correlations between the Angoﬀ estimates and the actual test results achieved
by over 900 aviation security screeners during certiﬁcation. Except for the iterative
method all correlations were signiﬁcant (see Table 7.5 and Figures 7.6 - 7.8). This
indicates that the judges estimated the diﬃculty of the test items rather similarly to
the actual performance of the normative group. These results qualify both standard
setting approaches as appropriate, the normative approach as well as the criterion-
referenced approach. This means that there is no substantive reason in favor or
against one particular approach regarding statistical measures and the decision on
which method to use to deﬁne a pass mark will have to be based on the advantages
and disadvantages of the two approaches and be taken by each institution individ-
ually. While the eﬀort of setting the pass mark is far smaller with the normative
approach than with the criterion-referenced approach and the normative approach
allows for adaptation of the pass mark to situational circumstances, the psycholog-
ical eﬀect may favor the criterion-referenced approach. Candidates may accept a
criterion-referenced pass mark more easily than a norm-based. They know, if they
achieve a certain minimum score they will pass the test independently of the other
candidates’ scores. This may seem to be fairer. With a criterion-referenced pass mark
all candidates have the chance to pass the test. However, there is also the chance
that all candidates or a major portion fails the test. If the situation does not allow
for more than a certain number of candidates to fail the test the pass mark would
have to be adapted.
If a choice would have to be made on which criterion-referenced approach to choose
in the situation of aviation security screener certiﬁcation tests the results of this
study favor the two-choice Angoﬀ method. The iterative two-choice Angoﬀ method
has the highest reliability but the lowest correlation with the results of the CAT
certiﬁcation test and the classical Angoﬀ method has the highest correlation but
the lowest reliability. Therefore, we suggest using the two-choice Angoﬀ method for
standard setting of this kind of test. It has a high and signiﬁcant correlation with
the results of the certiﬁcation test and a good reliability. Furthermore, as compared
to the classical Angoﬀ method it is easy to apply and understand for the judges.
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However, as mentioned earlier, the reliability diﬀerences between the four methods
are rather small and in this case can primarily used as a decision aid on which
method to use but do not disqualify any method from being used for this purpose.
In summary, it can be said that the Angoﬀ methods are appropriate to use for stan-
dard setting for X-ray image tests. The results obtained in this study indicate that
all methods would result in similar pass marks. Which method should be the ﬁrst
choice - whether it is norm-based or criterion-referenced - depends on the purpose
of the test and the situation.
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